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 Preface      v 
Preface 
This report is the result of my PhD research that I started autumn 1999.  
What is it I am analysing in this project? My entrance to the concept “the 
precautionary principle” has been a curiosity towards the application of scientific 
knowledge in the creation of environmental regulation. I used the concept writing my 
master thesis in the late 1990s, but did so without any deeper understanding of it. My 
master thesis subject was the realisation of endocrine disrupting chemicals as a 
problem and the social response. At that time, it seemed natural that the precautionary 
principle ought be invoked, considering the possible impacts and the number of 
possible hazardous substances. And my investigations indicated that political forces in 
Denmark employed the public attention towards this issue to enforce the 
implementation of the precautionary principle in Denmark.  
When I made the preliminary investigations for this PhD project in 98/99 was my 
primary idea to investigate the nature of risk assessments and its lagging capability of 
providing a frame for the discussion of uncertain or absent knowledge. At the outset I 
believed – and still believe – that policymaking also must take uncertainty to account. 
This widens the task of applying expert knowledge because this standpoint implies 
that expert knowledge not necessarily is enough, and that the framing of the problem 
at hand might be equally important for the policy process as the very specific expert 
knowledge. I gained my momentum for this focus, during my master thesis, working 
with the testing- and regulation-strategies relating to endocrine disrupters.  
During the preliminary process of defining this PhD project I had an aha-experience 
that connected my idea of a critical approach to risk assessments, my insight into 
chemicals regulation and issues, and the precautionary principle. At those days I lived 
in Aarhus, I was just about to finish a six months contract with a consulting 
engineering company, and where working on my PhD proposal and application to 
Aalborg University. From my earlier work at the Danish Board of Technology, I had 
contact with Michael Skou Andersen at the centre for social science research on the 
environment.  Michael suggested that I should look at the precautionary principle in 
Denmark, because, as he put it, even though there were much literature about the 
principle internationally, had it not got any particular attention in Denmark. To me 
that indeed gave sense. First of all, I perceived the principle as a challenge to the 
existing paradigm of risk assessment, and by centring my investigation on this concept 
- it seemed to me - I would obtain an important advantage. My critique of the risk 
assessment paradigm could get a frame with political relevance, and thereby it could 
become more constructive and usable.  
Concurrently, I was investigating the latest trends in the field of chemicals regulation. 
I was especially interested in the problematic of the huge number of non-assessed 
chemicals, and through an employee in the Danish Environmental Protection Agency, 
I obtained insight into the ongoing transformation processes of the European 
Chemicals Policy. At an informal meeting April 1998 in the Environment Council, the 
EU approach to chemicals management had been discussed (UK Presidency, 1998). 
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The initiative to this discussion came from Austria, Denmark, Finland, The 
Netherlands, and Sweden, and it consisted of an critique of the existing Chemicals 
Policy within the European Union, and a suggestion for the development of a 
framework directive for the overall chemicals regulation (KEMI, 1998). What thrilled 
me about these papers was that both in the minutes of the pro-environment EU 
member countries and in the Presidency conclusions, the precautionary principle 
definitely had a role. The minutes on the chemical policy laid down both a call for the 
application of the precautionary principle, and a call for an elaboration of how this 
application of principle were to come about in the EU. The Council conclusions show 
a kind of acceptance of the new principle, and they show the tensions between 
different views on what should be taken into account assessing and managing the risks 
of chemicals. Three aspects was emphasised, and there were differing views on the 
relative importance of these: 1) a soundly based scientific assessment of the risks to 
health and the environment; 2) an analysis of the socio-economic consequences of the 
decision; and 3) the Precautionary Principle.  
To me, the case was clear: I would work with the precautionary principle, viewed as a 
critique or a correction to established practise, with its application in the chemicals 
regulation, and with its relation to conventional risk assessments. But, of course, this 
project could very fast grow immensely big, so I had to delimit the scope. The 
intuitive cut was to limit the scope to Denmark, and that became my choice. But, in 
the same breath, I have to state that to talk about chemicals regulation a sole national 
perspective focus is to limited. Chemicals regulation is an international issue, and no 
government in the world can set up its own regulation independent of international co-
operation, be it OECD, or WTO. There are basically two reasons for this 
interdependency; chemicals are valuable commodities and therefore ‘protected’ by 
free-trade rules, and chemical pollutants all too often travel world-wide, crossing all 
national boarders, overruling all local regulations. Therefore, the delimitation to 
Denmark must be delimitation to a Danish angle on the chemicals regulation. Political 
theorists often talk about a ‘two-level-game’, and this seems to be quite adequate in 
the case of chemicals regulation in Denmark and the EU. Understanding the processes 
at the EU level isolated from processes at the national arenas, and visa versa, can be 
quite troublesome, because these arenas both are connected and very different.  
The upcoming revision of the European chemicals policy constituted an overall 
political frame giving relevance to my project, and that was the first or prime ‘event’ 
that I inspired my project. The process gained seemingly its momentum in the late 
1990’s EU-policymaking, but I assessed that to understand the process would require 
insights that I could not gain through an exclusive international focus. Therefore, I 
intended to bring together both the history of the chemicals regulation at both an 
international European and national Danish levels.  
At the Danish level, the ‘core-events’ are less obvious than at the European level. 
However, there are links between the two levels. Denmark was one of the promoting 
countries, taking initiative to the revision of the established practice of chemicals 
regulation. How can we interpret the national background for the Danish promotion of 
a precautionary principle at the European level? How did it come about to speak about 
pp in Denmark? The overall questions are as follows. What is the history of the 
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outspoken precautionary principle in Denmark? Was the precautionary principle 
manifest in early environmental regulation and especially in chemicals regulation? 
What events and processes in Denmark could I point to as important for the 
appropriation of the precautionary principle?  
At the outset of my research, I had some preliminary ideas of answers to some if these 
questions. Interviewing a political secretary of one of the political parties in 
parliament, I had the sense that the issue of endocrine disrupting chemicals had been 
used strategically to enhance the meaning and use of the precautionary principle in the 
parliamentary debates on chemicals regulation in the mid 1990s. In the early 1990s 
Environmental Minister Lone Dybkjær was seemingly one of the first to invoke the 
precautionary principle in a specific case on plant growth retardants. This case 
involves different and conflicting testing rationales, institutionalised in separate 
organisations.  
That was my point of departure. What comes next is what the thoughts became. 
 
During the years of study, I have had a crucial support from my two supervisors at 
Aalborg University, Professor Andrew Jamison and Professor Per Christensen, in 
shape of inspiring discussions, profound criticism, and acknowledgement of my ideas, 
which all are indispensable necessities when working on this type of long solo-
projects. 
I am indebted to numerous people, but most of all to my wife who have given me 
more space than I could possibly expect, our two daughters who was with us in the 
UK during my ‘PhD-sabbatical’ in Sussex, and our little son who was born just about 
the date I formally should have finished the job.  
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Summary  
The precautionary principle is a concept that has taken a central place as one of the 
guiding principles for the European environmental policy. The shaping of this concept 
is examined in relation to the development of chemicals regulation in Denmark and 
Europe. The report documents my journey into the world of precaution in five parts. 
The first part introduces my approach and my problem definition.  
In the second part, I have outlined and synthesised the theoretical basis for my study. I 
have based the study on a theoretical approach that combines a discourse theoretic 
understanding of policy processes and a social constructivist approach to the shaping 
of technology. These two theoretical approaches is synthesised into an analytical 
approach that is sensitive to the combined effect of discourse and technology for the 
shaping of policies and actual practises. The first central concept in this approach is 
discourse coalitions that are combined of a storyline or a set of storylines, of actors 
and actor-groups who refer to these storylines, and the practises through which the 
actors constitutes their affiliation to the discourse coalition. The second central 
concept is knowledge frame that characterises the communalities within a certain 
approach to a specific technological problem.  
In the third part, I start exploring the precautionary principle, which I do in two steps 
and without specific hindsight to chemicals or regulation of chemicals. First, I draw a 
general picture of the genesis of the principle as a policy concept from a basic 
common meaning, and I analyse the use of the principle in scientific writing. 
Secondly, I analyse the explicit references to the principle in Danish written media 
debate. I do this to establish an overview of the issues linked to the precautionary 
principle in public debate and to outline the diversity of these issues. The issues are 
divided up in six different categories ranging from chemicals and chemicals 
regulation, over food-related issues to discrete uses such as September 11th. The 
changing use of the precautionary principle is also identified and is contextualised 
with changes in the political settings. It is a general characteristic of the issues’ 
affiliation to the spoken precautionary principle are like the relation between the 
iceberg and the visible iceberg. The precautionary principle is most often used as a 
‘tag’ that characterises the case; and the specific cases may therefore very well be 
discussed in length without the mentioning of the precautionary principle. However, 
the analysis do also indicate that the precautionary principle, as concept, enhance the 
discussion of uncertainties in contrast of certainties. I use the analysis to qualify the 
case choice of the first in depth-analysis of the precautionary principle in the 
following fourth part. The chosen case, straw-shortening chemicals, demarcates the 
first explicit use of the precautionary principle in Denmark, which also intersected 
with the international negotiations over the principle in relation to the preparations of 
the Rio Declaration.  
The fourth part is devoted the analysis of chemicals regulation, which I do in two 
steps.  In this section, I leave the explorative approach followed in the previous section 
in favour for the analytical framework outlined in section two. The first step, an in-
depth analysis of the case, show that the practises of a wide range of involved actors 
 Summary      xi 
of a precautionary character long before the Minister for the Environment in 1990 
referred explicitly to the principle. The case is particularly interesting for me as it 
involves a (sometimes heated) debate over what types of tests are valid. The case has 
the advantage of being nationally isolated, which results in a rather intense and deep 
debate that eases the analyst’s task. The case shows the multi-layered nature of both 
the precautionary principle and that of environmental policy-making, and how both 
institutions and rules are put into use to re-establish the order that was threatened. 
Specifically, the case gives a hint to the interrelation between national and 
international regulation of chemicals, which is taken up in the second half of part four 
where I focus at the international and especially European development of a regime 
for chemicals regulation. My second step analysing chemicals regulation builds on 
three themes that reaches back to my initial interest for the ongoing revision of the 
European chemicals regulation and which makes out the last of the themes. The two 
first themes are the development of both national and international regulatory 
responses to chemicals perceived as problems and the development of a chemicals 
critique. It is demonstrated that the worries and problems that eventually lead to the 
initiation of European revision of the chemicals regulation in the late 1990s was 
present in the Danish discussions in the 1970s, and that the revision is at risk of 
enclosing much of the uncertainties connected to the assessment and management of 
Chemicals. 
The fifth part concludes the project, and points to the need for vivid debate at all levels 
including scientific approaches and public deliberation as a necessary precondition for 
a real application of the precautionary principle.  
 xii      Resume  
Resume 
Dette projekt analyserer forsigtighedsprincippet i fem dele. I den første del gennemgår 
jeg det analyserede problem og tilgangen til problemløsningen. I den anden del 
udarbejder jeg mit teoretiske udgangspunkt for analysen med afsæt i diskursanalyse og 
teknologianalyse. I tredje del analyserer jeg forsigtighedsprincippet på et generelt 
niveau, dels på et begrebsniveau, dels i den konkrete anvendelse i danske aviser. I den 
tredje del analyseres dels den første anvendelse af forsigtighedsprincippet i dansk 
sammenhæng, dels opbygningen af det eksisterende regime for kemikalieregulering 
samt dets pågående revision i Europæisk regi. I den femte del konkluderes og det 
understreges at der er behov for åben og aktiv debat på alle niveauer som en 
forudsætning for en reel anvendelse af forsigtighedsprincippet.  
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1 Project Description 
1.1 Introduction: roots and contemporary modes of the 
precautionary principle 
Fundamentally, the precautionary principle is a political principle that has been 
introduced as the antithesis of the, in many ways dominating, principle of scientific 
burden of proof (Weale, 1992: 81). In the policy context, the principle of precaution 
argues that policy makers will sometimes have to decide on action even if there is no 
scientific evidence of causation. 
The precautionary principle takes seemingly its point of departure from the changing 
social conceptions about the appropriate roles of science, economics, ethics, politics, 
and the law in pro-active environmental protection and management (O'Riordan & 
Cameron, 1994: 12).  
The principle of precaution raises important questions about the relation between 
science and policy formation, and it has relation to the dilemma between pursuing 
strategies of growth, competition, and strategies of sufficiency and fairness.  
Paradoxically, the threat the principle poses against what might be termed 
“technocracy” is probably also the characteristic that makes it attractive or necessary 
for the ‘technocracy’. In this sense, the precautionary principle is useful as the 
guarantor that may serve to regain the lost confidence in the political and scientific 
governance in society, a confidence that has been lost e.g. in cases such as the BSE 
and the dioxin-food scandals. 
The roots of the precautionary principle are connected to the emergence of the 
environmentalist discourse that emerged during the 1960s and 1970s. Central texts are 
Silent Spring, The Closing Circle, and The Limits to Growth (Carson, 1962; 
Commoner, 1971; Meadows, 1973). All are references that in their specific ways are 
related to specific discussions: Carson to the critique of man’s destruction of nature 
through unnecessary employment of chemical technologies, Commoner links between 
the environmental crisis and the social systems, and Meadows by mediating a concern 
from the business segment i.e. the Club of Rome.  
From being a minor argument of a critical movement, the concept today has been 
taken up by policy elites in most industrial countries, is now an integral part of the 
language in the EU-bureaucracy, and has become a central argument of the 
environmental NGOs.  
This process of internalising the principle of precaution coincides with the narrative of 
the so-called ecological modernisation. According to Maarten Hajer, the principle is a 
key “story-line”, structuring the discourse of ecological modernisation (Hajer, 1995: 
67). A major component in ecological modernisation is the attempt to merge the 
antagonistic relation between environmental protection and economic development; 
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the trade off between economic growth and environmental protection was abolished – 
at least at the conceptual level (Weale, 1992: 31-2). The major milestones in this 
process were the Brundtland report in 1987, the Rio conference in 1992, and the 
Kyoto protocol in 1997.  
1.2 Motivation: Why Precautionary Principle and Chemicals 
Policy? 
Firstly, chemicals are an old focal point for the use of so-called technical fix’s – pests 
needs pesticides, unclean drinking water needs chlorine, burning plastics needs 
brominated flame retardants – all examples of highly reactive chemicals with powerful 
innate capabilities that have both desirable function and destructive side effects.   
Chemicals are also a traditional focal point for the environmental critique that with 
Rachel Carson became a contributing factor in institutional reform, legislation, and 
regulation, and for the basis for social activism (Carson, 1962: 35-42, Jamison & 
Eyerman, 1994: 101). 
Thirdly, there are many symptoms of crisis in the existing regimes for chemical 
regulation. A clear indicator of this is the fact that the European chemicals policies are 
undergoing a profound revision, leading to a proposal to be presented by the 
beginning of the year 2001 (EC Commission, 1998; EC Council, 1999). Explanations 
to this crisis may be both new understandings of ‘toxicity’ triggered by the problem 
posed by industrial chemicals with endocrine disrupting properties, the apparent 
shortcomings of the current chemicals legislation, and to receding public confidence in 
the authorities handling of technological risks.  
1.3 Problem definition 
Within the extensive revision process of the EU chemicals policy, the precautionary 
principle plays a central role. It is therefore my thesis that the chemical area probably 
will have a conclusive importance for the realisation of the precautionary principle. In 
addition, the ongoing process can be viewed as a test as to whether society is capable 
to manage what the German Sociologist Ulrich Beck has called the transition from 
industrial society to risk society. 
Thus, the main questions of this study are: 
• How has the critique of the societal use of chemicals - and the societal 
acceptance of this critique - lead to policy changes? 
• What role does the precautionary principle play in these policy changes and 
negotiations? 
Conceptualising the precautionary principle: 
• What are the intellectual and conceptual roots of the precautionary principle? 
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• How are the precautionary principle reflected in public debate? 
Looking at the chemicals policy:  
• What is the history of the chemical regulation in Denmark? 
• What issues, other than chemicals, connect at the Danish agenda to the 
precautionary principle?  
• How does the precautionary principle connect to chemicals regulation in 
Denmark?  
• What role does the precautionary principle play in the ongoing discussions 
about how to regulate chemcials? 
Looking at the chemicals policy “from below”: 
• How are the perceived problems tackled, concerning ‘scientificallity’, testing 
strategies, and employment of ‘new’ actors?  
1.4 Precautionary Principle and Chemicals Regulation 
The academic discussions on the precautionary principle have flourished mainly since 
the inscription of the principle in the Rio declaration. A number of books and articles 
discussing the principle from various points of views have been published. The 
discussion of the precautionary principle may be divided in two main themes. The first 
theme is the principle as a legal principle, and the second is the principle as a directive 
on how to implement environmental policy, which especially relates to the idea of risk 
assessments.  
Furthermore, it is important to notice that there does not exist a definitive definition of 
the precautionary principle, and that the perceptions of the concept has been changed 
and are changing. What today may be ment by the  precautionary principle might have 
been indicated differently in other times or at other places. This leads to some 
differences in the opinions about where the concept first was used and implemented. 
In the US for instance, the Precautionary Principle has been applied in various ways in 
decisions about health, safety, and the environment for about 25 years, according to 
US observers (Ashford, 1999: 198; Bodansky, 1994), even though the principle has 
not been used in the literal sense. Recently, Sandin analysed 19 different formulations 
of the precautionary principle, pointing at critical differences in how the principle is 
interpreted (Sandin, 1999: 902-5). 
Most research on chemicals policy has been made in the U.S. or in the comparison 
between U.S. an Europe (see Bosso, 1987; Brickman, Jasanoff, & Ilgen, 1985), and 
has had a very empirical focus. This may very well be due to the major differences 
between US and European policy-cultures. In the U.S. the conflicts are very open and 
characterised by clashes, where the European style is much more characterised by 
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close connections between the state and strong interest groups (Brickman, Jasanoff, & 
Ilgen, 1985: 23, 300, 307). 
1.5 Approaching the Analytical Framework 
What kind of analytical tools do I need? I must establish that I have no intention to 
apply a specific theoretical understanding. For me, theory is the tool that should be 
adapted to the empirical case, and not vice versa. At that point, the theory should give 
a deeper and nuanced insight into the case, its implications, and the world (!).  
The first and most important question is the following: for what do I need my tools? In 
this project, I am studying the application of the precautionary principle in chemicals 
regulation in Denmark and to some extent in the European Union. It is not the entire 
European chemicals regulation that I put under scrutiny, but rather the interplay 
between the Danish and the European level. Therefore, it is the European chemicals 
regulation, as I see it in the Danish perspective that is part of my investigation. This is 
immensely important: Danish chemical regulation is most of all about international 
and especially European chemical regulation. In the following, I give an account of 
my approach to the subject.  
In the following three chapters, I develop my analytical framework. At the outset I 
have two basic requirements the framework should fulfil and these relates to each 
other as two Chinese boxes. The outer box is the concept and its interpretations, and 
inner the box is the appropriation, diffusion, transformation, translation and mutations 
of the concept. Already with this metaphor, it seems if the two requirements are 
intertwined, as the outer box is empty without the concrete contents of the inner box. 
I use a discourse analytical approach as inspiration to the outer box, and a modified 
version of the SCOT approach is the inner box. In the following two chapters are these 
theoretical inspirations discussed, and in a concluding theoretical chapter do I outline 
my theoretical and analytical framework. 
The overall frame of the study can be termed with the idea of processes of ecological 
transformations (see Hajer, 1998: 35, Jamison, 2000), and the developments of the 
chemicals policy and the actualisation of the precautionary principle are followed 
within this frame.  
The precautionary principle is conceptualised as a boundary object (or concept) that 
enables transfer, transformation, and mutation of values, ideas, and objectives crossing 
realms of quite different discourses. Policy principles – or rather: policy doctrines – 
whether “substitutions principle”, “polluter pays principle”, or “precautionary 
principle”, need institutions to operationalise them. I interpret institutions in an open 
way, i.e. as building blocks of society, e.g. as participation, scientific research, or 
monitoring and assessment.  
The analytical framework of this project draws on two different albeit somewhat 
intersecting types of theories; namely discourse theories, and social theories of 
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technology. In the following, I briefly describe the two fields and their application in 
the present project.  
Central for my study is Maarten Hajer’s Foucault inspired work (1995) – The Politics 
of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernisation and the Policy Process. This 
work bridges the analysis of policy processes with a discourse approach. Further, the 
discursive approaches are important for the conceptualisation of the intellectual roots 
of the precautionary principle, where the recent work by Dryzek and Darier (Dryzek, 
1997; Darier, 1999) gives a good point of departure. The precautionary principle 
really gets interesting, when the black box of technology is opened, because the 
principle should open up for alternative technological trajectories, and social futures 
(Schwarz, 1992: 18-19; Stirling, 1999: 29-30). Therefore, a deeper understanding of 
technology and technological development is important for the analysis of the use, 
interpretation, and consequences of the precautionary principle. 
Furthermore, the discussion of the precautionary principle is linked with discussions 
about revising the conceptual understanding of risk assessments, as well as the 
techniques and technologies involved in the appraisal of risks posed by technologies.  
The theoretical framework of SCOT (social construction of technology) developed by 
Bijker (e.g. Bijker, 1987; Bijker, 1995), and ANT (actor-network theory) developed 
by Callon, Latour, and colleagues (e.g. Callon, 1987; Latour, 1987; Latour, 1987) are, 
together with theories of technological systems (e.g. Hughes, 1986; Hughes, Bijker, & 
Pinch, 1987) the sources that I draw on in the analysis of the specific practises that 
constitutes .  
The research may be characterised as action-oriented planning research. This approach 
has a characteristic ‘engineering’ quality by being problem-driven, rather than 
disciplinary-driven. Intervention in the ongoing processes is an important part of the 
research. The intervention comes partly by communicating with central actors and by 
performing participatory observation, partly by submitting analysis to actors, 
reflecting actual strategies and events. Doing this requires intellectual and technical 
engagement in the field of study. 
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2 Discourse analysis and the making of 
environmental policy  
To me, discourse is two things. First, it defines an abstract model of society with the 
central thesis that speech and linguistic constructions has to be regarded as a condition 
for social actions as well as for the effects of social actions. The discourse marks out a 
set of rules that for the time being excludes other rules of the game. The model also 
postulates that linguistic actions are co-determining for how social reality is taking 
form, and how social reality change. Thus, social stability and social change has a 
linguistic ‘condition’ d’être. Not raison d’être, as it is enough to state the linguistic as 
a condition for the social – the social cannot be explained without (great) attention to 
text or rather how phenomenon are codified (see Neumann, 2001: 23), but either can 
the social be solely derived from text1.  
Secondly, discourse is an analytical tool; with which one identifies different 
discourses in the historical reality. The discourse concept can be used very different 
levels of abstraction, different locus, and crossing different institutional borders; and 
discourse analysis may be targeted at both the micro and the macro level. 
Nevertheless, how a concrete discourse is to be identified, discourse analysis (in the 
sense Laclau and Mouffe has given it) does not give any detailed directions to. It is 
here that I try turning to Hajer. 
2.1 Hajer’s discourse-analytical approach to the study of 
environmental politics  
One of my sources of inspiration for the analysis of environmental policy discourse is 
Marten Hajer’s book ‘The Politics of environmental discourse’, and the concepts of 
story lines, discourse coalitions, and the related understanding of ‘discourse’ as a 
strategic possibility. In the book, he presents an analytical approach – a discourse-
analytical framework – that are based upon the assumption that environmental 
discourse is fragmented and contradictory, and that we yet somehow distil seemingly 
coherent problems out of this. Hajer argues that to investigate this, a discourse 
approach is very useful, not just to examine the discussions of the ecological crisis, but 
all those factors that influence the way in which we conceive the environmental 
problematique (Hajer, 1995: 1-2). He further argues, “that the developments in 
                                                     
1 I follow Laclau and Mouffe that maintain what could be called a guarded or precautious 
realism. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, they discuss the relation between discurse 
analysis and relism: “The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has 
nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism 
opposition. An erthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly extists, in the sense 
that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But wheater their specificity as objects 
is constituted in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of God’, depends 
upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not that they could constitute 
themselves as objects outside any discursive condition of emergence” (Laclau & Mouffe, 
2001: 108) 
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environmental politics critically depend on the specific social construction of 
environmental problems”.  
Hajer takes the discourse approach of Michel Foucault as a point of departure, and 
modifies, especially with inspiration from Davies (Billig) and Harré, to add a greater 
sensitivity towards social interaction, and ease the possibility of less pinioned actors, 
capable of some kind of action.  
Hajer understands discourse as a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and 
categorisations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of 
practices through which meaning is given to physical and social realities (Hajer, 1995: 
60). In the following, I unfold Hajer’s approach and some of its qualifications in more 
detail, and return in the end of the second subsection to his idea of discourses and its 
relation to institutions. In the succeeding third subsection, I elaborate the two middle 
range concepts, story lines and discourse coalitions, which take centre stage in Hajer’s 
approach to discourses and institutions in the analysis of environmental politics 
2.1.1 Levels of discourse analysis 
In his framework, Hajer distinguishes between two levels or understandings of what 
discourse means, and in the same movement, he underlines the importance of 
combining them. The first level relates to a social science understanding, where 
discourse analysis primarily aims to analyse why a particular understanding of a 
problem at some point gains dominance and is seen as authoritative, while other 
understandings are marginalised. The second level draws on the common-sense 
understanding of discourse as ‘discussion’, or the actual mode of talking, but 
elaborates this understanding from a social scientific point of view. Hajer points at the 
context and content of speech as important; the discourse as internally related to social 
context, which gives regularities and variations in speech or ‘text’ to examine, and on 
the other hand, discourse as content, which gives ensembles of ideas, concepts, and 
categorizations to analyse. 
By combining these approaches to a rather broad concept, he defines discourse as a 
“specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, 
reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which 
meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer, 1995: 44). In this way, the 
discourse concept comes to embrace both scientific paradigms in the Kuhnian 
understanding as a specific matrix of practices, inclusive professional terminology and 
other kinds of sub-cultural languages, such as that of radical environmentalists, as well 
as the more abstract meta-level discourse concept that Michel Foucault developed, and 
which is more out of reach of the actors. 
2.1.2 Introducing the approach; the notion of story lines 
An important issue is how discourses work. It is the ’small’ and less conscious 
practises, techniques, and mechanisms that to a certain degree determine how the 
larger institutional systems actually work. This idea about the importance of ‘micro-
powers’ originates from Foucault that criticised the traditional political theory for 
giving too much attention to the institutions, and too little to these smaller practises. 
Foucault would instead break down the large discourse down into a multiplicity of 
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component discourses that were produced and reproduced through a whole array of 
practices in various institutional contexts (Hajer, 1995: 47). A consequence of this 
worldview is that it becomes problematic to see and understand history and 
institutional developments as continual processes. History should rather be understood 
in the light of the relations and interdependencies between discourses. In my 
understanding, this compares to the idea of reality being contingent; things could have 
been different, and the future is not determined.  
Hajer stresses the importance of Foucault’s theoretical work for the analysis of policy 
discourses and their creation. The strength of doing this lies in the analysis of 
discursive practises and the co-evolution and fusion of discourses, notably the notions 
of  ‘tactical polyvalence of discourses’2 and ‘polymorphous interweaving of 
correlations’3. 
This given, Hajer presents two ‘corrections’ to Foucault’s theory that aims at making 
the approach more operational for the analysis of environmental politics. Hajer’s 
theoretical project is to bridge the abstract work of Foucault with the study of concrete 
political events, and the mean is to relate the interaction between discourses to the role 
of individual strategic action in a non-reductionistic way (Hajer 1995: 52).  
The first correction gives the actor more manoeuvre space, and focuses at the 
argumentative interaction as a key moment in discourse formation. The second 
correction regards social change and permanence, and gives like the first correction; 
occasion to directions of what kinds of analytical strategies might be pursued in the 
analysis of environmental policy formation. The corrections leads to the introduction 
of the ‘middle range concepts’ story lines and discourse coalitions, which links 
discourse analysis with the analysis of individual strategic action. In this subsection, I 
introduce the first concept, story lines, and some of the basic assumptions that Hajer 
use to ground his argumentative discourse analytical approach.  
In the argumentative interaction politics is conceived of as a struggle for discursive 
dominance or hegemony in which actors try to secure support for their definition of 
reality. Therefore is the capability of making a pursuing argument is at centre stage, 
and the concepts Logos, Ethos, and Pathos from rhetoric are important. In this game, 
the dynamics is shaped around three factors (Hajer, 1995: 54, 59-60): 
Credibility is a necessity for the actors to believe in the subject positioning they are 
given in a discourse, and it is a precondition for the actor’s acceptance of the 
implicated structuralised subject positions. 
Acceptability requires the positioning to appear attractive or necessary. 
Trust refers to the fact that uncertainty or insecurity can be suppressed if the speaker 
(institution or person) manage to establish authority or confidence, e.g. by referring to 
its or her impeccable record, or by the practise through which a given definition of 
                                                     
2 Hajer, 1995: 50 
3 Foucault 1975, Discipline and Punish: 58 in Hajer, 1995 
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reality was achieved, e.g. by showing what sort of deliberations were the basis of a 
given claim. 
Strategically used, these factors can become the ability to convince with logics, the 
speakers reputation, and the speakers strategy with respect to historical positioning 
and identification.  
In the actual dialogue, the discourse analysis examines the boundaries between clean 
and dirty; morality and efficiency; or how specific framings leaves certain elements to 
appear as unquestionable or inevitable, while other elements are abandoned as 
problematic (Hajer, 1995: 54). 
In the actual practises of communication, Hajer point to the potential of the rhetorical 
approach to inform the analyses of the modern bureaucratic ‘discursive styles’: “[...] 
The rhetorical approach sensitizes research to the effects of ‘categorization’ according 
to which a particular issue is processed as just another element of a general category, 
or of ‘particularizing’, where the uniqueness of a case is emphasized.” (Hajer, 1995: 
54). Hajer continues. “To deconstruct a policy discourse and find that it is to be 
understood as the unintended consequence of an interplay of actions is one thing, more 
interesting is to observe how seemingly technical positions conceal normative 
commitments, yet more interesting still is to find out which categories exactly fulfilled 
that role, i.e. how this effect could occur and which course of affairs is furthered in 
this way.”  
The important aspect of this correction is the extended focus at the subject’s 
involvement in the production and transformation of discourse.  
The second correction Hajer introduces to Foucault’s notion of discourses considers 
the idea of stability and change. Hajer aims at dealing with the problem of the actor 
being ‘caught’ by the discourse as the notion of discourse is being outlined by 
Foucault. To do this, he takes the position that discourses are being reproduced by 
sequences of speech situations (which does not differ from the position of Foucault). 
Where Hajer probably diverts from Foucault is in the workability of discourses, and 
thereby the importance of speech and speech situations for the change and alterations 
of discourse. However, the resulting conclusion is in line with Foucault: “Rules, 
distinctions, or legitimate modes of expression, only have meaning to the extent that 
they are taken up. It implies that the rules and conventions that constitute the social 
order have to be constantly reproduced and reconfirmed in actual speech situations, 
whether in documents or debates. Consequently, the power structures of society can 
and should be studied directly through discourse.” (55) From this Hajer draws the 
following consequence for research of politics and policy making:  
“Analysing interpersonal communication thus becomes much more relevant. Analysing 
policy papers becomes important even if they do not include ‘hard’ new proposals or 
legislation. It becomes imperative to examine the specific idea of reality or of the status 
quo as something that is upheld by key actors through discourse. Likewise, it becomes 
essential to look at the specific way in which appositional forces seek to challenge these 
constructs. Discourse analysis, then, is not only essential for the analysis of subject 
positions but also for ‘structure positionings’ (referring to which structural elements can 
  Discourse analysis and the making of environmental policy      27 
be changed, and what institutions remain to be seen as fixed or permanent).” (Hajer, 
1995: 55-56) 
As with Foucault, Hajer’s actors yet seem to be caught between subject and structure. 
The structural determination of the actor is loosened, but it has not disappeared. In the 
discursive processes of reproduction and transformation, the actor is not completely 
free, but – as holders of specific subject positions – entangled into specific nets of 
meaning. Hajer uses the concept of story lines to conceptualise the tension between 
the influence of routinised understandings, and the possibility for the specific actors 
the exercise an – at least theoretical – choice between the available sets of practices. A 
story line becomes a generic type of a story that allows actors to draw on various 
discursive categories that make sense to certain specific physical or social phenomena. 
The key function of the story line is to suggest a (simplifying) unity and clarity in the 
otherwise staggering variety of discursive component parts of the problem at hand. 
The underlying assumption is that people do not draw on complete and coherent 
systems of discursive elements (typically such will not even be present). Rather, it is 
assumed, the interpretation is formed with reference to story lines. In this way, story 
lines play a key role for the positioning of subjects and structures, and Hajer argues;  
“Political change may therefore well take place through the emergence of new story-lines 
that re-order understandings. Finding the appropriate story-line becomes an important 
form of agency.” (Hajer, 1995: 56) 
Again, it is important to stress that this approach does not imply actor voluntarism, as 
the action of positioning not necessary is conscious. The positioning may just be “the 
way one talks” on this sort of occasion (Hajer, 1995: 57). Therefore, the routinised 
forms of discourse express a form of sustained power relation that is effective exactly 
because it does not imply actual confrontations. On the other hand, the actor can be 
conscious and may succeed in breaking with the dominating discursive structures. The 
discursive challenge consists in withstanding the routinised categories, or – even more 
powerful – to create new combinations within established discursive structures or 
systems. This corresponds to the discoursing subjects exploitation of what Foucault 
has called the ‘tactical polyvalence of discourse’.  
This makes this approach particular interesting for the study of environmental politics. 
If we take environmental movements as an example, a persistently unsettled issue is 
the dilemma between reasoning within the terms and rationales outlined by authorities, 
and insisting at developing an independent form for setting up the argument. On the 
one hand will the arguments be heard, maybe taken into account, but will by following 
the rationales of the sovereign be tame and tractable, and on the other hand may the 
arguments be radical and critical, but will not be heard. The dilemma stands between 
inclusion and de-radicalization – in worst-case co-option – on the one side, and 
sovereignty – in worst-case exclusion and isolation – on the other. In practise, there 
often exists a kind of division of labour between different parts of the environmental 
movement, such that different groupings take different positions, and thereby ensure 
broadness in the critique of, and interaction with, authorities and the public. 
To argue against the routinised categories is in the political reality the same as arguing 
against the institutions that are based on the “specific, structures, cognitive 
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commitments” (Hajer 1995: 57). This may cause the discursive interaction to appear 
as fragmented and non-intelligent with the participants in blind, fixated positions, 
thwarting reflexive debate, e.g. when a non-governmental actor deny the terms set by 
a governmental actor and emphasise the importance of the availability of alternative 
discourses. Hajer points to a disciplinary force of discursive practice, which often will 
be at work, as the implicit assumption that subsequent speakers will answer within the 
same discursive frame. When the speaker refuses to fall into line, the discussion 
becomes divided on different and perhaps incompatible discursive frames, as even 
challengers of the prevailing discursive frame will be expected to position their 
contribution in terms of known categories. 
2.2 Hajer’s conceptual framework  
On this basis, Hajer develops an approach for the analysis of discourses in a political 
context, which resembles the structure-actor relationship as pointed out by Giddens (se 
Giddens, 1984).  
“My ‘argumentative’ approach focuses on the constitutive role of discourse in political 
processes as described above and allocates a central role to the discoursing subjects, 
although in the context of the idea of duality of structure. Social action originates in 
human agency of clever, creative human beings but in a context of social structures of 
various sorts that both enable and constrain their agency. The transformational model of 
social reality then maintains that society is reproduced in this process of interaction 
between agents and structures that constantly adjusts, transforms, resists, or reinvents 
social arrangements.” (Hajer, 1995: 58). 
Compared with Giddens structuration theory, Hajer’s approach seems to avoid the 
pitfall associated with Giddens’ concepts of recursiveness and rules that makes the 
analysis of societal stability more accessible than the analysis of change (see also 
Mortensen, 19914). Hajer’s project resembles that of Giddens in the sense that they 
both work with the problem of inconsistency between structure and actor. However, 
where Giddens abandon the traditional structure concept and redefines it with 
concepts such as social practice, the latter’s rule-character, ‘recursivity’ and ‘duality 
of structure’, does Hajer instead - especially by drawing on Foucault - aim at changing 
the perception of actor and subject concepts. This is probably the most important 
reason why Hajer escapes this pitfall. The implicit and rather radical critic of the 
traditional actor and structure perspectives that follows with Foucault’s discourse 
analytical approach make actors become socially constituted social actors who in a 
wide-ranging sense are enrolled in a social context. At the outset this context has to be 
interpreted as more encompassing than the actual face-to-face relations those actors in 
the immediate situation are a part of. In line with this, it is my assessment that Hajer’s 
framework is developed along a structure concept that allows a greater degree of 
systems complexity, unpredictability, and creativity, than more traditional structure- 
and systems-concepts do. Furthermore, it may be noted, that where Giddens aims at 
developing a general theory for understanding structure-actor relations, does Hajer 
                                                     
4 For a extensive critical discussion of Giddens, Mortensen refer to Held & Thompson (eds.) 
(1988). Social theory of modern societies: Anthony Giddens and his critics, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
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aim at developing operational concepts for the specific analysis of environmental 
politics, and they may therefore not easily be compared. 
Hajer’s approach gives a comprehensive attention to the actual interaction. In his 
conceptual framework, there exists a substantial interaction between linguistic 
structures and the development of preferences. Language as a specific communicative 
practice is an inseparable part of reality that partly shapes the interpretation of 
interests and preferences. Interests are – in other words – seen as intersubjectively 
constituted through discourse. Discourse, therefore, is utterly important for processes 
that involve political change, argues Hajer. In the argumentative approach, politics and 
policy making are seen as struggles for hegemony, where the actors seek support and 
stability for their respective worldviews and specific interpretations of reality. The 
important implication of this approach is that the emergences of new policy discourses 
like ecological modernisation in Hajer’s case, and the precautionary principle in my 
case, may eventually “alter the individual perception of problems and possibilities and 
thus create space for the formation of new, unexpected political coalitions.” (Hajer 
1995: 59) 
Hajer does thus combine a cognitive and a social constructive approach: Arguments 
can convince because of some property they have – e.g. plausibility – that 
countervailing ideas lack, but the plausibility is the product of persuasion, which is not 
a purely cognitive process (Hajer, 1995: 60). The cognitive and the social are therefore 
intertwined and inseparable. 
The point is that the processes are social and takes place in a context of existing 
institutional practises, and this derives certain tasks for the analyst. One must examine 
which institutional practices support the existing discursive dominance, and what and 
how certain claims are furthered. In this sense, the institutional arrangements are 
preconditions for the discourse formation. Reversed, the institutions cannot function 
without the discursive software. For research, this implies that we must unravel how 
institutions are made to operate through subject positions and structure positions 
lending closure to institutional machinery that can be put to different uses. Here, Hajer 
points to two important issues the discourse analysis should illuminate: 
How “cognitive and social commitments routinely are being reproduced” (Hajer, 
1995: 60), i.e. the stability of discource. 
How “discursive ‘interpellations’ takes place, whereby interpellations are understood 
as those moments where routinised procedures are being interrupted”, i.e. change 
through new discursive relationships and through creation of new positionings. 
With other interpretations of discourse analysis, interpellation is the act of discourse 
giving meaning to specific subject positions (see Jørgensen & Phillips, 1999: 53-54). 
This use of ‘interpellation’ denotes a deviation from Althusser’s definition of the 
concept. Laclau and Mouffe see the subject as fragmented; it is not positioned at one 
position in one discourse, but is interpellated into many different positions by different 
discourses. The subject will often (normally) be over-determined meaning that it is 
positioned (and interpellated) by conflicting discourses. If a certain subject position 
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does not seem to be in conflict with other positions, this will be the result of 
hegemonic processes. According to this is the situation with ‘discursive 
interpellations’ characterised by the person or institution in question being under 
interpellation from more than one discourse, whether the ‘routinised commitments’ is 
characterised by the subject being interpellated by a hegemonic discourse.  
This takes us back to Hajer understanding of discourse, and to the relations and 
dynamics between discourse5 and institution. Hajer speaks (60-61) of the condition of 
discourse structuration if the credibility of actors in a given domain requires them to 
draw on the ideas, concepts, and categories of a given discourse, for instance, if 
actor’s credibility depends on the usage (in my case) of the term precaution in the 
domain of environmental politics, or even technology policy. Further, he speaks of 
discourse institutionalisation if a given discourse is translated into institutional 
arrangements, i.e. if the theoretical concept of the precautionary principle (in my case) 
is translated into concrete policies (i.e. no pesticides in drinking water) and 
institutional arrangements (i.e. establishment of procedures for public involvement). If 
these two conditions are fulfilled a discourse can be said to be hegemonic, or weaker, 
to be dominant in a given domain. 
The approach thus focuses at the historical formation of institutions; how ideals are 
created, made discursive, and institutionalised, but also how some ideals and 
discourses are being expelled and never become institutionalised. The distinction 
ideal-discourse-institution should not be perceived as a sequence in time where an 
ideal with time will blossom as an institution, but rather as a logical and analytical 
distinction. It is through the analysis and unravelling of the history of institutions this 
logic appears, as history is sorted out to enable the visibility of t he struggles over the 
formulation of ideals, how certain ideals succeeds being discursive, and others 
becomes displaced, and of the struggles over the institutionalisation of discourses. 
(See also Andersen, 1995: 16-32)  
2.2.1 Story lines and discourse coalitions; the framework at work 
Story lines and discourse coalitions are Hajer’s middle range concepts or ‘concept-
tools’ that are established especially for the study of inter-discursive communication. I 
introduced the story line concept in the beginning of this chapter as a generic story 
outlining an otherwise complex and intractable issue. The story line concept resembles 
Emery Roe’s (1994) concept of narratives6, and it draws on the idea of metaphors as 
important common ground mediators between various discourses for policy formation 
(Schön, 1979). The metaphor allows the actor to create their own understanding of the 
problem, by subsuming the metaphor their specific worldview. Metaphors may 
provide connexions between otherwise distant or incompatible domains, by 
                                                     
5 Discourse understood as a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorisations that are 
produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices through which meaning 
is given to physical and social realities. See page 1. 
6 Roe though use the policy narrative concept more as an analytical tool, than a phenomenon 
to be uncovered. I.e. in the hands of Roe, the narrative is an analytical, and in the hands of 
Hajer, the storyline concept is both an analytical approach and a strategic resource for the 
actors under examination.  
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simplifying or sealing uncertainties and indeterminacies. This could for instance 
involve the relation between advice based on expert and scientific knowledge and 
policy making. Neumann has the point that the metaphor is a requisite part of 
language, also when it comes to science writing, where the metaphor may be the most 
important tool in breaking through an existing discourse that normalise phenomena 
and thereby makes in ‘invisible’. As extreme examples on ‘scientific’ metaphors Hajer 
points to a single graph representing the longitudinal development of forest damage or 
the reduction of ten years of research in air chemistry in a discursive change from ‘tall 
stack will dilute and disperse emissions’ to a saying like ‘what goes up must come 
down’. Other examples that could be added is the figure of 100,000 non-assessed 
chemicals as a driver for renewed chemicals regulation, or the graph of decreasing 
sperm quality since the end of WWII and the association with oestrogenic active 
synthetic chemicals (see e.g. Sharpe & Skakkebaek, 1993 and Giwercman et al., 
1993).  
This property of metaphors relate to MacKenzie’s idea of the ‘Certainty Trough’, 
whereby the perceived certainty of knowledge claims of a research specialty is 
greatest some way from the actual site of knowledge production, as illustrated in the 
figure. The knowledge is to a varying degree ‘black boxed’; key issues are preserved, 
but uncertainties and indeterminacies are – wittingly or unwittingly – underplayed or 
eliminated. Therefore, practitioners may attribute greater certainty to knowledge from 
another specialty than the practitioners in the first would attribute to it themselves. The 
subsequent point in the certainty trough is that the perceived uncertainty may be even 
higher farther away by actors alienated from research and those institutions7. 
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Figure 2.1 The "Certainty  Through" (MacKenzie, 1990: 372). 
 
In the hands of Hajer, the approach to story lines and the meaning of narratives as 
vehicles for knowledge transfer gets an extra twist, as he argues that regulation in fact 
depends on this loss of meaning and the multi-interpretability of text (Hajer, 1995: 
62). The regulation of conflicts over the interdiscursive problems characterising 
complicated (i.e.) environmental problems, will be dependent on and determined by 
                                                     
7 Bijker (1995: 284-285) has the point that the MacKenzie representation might be misleading, 
as the character of the uncertainty change along the x-axis: when the boundary of a 
technological frame is passed, the character of the technology in term of its obduracy changes. 
The uncertainty at the end of the curve is due to the obduracy of the sociotechnical ensembles 
in the “take it or leave it” sense, while at the beginning of the curve it is due to their high 
differentiation for highly included actors. 
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the effects of certain story lines. This partly corresponds to observations made by 
Shackley and Wynne (1997) in the realm of climate change and the related model 
building and policy making. Shackley and Wynne argue that in the case of Global 
Warming Potentials ambiguity in their precise meaning is a major reason why they 
have been developed and continue as scientific policy tools.  
However, essentially working as a metaphor, story lines also encompass more than 
that. Story lines are problem setting stories or narratives that help cluster knowledge, 
position actors, and – ultimately – create new coalitions. 
The workings of story lines can be sketched in three steps: 
• Foremost story lines facilitate the reduction of the discursive complexity of a 
problem, and thereby create possibilities for problem closure. 
• When a storyline is accepted and more and more actors subscribe to it, the 
reference to it becomes ritual, which gives certain permanence to the debate. 
Accordingly, the storyline has become a trope that rationalises or constructs 
the problem as coherent.  
• This allows actors from different domains to expand their own understanding 
and discursive competence of the phenomenon, which otherwise would be 
beyond their reach. 
It is by being a very constructed phenomena, a storyline succeeds in linking actors 
from very different domains or discourses (such as scientists, politicians, 
environmentalists, journalists), giving meaning or illustration to how his or her 
understanding and contributions fit into the larger jigsaw outlined by the storyline. 
Moreover, Hajer argues that it is the shallow and ambiguous property of the story line 
that allows it to become the ‘cement’ in the creation of communicative networks 
among actors that have different, or at best overlapping, perceptions and 
understandings. Discursive practices that come under this definition of the story line 
are metaphors, historical references, analogies, clichés, or even appeals to collective 
fears or senses of guilt (Hajer, 1995: 63).  
I will propose that it is exactly this characteristic of the debate on environmental 
problems, which has fuelled the relative success of authors like Bjørn Lomborg 
representing the sceptical attitude towards the severity or even the very existence of 
environmental problems8. This paradox might have further and general implications. It 
is likely to assume that emergent discourses will be more fragile than established ones, 
exactly because the terminology and intersubjective understandings has not been 
stabilized. The very reason why the new understanding can emerge – the coupling by 
                                                     
8 The position Lomborg takes up, place man in top of the hierarchy over everything else, and 
employs a mechanistic view of full the substitutability between nature, technologies, etc. (see 
Dryzek 1997: 43-60 for a characterisation of the promethean position cultivated by among 
others Julian Simon and Aaron Wildawsky, which Lomborg usually takes). 
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otherwise alien discourses through shallow concepts – is also the Achilles' heel of the 
emergent understanding. 
The issue of communicative networks bring us further to the second ‘middle range’ 
concept; discourse coalitions. Discourse coalitions are the media wherein the struggles 
for discursive hegemony are carried out; they comprise or involve story lines in action. 
Discourse coalitions are formed among actors that for various (to be examined!) 
reasons adhere to the involved story lines, and thereby strengthen a certain 
understanding and rationale of the problem concerned. 
A discourse coalition is distinct from the traditional notions of political coalitions and 
alliances. First, because the constructive approach use a linguistic understanding of 
social change and denies interests as the basis of actions. Instead of interests, the 
discourse coalition takes story lines as the basis of the coalitions, as story lines 
potentially can change the actors’ perception of own interests. Secondly, it is possible 
to add the methodological argument that story lines are easier to identify and ascribe 
than are interests. While it is quite straightforward to know what policy actors are 
advocating as a policy option along with the arguments and assumptions they use to 
support their position, is it almost impossible to identify their interests with any 
reasonable intersubjective plausibility (Weale, 1992: 59, see also Neumann, 2001: 37). 
This said, it must be stressed that I put no claim on story lines or beliefs as being 
consistently more fundamental than interests, as there very well may be economic or 
strategic reasons behind an actor’s adherence to a certain story line. I rather see 
beliefs, worldviews, and interests as being interwoven. In this, I believe to be in line 
with Hajer: “ […] interests cannot be taken as given a priori but are constituted 
through discourse. The point here is that interests have to be constantly reproduced 
and will change over time […]”. I perceive of the relation between interests and 
adherence to storylines as a chicken and egg situation. He does not explicitly address 
whether interest beyond perception exists, but would probably take the position that 
this would be an un-matched and therefore un-interesting type of interest. What is 
interesting to examine is how the discursive position and hence perceived interests is 
created, stabilised, and changed: “The task of the political analyst will be to explain 
how a given actor [person or organisation] secures the reproduction of his discursive 
position (or manages to alter this) in the context of a controversy.” (Hajer, 1995: 51) 
In line with the general characteristics of discourse analysis, the discourse coalition 
broadens the scope of where the actors of the coalition are to be found, especially 
including actors that are not founded in state apparatus or has economic relations to 
the problem, which normally would be the main focus in traditional systems analytical 
or structural Marxist approaches. Discourse coalitions therefore: 
“suggest searching for politics in new locations, looking for the activity of the actors who 
produce story-lines (i.e. scientists, activists, but also mediators such as journalists) and 
the practices within which this takes place, for instance by investigation the role of a 
popular scientific magazine in the construction or proliferation of a story-line, or by 
looking at the activities of specific organizations in bringing together previously 
independent operating academics or policy-makers.” (Hajer, 1995: 66)  
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Hajer defines a discourse coalition as consisting of three elements: 1) A set of story 
lines, which is the ‘cement’ of the coalition that makes otherwise alienated actors or 
entities have common points of understandings. 2) The actors who utter these 
storylines, and therefore routinise them, by referring to them, and possibly by 
changing practice. 3) Finally, the coalition consists of the practices in which these 
discursive activities are based, and which ultimately may lead to the 
institutionalisation of the discursive practice. 
The discourse coalition concept wraps up Hajer’s approach, binding up story lines 
with actors and ultimately with changed practices, changed policymaking, and perhaps 
changed policy-outcomes. 
Left is the question why a given actor adheres to specific story lines. I have already 
adduced that it may be strategic reasons that lead to adherence, but as Hajer states, 
presents this a too individualistic explanation if detached. Hajer argues that storylines 
do not primarily derive their discursive power from the individual strategic choice, or 
from the fact that the specific elements fit together in a logical way, but because they 
depend on what Hajer propose to call ‘discursive affinities’ (Hajer, 1995: 66). Hajer’s 
inspiration to the concept comes from Weber’s notion of ‘elective affinities’ that refers 
to practices that mutually favour the continuance of the other practice. This is 
consistent with the observation that standard operating procedures are the usual ways 
in which bureaucracies process issues and thereby cope by adapting existing 
procedures and routines of working to new problems. An explanation is that with 
limited time, issues compete with one another for attention and ways of coping with 
this information overload will have to be found if the organisation is to manage 
(Weale, 1992: 54). However, this example concerns a certain practice – and it is a 
rather mechanistic and rational choice-like explanation to affinity.  
As an alternative the discourse approach suggests to take one step back, looking at the 
narrative that (possibly) gives meaning to a practice: 
“Separate elements might have a similar cognitive or discursive structure which suggests 
that they belong together. In that case, actors may not understand the detail of the 
argument, but will typically argue that ‘it sounds right’.” (Hajer 1995: 67) 
In my interpretation, this account tends to omit explanations beyond ‘affinity’ – that 
something ‘sounds right’ means that the speaker has an affinity, but not why. Hajer 
continues,  
“This element of the explanation of a discursive order thus does not primarily refer to the 
actors and their intention but explicitly operationalizes the influence of discursive formats 
on the construction of problems.” (Hajer, 1995: 67).  
This implies that preferences (for story lines) become an empirical issue, and that it is 
one of the analyst’s tasks to empirically demonstrate the affinity, and its discursive 
explanations. Perhaps Hajer’s concept of discursive affinity relate to Laclau and 
Mouffe’s idea of interpellation, so that the discursive affinity is dependent on which 
interpellations that gives the actor’s position, e.g. as scientist or as environmentalist.  
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2.3 A flawed concept and a good example 
Finally Hajer operates with the concept ‘discursive contamination’, which I find 
slightly problematic, because the concept seems to more normative than analytical, 
which I explain below. I will give the concept some attention in this last section 
despite the fact that I do not apply it in this study. I do so because the concept gives an 
entrance to a distinct and a relevant example on the working of the discursive 
framework presented in this chapter. 
‘Discursive contamination’ is when a discursive affinity is particularly strong, and to 
illustrate this he gives two examples of which the second is quite interesting in my 
empirical context, and I will though recount both. The first example is drawn from 
Donald Worster’s Nature's 
Economy (Worster, 1994). 
Darwin drew on the sociological 
concept of ‘competition’ as a 
metaphor for the understanding 
of natural reality, and the 
‘contamination’ was returned 
with Social Darwinists claiming 
competition being the natural 
state of society (Hajer, 1995: 67) 
First, I think contamination might 
not be the right word as it has a negative connotation, even though it is supposed to be 
used in a descriptive way. A contaminant is a highly contextual concept that especially 
depends on the definition of what pure is; hence is ‘contamination’ the contaminated’s 
concept, and the contaminated may even over time adapt to the contamination and 
rephrase it as ‘improvement’. If a certain concept should be used for this type of 
situations, I would suggest simply saying that there exists a strong influence of a 
certain discourse, and thereafter seek explaining how this influence come about. I 
believe the conceptual framework suggested by Hajer (excluding ‘discursive 
contamination’) can cope with the crossing of discourses. In fact, the conceptual 
framework seems to have been tailored to this purpose. This critic becomes especially 
obvious, with the second example. 
The example implies a sociological discourse on society contaminating a natural 
science discourse, which recur and contaminates the discourse on society. However, 
the example has the weak point that it is not the same discourse that first supplies the 
contamination and later receives it, as sketched (it might even be noted that also the 
natural science discourse changes, which actually gives a flaw to my sketch). It is 
important to note that what interests Hajer is the metaphorical level. Therefore may it 
very well be for rhetorical reasons Social Darwinists drew on the natural concept of 
competition, while the reason for the strong affinity for the concept might be found 
elsewhere. 
The second example Hajer gives originates from the early days of the precautionary 
principle. According to Hajer is the precautionary principle one of the key story lines 
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that “structured the discourse of ecological modernization”. In the example, this story 
line has an impact on the “discourse of biological science” (67, italics added to 
underline Hajer’s variable use of the discourse concept). The occasion is the first of a 
row of interesting contributions in Marine Pollution Bulletin to the discussion of what 
precaution is, and especially how the concept relates to scientific practice. The 
incident takes it’s starting point in 1990 when Gray (1990), an acknowledged 
professor in marine biology at Oslo University, calls scientists to order: “In my 
opinion it should be the role of scientists to produce the objective scientific evidence 
on which politicians can then enact the precautionary principle”. What disturbed Gray 
was the tendency of scientific findings being presented with reference to the 
precautionary principle, and with a statistical methodology that deviates from 
established practice; what Gray reacts against is scientist overruling established 
methodologies by referring to precaution, and thereby enabling other conclusions, 
giving bios towards environmental protection. However, this debate eventually 
evolved in direction of discussing the validity of statistical methodologies, and 
especially the importance of type II errors (see e.g. Peterman & MGonigle, 1992, Gray 
& Bewers, 1996, Buhl-Mortensen, 1996, Gray & Bewers, 1996, Gray, 1996, Santillo 
et al., 1998), and hereby the incident gives an example of how discursive 
understandings may further changes in practical reality. Furthermore, the example 
show how the concept of discursive contamination relates to specific positions, as 
“contamination” would be the word of Professor Gray, defending what he perceives as 
pure ‘uncontaminated’ biological science.  
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3 Social Construction of Reality / The Study of 
Technology 
Perhaps this chapter rather should be called the social construction of reality. That is 
because what I am concerned with is not the construction of certain technologies or 
artefacts, but the construction of effects, risks for health and the environment, caused 
by chemicals. Then, of cause and as many observers has noted is the construction, or 
more ‘positivist’ speaking, the perception of both the environment and of potential 
risks to it depends on science and technology. Lets just take the problem ozone 
depletion as an example; without stratospheric measuring programs, atmospheric 
chemistry etc, etc would it be impossible to comprehend the problems attached to 
CFCs, HCFCs etc, etc. It might even be difficult to establish causality when increased 
levels of skin cancer would start occurring. Like this, it is only in second order I am 
concerned with technology. Consequently, what I am interested in is the social 
construction of reality, the use of technology (in a broad sense) in this, and the 
through-going and criss-crossing rationales that co-constructs both technology and 
reality.  
The point spelled out in social construction of technology is to go one step further into 
technology, and give special attention to partly how technology shapes ‘reality’, partly 
how technology is shaped socially. It says that the construction of technology is a 
negotiated phenomenon, and it points to the importance of ‘going into’ technology, to 
open the black box of technology. In my case it is intrinsically interesting to study 
how certain technologies and certain knowledge regimes supports certain regulatory 
regimes. To me, the social construction of technology gives the important point that 
tools are neither neutral nor objective, and that different tools may support different 
arguments and rationales. Let me give an example from a resent Dutch study 
evaluating controversies relating to chlorine in the Netherlands, and PVC in Sweden 
(Tukker, 1998: 310).  
Tukker is interested in the framing of toxicity controversies, and as a part of his study 
he assess major tools for environmental evaluation, namely risk assessment, life cycle 
assessment, and substance flow analysis. He concludes, “RA and LCIA of toxic 
releases are frames in themselves, and thus give results that reflect a single frame. 
Furthermore, LCIA in particular results in data that are not robust in scientific terms. 
Data generated with RA and LCIA therefore cannot be presented as entirely ‘value-
free’ or ‘objective science’. Results of RA and LCIA are thus of limited use in 
controversies such as those about chlorine and PVC.” (Tukker, 1998: 310-311). 
Tukker’s point is that the quantitative LCIA frame has three points of departure that 
reflects what the risk assessment frame and contradicts what he calls the phase out 
frame. 
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The risk assessment frame assumes: 
• We can obtain quite a good emission inventory.  
• We are reasonably able to model fate and assess effects. 
• Potential impacts of one substance regardless of e.g. its residence time in the 
environment can be ‘exchanged’ with potential impacts of another substance. 
The phase out frame stress: 
• The lack of knowledge about chlorinated micropollutants, 
• The difficulty of modelling fate particularly for persistent substances and the 
fact that effect assessment may be very uncertain, 
• Top priority should therefore be given to preventing irreversible contamination 
of the environment, implying an extra, highly critical judgement of substances 
with a long residence time in the environment. 
Tukker argue that these two frames, for dealing with toxicity problems, are equally 
defensible, but that they would be performed with totally different structured 
indicators, and that they would lead to very different results:  
“[…] If decision making were to be supported by state-of-the art LCA it would probably 
be more difficult for the advocates of the alternatives to the risk-assessment frame to get 
their message through. One could say that LCIA has already tacitly taken side in the 
debate, rather than being the neutral tool it is assumed to be.” (Tukker, 1998: 309) 
From a social construction point of view, it is the shaping of the tools, that Tukker 
examines, which are interesting. In my case, it is the shaping, construction, or 
adjustment of the chemicals regulation caused by the introduction of the precautionary 
principle that is in focus. This includes the construction of toxicity and ecotoxicity, 
namely; the basis for what non-wanted effects the regulation should take into account; 
changing rationales for the regulation of chemicals causing these effects; and the 
construction of the tools to assess the chemicals.   
In this chapter, I give my account of what sometimes is denoted sociology of 
technology. To me, one of the central ideas in this field is social construction of 
technology, though being aware this concept represents one approach in what is a 
more diverse field. I view this range of approaches as supplementary to the discurse-
analytical approach that I have presented. In my understanding do the approaches 
largely draw on the same ‘language-turn’ of the social sciences, but what I am going 
to outline in the following is more taylored to the study and discussion of technology, 
and particularly do the approaches in my interpretation underline the importance of the 
materiality of the discourse.  
My purpose with this paper is twofold. Firstly, I want to conceptualise what 
technology is and how technology are formed, changed, and stabilised, that is, to 
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dissolve the idea of technology as independent artifacts. To me this involves a (social) 
constructive approach to what technology is and hereby the result is partly a 
deconstruction of technology in the sense of technology as single-valued 
(unequivocal) and essential artifacts. My overarching metaphor for this first  purpose 
is the seamless web, wich I will elaborate shortly. Doing this I have inspiration from 
the literature of sociology of technology with prominent exponents such as Wiebe 
Bijker, Bruno Latour, and Thomas P. Hughes.  
Secondly, I need reconstructing some of that which I take apart. The seamless web 
metaphor point to the fading of boarders, between science and policy, between 
technology and science, between the natural and the social. But for analysing purpose 
I do need to categorise, and very important: to awoid being contradictory to my own 
epistemology, my approach to categorising must be non-essentialist. A central 
metaphor for this part is inspired by Thomas F. Gieryn’s idea of boundary work, 
which I unfold and relate to boundary objects that Bijker has employed (1995: 282-
285), and boundary concept that I suggest as useful for the understanding of the 
precautionary principle. 
I conceive of the Precautionary Principle as a boundary concept that relates science, 
technology, and policy. In the following, I will elaborate on some of the theoretical 
inspirations that make out the basis of my de- and reconstruction of the precautionary 
principle. A basic ratio decidendi for my study of this rather ‘fluffy’ policy concept is 
that I need a materialised practise that relates to the concept – precaution without 
action is not of my interest. To me, this is enough reason to embark and draw on the 
field of STS.  
3.1 Stepping from Discourse to the study of Technology 
The central points in the following is that setting up sharp boundaries between nature 
and culture is artificial and misguiding, and that a networks approach is to be preferred 
for a systems approach, as the boundaries between inside and outside is determined 
empirically and depending on context and analytical purpose.  
3.1.1 The ethical impetus of STS; concepts of power 
A basic feature of the field of science-technology-society that has attracted me is the 
idea of technology and science as important factors shaping society. In fact, when I 
began my education as environmental engineer, my vision was to use knowledge of 
technology to make the society better, and to integrate knowledge of science and 
technology with knowledge of society in this quest. Of cause, I did not have the 
faintest idea of what this would be in practise, but I was quite sure environmental 
problems was not just a question of finding the right (technical) solutions.  
Perhaps it is for this reason that I have an affinity to the following lengthy quote. It 
comes from an essay by Bruno Latour, where he explores how Machiavelli’s The 
Prince can be expanded to redefine democracy, and how it can be expanded to 
relevance of contemporary society. Where Machiavelli wants us to understand the 
duplicity of Princes and Popes who break their word, is the desideratum of  Latour to 
show how the Princes of our time appeal to both human and non-human allies, i.e. 
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society and technology: “to the age-old passions, treacheries and stupidity of men and 
woman, we have to add the obstinacy, the cunning, the strength of electrons, microbes, 
atoms, computers, missiles.” (Latour, 1988b: 21). The message that I take is Latour’s 
argument against a traditionalist perception of technology and technological 
development as deterministic, and the argument for a strategic use of / and non-naïve 
approach to / technology:  
“[…] The two most common clichés about technology, its inertia that would be too strong 
for anyone to resist, and its inner complexity that would be too much for any one to 
fathom, are real enough, not as the cause of the Prince’s moves, but as the effects that the 
Prince strives to achieve. 
The first principle of technical democracy is thus never to offer this achievement to the 
prince on a golden plate. Alas though, this capitulation is very frequent among well-
intentioned analysts of technology who accept that there are trajectories, inertia and inner 
complexities – in brief, that technology exists. Another capitulation occurs when analysts 
of society, no less well-intentioned than the former, insists that there is something like an 
overarching society, knowable, at least in principle, that should control and check the 
development of technology. These two symmetrical capitulations paralyse democracy 
because the only way to envisage a modification of the technocracy is then by appealing 
to an alternative technology and society. If there is a Technology and if there is a Society 
and if the only way to conceive of possible changes is by imagining an alternative 
Society, then the Prince is perfectly free in his palace, unhindered, weaving at leisure 
human and non-human actors, redefining locally, as much as pleases him, what ties all of 
us together. Observers outside will see nothing but technologies moving, thanks to their 
own autonomous thrust, and a society moving in parallel according to its own 
autonomous laws. Instead of the harsh constrains of democracy, the Prince will only hear 
moralists’ remonstrances and a little empty talk about the ‘participation of the public in 
technical decisions’ – once everything has been decided upon. If science and technology 
are politics pursued by other means, then the only way to pursue democracy is to get 
inside science and technology, that is, to penetrate where society and science are 
simultaneously defined through the same stratagems. This is where the new Princes stand. 
This is where we should stand if the Prince is to be more than a few individuals, if it is to 
be called ‘the People’.” (Latour, 1988b: 38-39).  
And this is where my overreaching ambition is: to enable and enhance an open-eyed 
approach to technology, and in this stance, to chemicals technology.  
Of course, this quote might be eligible to a critic that would say that in the attempt to 
avoid naïveté, the text take a turn in the direction of conspiracy theory. With outset in 
discourse theory, it would be quite reasonable to assume, that it is not the cynical 
industrialists who the ‘virtuous democrat’ faces, but that the Prince himself has 
become more complex and integral than Machiavelli’s ‘bloodthirsty tyrants’ have. 
However, do Latour’s Machiavellian picture of technology, society, and power fall 
apart, if the Prince does not have a specific locus and a recognisable face? I would say 
no, as this does not influence how technology and society are being co-constructed, 
and hence does it not influence the need for opening up technology and enhancing 
debate on what futures we do and do not want. Besides – I will not rule out that such 
Princes with face and locus might be found, even though the face and locus may 
surprise! 
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Without using the word, this quotation is so laden with power that I need to elaborate. 
That power is present and though not spelled out is not is a coincidence. It is the wish 
to enable political debate, political aspects of technology and science, and specific 
perception of power that leads to this peculiar situation. If we take Latour, then on the 
one hand he draws heavily on the ‘father of power’ Machiavelli, and on the other hand 
he refuses to talk about power: “No, we need to get rid of all categories like those of 
power, knowledge, profit or capital, because they divide up a cloth that we want 
seamless in order to study as we choose. ” (Latour, 1987: 223).  
The key issue in the power concept is not to view power as an essence; it does not 
exist ‘an sich’, but is relational. As such power is not something that is possessed, but 
characterises the specific relation. I agree with Bijker (1995: 261) when he terms 
power as an overall label or a characteristic of social processes: “At the best the term 
‘power’ can be a practical shorthand for more detailed and rich descriptions of 
situations, outcomes, relations, etc”. This conception of power lies in the tradition that 
Giddens represents when he defines power as the transformative capacity to harness 
the agency of others to comply with one’s ends. What is being added to this perception 
of power is who is being harnessed; with Latour, Bijker, with others, it is not just the 
agency of humans but also the agency of non-humans that is being included. 
Furthermore it is important to have attention to both an action and a structure 
perspective of the power concept. For my purpose I adapt Bijker’s two concepts 
“semiotic power” and “micropolitics of power” (1995: 263-266), respectively 
representing the structure side, referring to the fixity of meaning, and the action side, 
referring to the. The structural end of the power concept, the semiotic power can be 
conceptualised as the things we take for granted. Laclau talks about objectivity as 
deposited power; the traces of power has vanished and we – the people – has forgotten 
that what we perceive as ‘objective’ once was politically constructed (see Jørgensen & 
Phillips, 1999: 49 and Torfing, 1999: chap. 8), this be facts, artefacts, agents, practices 
or relations (Bijker, 1995: 263). The micropolitics of power labels how a variety of 
practises transforms and structures the actions of actors, and thereby constitutes a 
particular form of power.  
The two types of power are closely connected: “micropolitics result in a specific 
semiotic structure, while the semiotic power in turn influence the micropolitics 
structures.” (Ibid). I find Bijker’s choice of words somehow unlucky, and would 
prefer ‘the possibilities for performing micropolitics of power’ instead of the used “the 
micropolitics structures”, as to conserve the idea of agency with the notion of 
micropolitics of power.  
For me, to attain attention to power, is to attain attention to what is political, and this is 
what I am interested in: I want to study the politics of technology, and especially how 
things could have been or can be different. Secondly, my ambition is to affect and 
democratise technology policy, not as a ‘technical’ issue, but as a societal one.  
Elzinga and Jamison’s (1995) distinction between science policy and politics of 
science coins this:  
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“[T]he latter has to do with the interaction between science and power, that is, the 
mobilization of science as a resource in international relations, the use of science by 
interest groups or social classes to increase their power and influence in society, and the 
exercise of social control over knowledge.”  
Contrary Elzinga and Jamison see science policy as the 
“collective measures taken by a government in order, on the one hand, to encourage the 
development of scientific and technical research, and, on the other, to exploit the results 
of this research for general political objectives” (Salomon 1977, quoted in Elzinga & 
Jamison, 1995).  
In this relation, my prime interest is the reflexivity from politics of science and 
technology, but to draw near the science and technology policy approach adds what I 
perceive as an important action dimension.  
The picture of society not being superior to technology and technology not superior to 
society, or what we can call the mutual co-construction of technology and society, 
opens the door for a research strategy that Bijker (1995: 280) calls politics of 
technology: “The politics of technology […] will not yield the concrete policy 
instruments that [science policy] promises to produce. It will be emancipationist rather 
than instrumental, it politicize technological choices rather than pacify them, and it 
will problematize rather than absolve.”  
A very important implication that comes with the Machiavellian power concept is that 
power is morally neutral, and so must the social construction approach to the study of 
power relations and technology also be. This has led Bijker to describe what he calls 
the Paradox of Sociotechnical Politics: 
“[…] [W]e can no longer imagine that constructivist STS studies will principally or 
primarily benefit any specific social group, such as the less privileged or less powerful. 
One might attempt to argue that the sorts of STS studies I have discussed, by highlighting 
the constructed nature of facts, artifacts, social orders, and sociotechnical ensembles, will 
allow those who are kept hostage by the semiotic powerstructures involved – nonscientist 
citizens, consumers, patients, women, workers, neighbors to a chemical or nuclear plant, 
environmentalists – to sever these bonds and free themselves. Although this may happen, 
there is no guarantee that it will always work out this way. First, science and technology 
may also be fruitfully employed by the less privileged. Environmentalists, for example, 
frequently use scientific data to argue their case, and the last thing they would want is to 
see those findings and arguments deconstructed. And second, there is no reason why the 
powerful may not draw on the insights of the STS community or even hire constructivists 
to strengthen their micropolitical strategies. The relativizing force of constructivist STS 
studies thus prevents it from attaining a neat and political correctness.” (Bijker, 1995: 
289) 
 
So, it may be naïve to talk about an ethical impetus of STS, as nothing a priori can be 
taken to be good or bad. Hence, the impetus must end up with the researcher and not 
the theoretical or methodological standpoint. And indeed, as Bijker point it out, the 
ones that I actually find to have common cause with, may in fact not be interested in 
what I find, looking at the practices of assessing impacts and risks.  
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3.1.2 From essentialism to the seamless web 
In a note in Social Studies of Science (1986) Hughes suggests The Seamless Web as 
an overarching concept for the study of science and technology. At the outset he 
opposes notions of technology as embedded in science, or technology as applied 
science, and thereafter he explores the shifting approaches and changing assumptions 
that has emerged in the study of technology, and that he had experienced through own 
work.  
As an alternative to the Internalist technology-as-applied-science has been the 
introduction of an interactive relationship between science and technology, the so-
called contextual approach. This then raised questions whether the relationship 
between technology/science and other contextual factors, such as the political and the 
social, also should be redefined as interactive. But Hughes points to the weakness that 
comes with the contextual approach, exemplifying with his own drift from a 
contextual to a systems approach to history (Hughes, 1986: 283). Hughes found that 
the focus of internalist analysis – more efficient and more diverse generators, motors, 
and so on – did not sufficiently explain growth. To do this he had to involve what 
conventionally is called science, politics, economics, social, and so on. But, at a later 
stage in his case study, the contextual approach either gave satisfying explanation, as 
it  “In my own work I began to move away from the contextual to the systems 
approach when I found that system builders were no respecters of knowledge 
categories or professional boundaries. In his notebooks, Thomas Edison so thoroughly 
mixed matters commonly labelled ‘economic’,  ‘technical’ and scientific’ that his 
thoughts composed a seamless web.” (Hughes, 1986: 285). Context and text tends to 
be not just interrelated but inseparable. 
Therefore, together with Callon, Latour, Bijker and others (see e.g. Hughes, Bijker, & 
Pinch, 1987), suggests Hughes ‘networks’ and systems’ as the preferred version of the 
interactive approach, because interaction do not simply take place between science 
and technology, or between technology and contexts, but among a host of actors and 
institutions in a ‘seamless web’. Contrary to Hughes distinguishes Callon between 
system and actor network.  Callon points to that the systems concept presupposes a 
distinction between the system itself and its environment, which resembles the 
problem with text/context. Callon prefer the actor-network concept as it avoids 
boundary definitions of inside-outside, and the many difficulties of methodology it 
raises. However, in practise the approaches of Hughes and Callon seem very similar: 
“By stressing continually all the connections linking the ‘inside’ and outside’ of the 
system, he (Hughes) comes close to the actor-network concept”. (Callon, 1987: 100-
101). The important step is the dissolving of the traditional categories such as 
technology and science, economics and politics, content and context, foreground and 
background, and the resort to neologisms and “the abstractions of interaction – such as 
component, and system, entity and network, and actor and actor world.” Hughes 
points to “the precise language of the case history and the historical narrative” as the 
way to define these abstractions. Likewise, Callon asks why we categorize, or 
compartmentalize the elements in a system or network “when these elements are 
permanently interacting, being associated, and being tested by the actors who 
innovate?” (Quoted in Hughes, 1986). 
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The problem with the contextual approach is, 
notes Bijker, that “it is never clear a priori 
and independent of context whether a 
problem should be treated as technical or as 
social, and whether solutions should be 
sought in science, economics, or some other 
domain” (Bijker, 1995: 273). Bijker suggests 
that the seamless web not only should 
involve the system builders, but also the 
entire relevant social groups who contribute to the social construction of technology. 
Hence Bijker (1995: 273) suggests stressing the seamlessness between the technical 
and the social:  
“The technical is socially constructed, and the social is technically constructed. All 
stable ensembles are bound together as much by the technical as by the social. Social 
classes, occupational groups, firms, professions, machines – all are held in place by 
intimate social and technical links.”  
In the following, I will elaborate on a number of the concepts that I have touched upon 
here and tie them together in the conceptual framework Bijker has suggested for the 
analysis of technology. 
3.2 Social Construction of Technology 
The type of technology that I have in mind is testing regimes that are the ‘technology’ 
used to assess possible problems with chemical substances. I will elucidate central 
concepts in the framework of Social Construction of Technology. The SCOT approach 
consists of three parts. The first part is more or less a descriptive model that combines 
the social constructivist insight with the study of technology and especially 
technological artefacts. I will return to this shortly. 
The second part is analytical with the central structural concept technological frames, 
which is an explanatory frame for the descriptive analysis. It links the individual 
actors thinking and acting with the social dimension. Technological frames are 
Bijker’s (1995: 126) appropriation of Kuhn’s idea of the disciplinary matrix, which 
has similarity with Foucault’s episteme concept. The latter tend though to be more 
encompassing, while I perceive of technological frames as well as the disciplinary 
matrix to be local and specific in their targets. The perhaps most significant difference 
to Kuhn’s disciplinary matrix, is the broadened focus. The technological frame – or as 
Bijker prefer if it was not for the linguistic clumsiness: frame with respect to 
technology – are more heterogeneous both with respect to the emphasis on social and 
material elements in addition to the cognitive, and with respect to who the frame 
applies to. Where the disciplinary matrix is aimed at the scientist is the technological 
frame aimed at all relevant social groups around the technology. This gives a more 
widely applicable conceptual framework than the Kuhnian concept. Furthermore, the 
actor in Bijker’s terms will typically be member of more than one frame. To make this 
manageable, we talk about varying degrees of inclusion in technological frames.  
A sketch of Hughes account of 
changing approaches to the 
history of technology: 
Internalist Histories of 
technology ⇒ Contextual History 
⇒ The Interactive Model ⇒ The 
Systems Approach ⇒ Networks 
⇒ Seamless Web 
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The third part is centred on the power conception that I already have touched upon in 
the beginning of this paper. In this part, no completely new concepts are being added. 
Rather, the processes described in terms of interactions, interpretative flexibility, 
stabilisation, closure, technological frames, and inclusion, are being reframed so to 
make more visible the strategies and redistribution of power. 
3.2.1 The descriptive model 
To simplify, lets take starting point in the study of an uncomplicated artefact. It should 
be noted, that my ambition of applying these concepts in a wider frame than the 
development of an artefact, does not conflict with Bijker’s own idea of the flexibility 
of the SCOT approach, which indeed do include the analysis of the development of 
society and social power (Bijker, 1995: 197); these levels are just more related to the 
second and especially third part of the analytical framework. 
The descriptive level consists of two steps; first a deconstruction of the artefact, then a 
reconstruction of how it came to be what it is. The three central concepts for the 
deconstruction are relevant social groups, focus on problems and solutions, and 
interpretative flexibility, and the two reconstructive concepts are closure, and 
stabilisation. 
Below I have outlined the empirical analysis that Bijker use to develop the descriptive 
model to help the explanation of these concepts. 
Box 3.1 Bijker’s description, or rather: deconstruction-reconstruction, of bicycle 
technology: A compressed overview. 
The central historical question Bijker (1995: 97) advance is: “How can we understand 
the role of the high wheeled Ordinary bicycle in relation to its low-wheeled ancestors 
and successors?” 
The first step in his description is to line up the prehistory of the bicycle, including 
drawings from Leonardo da Vinci (1493), later ‘running-machines’ from the late 18th 
century to the mid 19th century, and ending with the “high-wheeled Ordinary bicycle. 
The Ordinary had its high time in 1860-1880. 
With the Ordinary as starting point, Bijker deconstructs the technology. Finding two 
significant relevant social groupings, two different interpretations of the Ordinary take 
shape. The first is a “comfortable, classy, well-working” artefact; the second is a 
“dangerous, accident prone and thus non-working machine.”  
The description of these ‘two’ artefacts is made through the eyes of the relevant social 
groups by focussing at their perception of problems and solutions. Among the 
solutions that were developed to solve the Ordinary’s problems was Tricycles and 
Safety Ordinaries. 
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Figure 3.1 Ordinary, Tricycle, Safety Ordinary, and Safety bicycle. Reproduced from Bijker 
(1995: 31, 55, 63, 70). 
The next step is to understand the development of the safety bicycle. To accumulate 
and operationalise the insight acquired so far – mainly that the technology is 
differently constituted by from different relevant social groups – introduce Bijker the 
concept interpretative flexibility. Using this concept, he deconstructs the air tyre into 
two artefacts: an anti-vibration device and a speed enhancing devise. Finally, the 
concepts Stabilisation and Closure are introduced to help the analytical reconstruction 
of the safety bicycle, by explaining the decreasing interpretative flexibility of both the 
bicycle and the air tyre devise. 
Deconstructing technology 
The central point here is that an artefact, for example a hammer or a stone, gives 
meaning when it is contextualised. If I need a hammer but do not have one, then a 
stone might be appropriate – the stone becomes a hammer. Likewise, the hammer may 
– with the right snatch – well serve as a bottle opener. This is very much 
commonsense and quite unproblematic; the carpenter do not mind you using your 
hammer for opening a beer (he might do it himself), and the producer are not alarmed 
by users applying stones as hammers. Examples of relevant social groups to these 
artefacts have been presented: the carpenter, the hammer manufacturer, the DIY’er, 
and the scout. We can call the for interpreting the same material thing in different 
ways for the interpretative flexibility of the artefact.  
The very unproblematic nature of this small example leads to the next element of the 
descriptive model: the focus at problems and solutions. Firstly, the focus on problems 
leads us away from the unproblematic. Secondly, together with the focus on relevant 
social groups, this does attach the specific grip on the seamless web that is 
characteristic of the SCOT approach. It is in the relevant social groups the technology 
finds it social shaping. The SCOT approach is a part of the development away from 
the Internalist technology-as-applied-science, that e.g. constitute the linear model of 
the innovation process: 
Box 3.2 Technology as applied science; linear innovation model. 
Research => Development => Pilot Plant => Scale up => Production => Product 
Development 
The problem with this model could be summarised as the problem of false linearity. 
What has become the final product at the end of the line seems as the result of a 
rational and determined development. An important point that comes with the SCOT 
approach is the focus on problems and solutions. With the seamless approach to 
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technology, the locus of technology becomes more diffuse, as it is not the sole 
technical gadget that we are interested in. Instead the development of technology 
could be interpreted as the development of solutions to problems. Now it is not the 
mere gadget but the gadget perceived as a solution to a perceived problem, which we 
are interested in. The focus on problems and solutions gives thereby the possibility to 
shake up the deterministic understanding of technology and technological 
development. Further more, this conception gives a very useful handle that taps into 
the discourse terminology, as we study not one world, but the many representations 
that different discourses give, which is comparable with the varying perceptions 
relevant social groups has of the same artefact.  
In this social constructive account, technology exists in the interplay between the 
artefact, the relevant social groups, their respective understandings, and respective 
perceived problems. The social constructive argument falls in two steps. First, how a 
group interprets an artefact is socially and contextually dependent. In turn, the 
meaning given to the artefact by the relevant social groups shapes the future 
conditions and possibilities for modifications and changes of the technology. This 
could be outlined as an alternative version of the innovation process:  
Box 3.3 Technology as translated knowledge;towards a network model of innovation. 
Artefact => percieved differently by different Relevant Social Groups => Solutions to 
problems => Modified Artefacts 
But, when we open for all the development tracks that eventually did not lead to the 
existing understanding of the technology in question, the analysis becomes more 
complex. Lets take a look at the following diagrams. The artefact has different 
meaning depending on the social group in question. Each of these social groups will 
with reference to their perception of the artefact see different problems and point to 
different possible solutions. 
Problem
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Social 
group 
Problem
Problem
Problem
Artefact 
Social 
group 
Social 
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Social 
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Solution
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Figure 3.2 Artefact, Relevant Social Groups, Problems, and Solutions 
After Bijker 1995: 47, 51, 52. 
If we combine these diagrams, it becomes obvious that this analysis may be very 
complicated. Two comments should be tied to this. Firstly, the focus on relevant social 
groups seems to safeguard against the implicit linearity of traditionalists accounts of 
technological development, and instead stress the importance of visions of social 
futures (see e.g. Schwarz, 1992 for a discussion of the social viability of technologies 
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and of visions of social futures). Secondly, the model takes an evolutionary character 
when the three layers of problems, solutions, and resulting artefacts are combined, and 
this evolutionary character do pose a risk. The evolutionary terms make it tempting to 
perceive of the artefact as a fixed entity, which is generated through the selection 
processes.  
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Figure 3.3 Evolutionary networks of artefacts, social groups, problems, and solutions, 
leading to modified artefacts 
(Combination of the elements in Figure 3.2) It is exemplified how the diagrams in Figure 3.2 
can be combined by linking one social group and one of its perceived problems. The higher the 
number of social groups and related problems, the more complex the picture becomes. The 
diagram is an example, and should be used as a heuristic – in practice it may be impossible 
and even misguiding to set it up.  
Therefore, these diagrams should mainly be used as heuristics for the analysis, and not 
as a main structure to build the case study around (see Bijker, 1995: 50-52). I will 
shortly discuss the difference between diffusion, which is the pitfall the evolutionary 
model could lead to, and the notion of translations in more detail in the next chapter 
that also sums up my analytical-theoretical approach. 
A fulcrum of this approach is how the relevant social group are found and defined. 
‘Relevant’ refers to two levels. Firstly it refers to what the actors themselves find 
relevant, and here Bijker has found inspiration from contemporary sociological 
research in the ‘snow-balling’ method. Basically the idea is to ask identified actors 
who else might be relevant to interview to get a fully picture of the issue. At some 
point it should be likely that the analyst do not get any new names, and the resulting 
list is a complete set of the actors involved in the controversy. An obvious problem is 
the possibility of social groups that are not being referred to, “missing groups”. This 
problem could for example be important when looking at side effects of a technology; 
some groups may not be aware of their (negative) interest, or some groups may simply 
not have the ability to speak up and are therefore not found by the analyst.  
Secondly, and to resolve the problem of missing groups, ‘relevant’ refer to the analyst. 
As there is no mechanistic way of including missing groups e.g. through snowballing, 
is it the analysts’ task to identify these, and therefore the analysts’ categories may 
deviate from that of the actors. The point to be spelled out here is that within this 
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approach, much stress is put to the actor’s own definitions of categories, but also that 
the analyst have to take responsibility to dig out and delineate categories that enlighten 
weak or marginalized positions.  
Finally, the idea of interpretative flexibility gives the stepping-stone to the 
reconstructive part of the descriptive model. In the introduction I explained this 
concept as the possibility of interpreting the same thing in different ways. A very 
important issue that follows this is the criteria that are laid down for assessing the 
working of the artefact, which may be e.g. a bicycle, a hammer, or a regulatory regime 
for chemicals, may vary with the social group.  
Bijker demonstrates the interpretative flexibility of the high-wheeled 74-75). For the 
social group of nonusers this bicycle was difficult to mount, risky to ride and not easy 
to dismount, all summarised to an Unsafe Bicycle. For the social group of users of the 
Ordinary, the machine was also considered risky, but for these young and often upper-
class men the bicycle was an opportunity to display their athletic skills and daring in 
the London Parks, and at eye level with the horse riders. ‘Their’ bicycle was a Macho 
Bicycle, which met quite different criteria than the unsafe bicycle did. Hence the 
Macho Bicycle was a working machine, and the Unsafe Bicycle was a non-working. 
The point is that relevant social groups not only see different aspects of the single 
artefact, the meanings given to the artefact also constitutes the artefact in this specific 
meaning: Bijker put it this way: “There are as many artefacts as there are relevant 
social groups; there is no artefact not constituted by a relevant social group”. 
This deconstruction may leave the analyst with a high number of artefacts. The next 
step in the descriptive model helps understanding the construction of the ‘winning’ 
artefact; it gives an insight into how the linear model of the innovation process was 
constructed 
Reconstructing technology 
The two reconstructive concepts are stabilisation and closure, which Bijker use to 
“clean up the sociologist’s desk, littered with artefacts after the sociological 
demonstration of an artefact’s interpretative flexibility Ordinary (1995: 84). 
Stabilisation is related to inter group processes and closure to extra group processes. 
The separation of these two levels is, of cause, analytical. How a group internally 
develop it’s understanding will never be independent of how other groups try to 
perceive and define the same artefact, and the there will probably never exist a 
sequential relation between stabilisation and closure. 
The inter-group stabilisation concept is about the invention process, cleared from extra 
group conflicts and dynamics. It is not the level of conflicting interests but the 
semiotic perspective to the analysis of technology, which is on the agenda, and central 
point is to prevent the idea of technological change as “the result of a momentous act 
of the heroic inventor” (Bijker, 1995: 86). Bijker exemplify with uses the invention of 
the Safety Bicycle as an eighteen-year long process (1879-1897), rather than as an 
isolated event occurring in 1884 (1995: 270). The key methodology is to trace the 
increasing degree of stabilisations is to examine the dropping number of modalities in 
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contemporary writings about the artefact. These modalities can be the number of 
definitions, specifications, or explaining comments (see also Latour & Woolgar, 1986: 
75-88). If we look at Figure 3.3, the stabilisation increases at the end of the grey 
arrow, as the different possible solutions get better defined. Stabilisation is the 
stabilisation of the meanings attributed to the artefact by the different social groups, 
and the concept is therefore connected to the delineation of the groups.  
It is the process of closure that links up with the interpretative flexibility. Closure 
leads to the diminishing of interpretative flexibility, and hence to the dominance of 
one stabilised understanding with advantage over the other. Compared to the process 
of stabilisation, closure is more related to conflicting interests or worldviews. An 
analogue to the closure of an artefact can be found in studies of scientific knowledge. 
Closure belongs in the final part of the Kuhnian ‘scientific-revolution-cycle’: 
Box 3.4 Kuhn's scientific revolution cycle. 
Normal science ⇒ unresolved problems or the like posing a threat the 'paradigm' ⇒ 
extra ordinary science ⇒ competing paradigms with different understandings ⇒ 
'winning paradigm' ⇒ Normal Science 
The situations that Kuhn describes as normal science are disjointed by scientific 
revolutions. It is a closure-like process that leads to the ending of the ‘revolution’. 
Within normal science the practice is described as working with jigsaw puzzle; the 
paradigm delineate how the total puzzle is expected to look like, how the pieces is to 
be identified etc., and the task is to find the pieces and put them together according to 
the expected larger picture. But it happens that unresolved problems, or the like, 
emerge to pose a threat to the paradigm, and thereby threatens the foundation for the 
normal scientific practice. The result is that normal science pass into extra ordinary 
science. New approaches and more creative attempts to problem solving leads to a 
situation with coexisting paradigms that defines how to understand the world and how 
to go about the unresolved problem. Ultimately one of the paradigms eventually 
succeeds, and the scientific practise turns to a new mode of normal science. During the 
period with ‘extra ordinary science’ the interpretative flexibility is high, but through 
closure-processes the interpretative flexibility decreases. With the establishment of a 
winning paradigm, the related actors worldview becomes restructured. History is 
rewritten, and it becomes difficult to recapture the flexibility as it was before closure 
was reached.  
A number of closure mechanisms have been described (see Bijker, 1995: 86, Pinch & 
Bijker, 1987: 44-46). A “crucial experiment” or a “knock-down argument” are of the 
rhetorical type that may close a controversy without necessarily being convincing to 
the core set of scientists or experts, but by the appeal the argument has on a wider 
audience. Another important type is the “redefinition of problem” mechanism. The 
redefinition type is probably the more stable of the two types. Though, I have to point 
to the circular character of the redefinition of problem as closure mechanism, as the 
redefinition exactly may be the result of a successful closure. Where the rhetorical 
type is likely to leave behind logical and in principle known inconsistencies, the 
redefinition type is characterised by setting up consensus around new sets of criteria, 
for which there may not be any established resistance in terms of such a critic.  Lets 
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have a look at the example Pinch and Bijker (1987: 45) gives. A very important step in 
the construction of the safety bike, that is more or less the bicycle we know today, was 
the air tyre. The air tyre was introduced as a solution to the vibration problem 
associated with the reduced size of the wheels. But in the general public the tyre was 
regarded as an unsavoury solution, compared to the traditional elegant, slim and solid 
tyres, and for the high-wheeler’s was vibration simply not a problem. But when the air 
tyres was mounted on a low-wheeler for a race, it proved to significantly increase the 
speed; in the same process, the air tyre was redefined as a speed-devise (instead of an 
anti-vibration-devise) and the art of bicycling turned from aesthetics to speed. 
3.2.2 The explanatory scheme 
The next step in the SCOT approach is to frame the descriptive model. Let me 
introduce the empirical case Bijker support the development of the explanatory 
scheme with, before we take a closer look at the two central concepts technological 
frame and inclusion.  
Box 3.5 The narrative of the first ‘modern’ synthetic and commercial plastic and the 
relevance of technological frames for the analysis: A compressed overview. 
Bijker has three points on the agenda with this case. The case is taken as a critical case, 
to show the applicability of the social constructivist framework, even in the case of “an 
individual inventor”. Secondly the case is used to introduce the concepts of 
“technological frame” and “inclusion”, which relate the interactions of the individual 
actors to the social processes that form the relevant social groups Thirdly, he wants to 
make a “comprehensive historical study of the first commercial plastic”. (Bijker, 1995: 
102). 
What the core idea in this case can be boiled down to is that even though it is one person 
that is at centre stage throughout the invention of Bakelite, is the invention built on the 
mixing of a number of technological frames. Hence, the art of inventing becomes 
extended also to be the art of combining frames. 
As in the case of bicycles, the prehistory of plastics is outlined, explaining the major 
aspirations in the search for substitutions to the natural plastics, and to ivory. This 
prehistory serve to present the understanding of what these plastics were – the cultural 
background – and it serve to present the social groups that’s on the stage. The 
predominant technological frame for this period was the frame of Celluloid chemists. 
Here the main focus in technical respect was on solvents, and this proved to be a blind 
spot in the search for synthetic plastics. This frame is summarised below. 
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Elements of the technological 
frame: 
Technological frame of Celluloid engineers: 
Goals: Production of fancy articles 
Key Problems: Price of solvent camphor, the flammability and moulding 
characteristics of Celluloid 
Problem solving strategies: Modification of the solvent in the reaction 
Requirements to be met by 
problem solutions: 
Set by the standards of the natural plastics: Colour, lack of 
shrinkage and distortion, price, aptness for being moulded. 
Current theories: No chemical theory 
Tacit knowledge: Application of heat and pressure without specific maxima 
Perceived substitution function: Natural plastics 
Exemplary artefacts:  Celluloid; production machinery such as presses, 
preheaters.  
‘The inventor’ of Bakelite – Baekeland – enters the stage of Bijker’s narrative as a 
chemist working in the field of photographic paper, moving into the field of 
electrochemical engineers. It is only at a later stage he encounters the problem of 
synthesising plastics, but at that point he had gained mastery of practises and research 
methods that had not yet been draw in to that quest. Among the new aspects that 
Baekeland’s inclusion in these technological frames provided him with was scientific 
method, and the idea of flow production of chemicals from the technological frame of 
electrochemical engineers, see below. 
Elements of the technological 
frame: 
Technological frame of electrochemical engineers 
Goals: Flow production of chemicals 
Key Problems: Corrosion, reaction efficiency, volume of production 
output 
Problem solving strategies: Specific design of diaphragms; careful examination of all 
variables; stepwise scaling up from laboratory to pilot to 
production scale 
Requirements to be met by 
problem solutions: 
 
Current theories: Basic inorganic chemistry; electrochemistry; fluid 
dynamics 
Tacit knowledge: Industrial flow processing 
Perceived substitution function:  
Exemplary artefacts:    
Baekeland’s inclusion in the technological frame of electrochemical engineers did not 
add any elements that were contradictory to elements from his inclusion in photographic 
chemistry, and the repertoires therefore continued to exist together. If the elements do 
not fit together, the ones of the older frame will be moved to the background, replaced 
by the new elements.  
When the basic form of ‘Bakelite’ and the first patents were in place, the last stages of 
social construction of Bakelite could begin. Bijker follows the stabilisation in the 
processes of 1) patent litigations, 2) collaboration with industrial social groups, 3) 
influence of World War I, 4) importance of industrial designers, and 5) Bakelite’s 
construction by the relevant social group of consumers.  
Let’s give Bijker the last word in this case: 
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“As I have traced the social construction of Bakelite it has become clear, I hope, that my 
social-constructivist analysis does not diminish the greatness of Baekeland as an 
inventor. It does, however, provide a different slant on his individual abilities. To 
describe Baekeland, […] as a heterogeneous engineer (Law 1987) or system builder 
(Hughes, 1983) does not reduce the development of Bakelite to the genius of this “grand 
duke, wizard, an bohemian.” Rather, this characterization serves as the summary of all 
the social processes in which Baekeland participated; his status as an inventing genius is 
the result of the social construction of Bakelite, not the cause.” (Bijker, 1995: 197-198).  
In my research, the individual have a less central position, but that is more founded on 
choice of case than differences in theoretical perspective. 
The technological frame is the frame of the relevant social group; as an analytical 
concept it can be defined by what keeps the group together. In this sense it share many 
properties with Kuhn’s idea of a paradigm and even more equivalent, with the 
disciplinary matrix that Kuhn corrected the paradigm concept with.  
How does the technological frame ‘glue’ the descriptive model together with the 
individual actors interactions and dispositions? Bijker stress that even though the 
concept involves the creative innovation process, does it not do this in ‘psycho-logistic 
terms’. The frame is not a characteristic of the individual nor of institutions or 
systems; the technological frame is located between actors: “If existing interactions 
move members of an emerging relevant social group in the same direction, a 
technological frame will be build up; if not, there will be no frame, no relevant social 
group, no future interaction” (1995: 123).  
Technological frame and inclusion do together give the possibility of both stability 
and change. In analogy with the Kuhnian paradigm or disciplinary matrix do the 
technological frames explain stability and enhance productivity within the 
paradigmatic understanding – Kuhn’s corresponding term is “Normal science”. But 
the inclusion concept introduces a relaxation to the Kuhnian approach, because the 
single actor may draw on more than one technological frame. Baekeland provides us 
with an example: by partly working within the celluloid frame, but also partly in the 
frame of electrochemistry, Baekeland became an agent of change (Bijker 1995: 192). 
Therefore is this approach more dynamic than the Kuhnian, as change not necessary 
comes as a revolution, even though it might be rationalized as such afterwards. The 
inclusion in the frame consist in adherence to the elements of the frame 
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The eight elements that were introduced in the 
examples above do not comprise the definite 
number of possible elements that can be present in 
the technological frame. Beyond the mentioned 
elements, adds Bijker Testing procedures, Design 
methods and criteria, and User’s practice to a 
tentative list of elements, which the analyst may 
take as starting point (see also the box). In the end 
it will be a task for the analyst to establish and 
identify elements that are meaningful in the 
specific study, which I return to in the following 
chapter where I contextualise the concepts with 
the study of the precautionary principle. The 
inclusion in technological frames via adherence to 
the specific elements has both a structural and an 
agency side, both unconscious and conscious 
aspects. On the one hand the possibility for the 
agent to take specific elements of the frame gives the manoeuvre room that 
corresponds to the understanding of ‘discourse’ as a strategic possibility that was 
presented in the previous chapter. On the other hand, the affiliation to a technological 
frame is likely to involve enculturation and discursive closure. Finally, access to a 
specific technological frame may be protected by professional pedigrees and validity 
tests that set the members of the frame apart from other social actors or groups. Here, 
it is very important to distinguish between such ‘member-groups’ and the 
technological frame; as I stressed before is the frame located between actors and 
between actors and artefacts, and there should therefore not be equalised between a 
technological frame and the social group e.g. what Haas and others has conceptualised 
as a epistemic community. But this do not hinder that certain groupings may protect or 
attempt to monopolise the right to use a certain technological frame. A brief example 
could be engineers protecting the engineering class through educative standards and 
title protection. This corresponds to the maintenance- and defensive mechanisms of a 
paradigm that Kuhn and other describes (see e.g. Kuhn, 1970: 43-51 or Haas, 1992: 
17), with the explicitation that Kuhn would say that the determination of normal 
science could come about without the intervention of discoverable rules.   
The last deviation from the Kuhnian disciplinary matrix prototype that I shortly will 
give attention here is the inclusion of other groups than scientists, and the inclusion of 
other elements than the purely cognitive. Technically speaking this ‘extension’ comes 
with the inclusion of the ‘non-expert’ elements in the technological frame that has a 
social and materialistic character (contrast e.g. with Kuhn, 1970 182-187). 
3.2.3 Notes on my appropriation of the SCOT terminology 
The SCOT framework has been developed for historical studies of the social 
construction of artefacts. I my work I expand this scope to ongoing processes. These 
do of cause have history, and for that part my work may not deviate much from 
Bijker’s. But in addition to the historical perspective, which I find very important and 
not least interesting, am I also keen to study the dynamics and perspective for the 
processes of inclusion, stabilisation, and closure in the field of chemicals regulation. 
Figure 3.4: A tentative list of 
elements of a technological frame 
(Bijker, 1995: 125). 
• Goals,  
• Key problems,  
• Problem solving strategies,  
• Requirements to be met by 
problems solutions,  
• Current theories,  
• Tacit knowledge,  
• Testing procedures,  
• Design methods and 
criteria,  
• User’s practice,  
• Perceived substitution 
function,  
• Exemplary artefacts  
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The field I am concerned with do therefore not possess the simplicity and clarity that 
history tends the give reality in hindsight. But do this involve any consequences for 
my study in the sense of theory and methodology? I have, of cause, to direct my 
analysis more towards interviews and participatory observation than to historical 
documents. 
Secondly, I do not close up on the individual construction and the process of invention 
as Bijker does. My focus lies at a slightly more aggregated level, where the 
construction of the single artefacts plays a role for the construction of reality.  
How does technological frame and story lines fit together? Where the storyline comes 
from the rhetorical and linguistic angle, comes the technological frame from the 
material. However, they share the character of being a possibility for the actor, and I 
would rather describe them as complimentary than contradictory. In my study, the 
frame with respect to technology therefore becomes a part of a knowledge frame with 
respect to environmental regulation and environmental policy. 
I elaborate on the relation between the two theoretical approaches in the following 
chapter. 
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4 Theoretical and Analytical Framework 
4.1 Reconciliation of SCOT and discourse theory 
The two theoretical stepping stones that I have chosen have many similarities. They 
share the view of ‘reality’ as a social construct; the reality that matters is the reality we 
perceive. This imply for the discourse analysis that it is interesting how we talk about 
and understand ‘reality’ and thereby constructs it. In the SCOT perspective is the basic 
premises the same, but the focus is concerned with the construction of artefacts. The 
discourse theoretical approach that I apply9 do not rule out the discursive role of 
matter; structures and artefacts, and the social construction of technology approach do 
not rule out the role of the social. 
I use the discourse theory to examine the political and discursive processes that relate 
to the precautionary principle, and the SCOT-terminology to examine the practises 
that constitute the regulation of chemicals and the precautionary principle in this 
regulation.  
My study-object is the precautionary principle in the regulation of chemicals, and I 
combine the two approaches to perform this task. No doubt; the ‘high-styled 
Precautionary Principle’ of the abstract international negotiations is merely a political 
principle; it is not an artefact and certainly not a technical artefact. The ‘high-styled 
Precautionary Principle’ is best described in general terms; (from the Rio declaration) 
“[…] Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation.” (Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, (Annex I) 1992/6/14: principle 15) 
But when the precautionary principle comes into action is it not with the general terms 
that it strikes, but in changed practises. We can follow the dissemination of the 
precautionary principle, but we may oversee what change the principle makes if we 
attach too much attention to the word and the political processes where the word is 
explicit. Therefore, I combine discourse theory with the approach developed by Bijker 
and others to enhance my analysis’ sensitivity towards the construction of the practises 
that are used for the assessment of chemicals. It is exactly these practises that are so 
important for the constitution of the concept ‘valid’, ‘safe’ and ‘toxic’, which take 
centre stage in the debate over the regulation of chemical substances. 
It is reasonable to say that the precautionary principle until very recently at the most 
has had a distant effect on the regulation of chemicals. The precautionary principle 
played therefore a role as a challenge to the existing practises, when it emerged during 
the 1990s. The key artefact for the regulation of chemicals; the creation of the testing 
regimes took its beginning in the early 1970s in the UN and the OECD that took the 
lead in the 1980s (Nichols & Crawford, 1983: 34pp and Jasanoff, 1986: 75), and is 
therefore beyond the scope of the present study. But I stress the constructedness of this 
                                                     
9 With inspiration from Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, Hajer, 1995 and Neumann, 2001. 
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testing regime by using the SCOT-terminology, and I use it to conceptualise how this 
construction is threatened with re-opening. 
We can say that the two theoretical approaches are used to follow two plots. The 
discourse-analytical concept form the backbone in my analysis of the precautionary 
principle as a political concept, and the SCOT-terminology form the backbone in my 
analysis of the construction and discussion of testing-practises, that constitutes valid 
knowledge, safe, and toxic in the prevalent discourse on chemical-technological risk. 
In practise will the two terminologies often have relevance at the same time; when a 
given testing practise is threatened by opening will this most likely also mean that the 
risk-discourse is being opened, and certain issues will logically be relevant at both 
places, e.g. discussions of what safe means and what toxic means. The closure of the 
conceptualisation of ‘toxicity’ will likewise have influence on the risk-discourse. 
These are concepts that have relevance for both political debate and expert discourse. 
The interweaving of the concepts is depicted in the table below. 
  Concepts from Hajer discourse theory <- relation -> 
Concepts from SCOT 
 Structural 
/ general 
 Discourse; 
Discourse institutionalisation 
No directly 
corresponding concept 
Absent; The way a knowledge 
frame works correspond much to 
the functioning of a discourse, as it 
specify the way in which members 
of a relevant social group interact, 
and the way in which they think and 
act. Furthermore the semiotic power 
concept has similarities with the 
discourse concept 
 Discourse Coalition;  
Storyline 
Actors 
Practises 
Same level but DC is 
broader and shallower 
than KF 
Knowledge Frame; 
Relevant Social Group(s) 
Goals, Key Problems, Practises, 
Theories, etc. 
 Opening of Discourse 
Closure of Discourse 
Different level but corre-
sponding concepts 
Opening of artefact 
Closure and stabilisation of artefact 
 Discourse representations 
discourse hegemony / 
domination  
(see Neumann, 2001pp50) 
Concepts contained in 
opening / closure; 
  Outset in discourse  
vs. outset in artefact  
Interpretative flexibility 
Fixity of meaning 
 
 Semiotic power; structure-side of 
power (see discourse) 
pr
oc
es
s /
 
Sp
ec
ifi
c 
 
Micro-powers; power can be 
understood as what produce 
the social. Power produces 
meaning and power excludes 
meaning. 
Corresponding concepts 
Micropolitics of power; actor part 
of power 
Table 4.1: Reconciliation of the Discourse approach and the SCOT approach.  
Parts to the framework of analytical concepts. For a more elaborate discussion of the 
concepts, please see the exploration of the two approaches in the previous two chapters.  
The two approaches’ different focus becomes clear when one look at the two 
approaches’ central and operational concepts. The knowledge frame (appropriated 
from the original notion of technological frame) resembles the Kuhnian notion of a 
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disciplinary matrix. It is therefore centred on some kind of practise. Bijker’s example 
is e.g. celluloid chemistry, and in my study is the frame that constitutes the OECD 
testing regime an example. A Discourse Coalition could very well refer to a 
knowledge frame, and in my study is the attention towards this situation particular 
strong. But a discourse coalition may refer to other things, and the members of a 
discourse coalition may not be members of a knowledge frame, even though reference 
is made to the frame.  
A knowledge frame may be more persistent than the discourse coalition as the 
practices of knowledge frame is institutionalised in laboratory practise and often will 
consist partly of written rules and directions, whereas the practises of the discourse 
coalition have the character of communicative interaction, which may or may not be 
translated into institutional arrangements. 
Both the two approaches are reluctant to use the power concept as power is perceived 
as a relational phenomenon, and not anything in itself; there are no essential power, 
but the existence of very powerful constructions and relations is incontestable. The 
type of power that primarily has the attention in the discourse analytical approach 
corresponds to what others has termed consciousness controlling power and 
institutional power (see e.g. Christensen & Daugaard Jensen, 2001).  
Discourse (or institutional power) is both working ‘behind the back’ of the actors, and 
it may be employed strategically. The actor may in the same moment be subject to the 
discourse in which they move and draw on a variety of discourses (see e.g. Dryzek, 
1997: 20). In the argumentative interaction, which is an important process for change, 
may arguments be shaped strategically so as to make them valid in a specific 
discourse, or reference to a specific discourse may be used to control the other’s 
perception of problem and interest. But the functioning of the discourse may also do 
the same without a conscious actor ‘pulling the wires’.  
4.2 Putting the concepts to use 
4.2.1 Translations (not Diffusion) between sites and arenas 
A central process category, which is latent in framework as it is constructed now, is 
‘translation’. It is a basic feature of a story-line that it has the capability of translating 
concepts between different frames of understanding – discourses – that otherwise 
would have been mutually incompatible or distant.  
Likewise is it important to stress that the translation-notion has the same implications 
at the practise level; different actors or relevant social groups ‘see’ different artefacts; 
they translate it to fit into their specific frame of understanding, or stress certain parts 
of its capabilities. 
When we follow the precautionary principle around could it be intriguing to talk about 
the diffusion of the principle but I will conceptualise the dissemination of the principle 
with the terms translations and transformations. I will argue that the principle is 
context dependent, and that this makes the translation-concept important. There is 
general support to the precautionary principle in Denmark and in the rest of the 
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European Union, even among the industrial organisations including the chemical 
industry. But it would be far fetched to say that this lead or will lead to a common 
perception of what the principle will imply in practise. The actual forms the principle 
has or may take is therefore negotiated and formed in the specific case. The notion of 
translation is therefore important for my conceptualisation of the dissemination of the 
Precautionary Principle as a policy concept. 
The concrete struggles over the precautionary principle are performed in the specific 
practises where the principle challenges the dominant risk-discourse. We can talk 
about the struggles as performed at a number of sites or arenas. These arenas may be 
the laboratory where certain test designs are employed, and steering groups discussing 
and legitimising experiments; or it could be intergovernmental bodies working on the 
creation and harmonisation of test guidelines; councils counselling authorities or 
interest groups on what is safe and what is unsafe. It may be the public media where 
debates relate to experiments, new knowledge, or political processes and outcomes.   
Case 1
Case 2
Case 3
Case 4
Case 5
Case n
Arena 2Arena 1 Arena 3 
Precautionary principle
The varying 
outcomes and 
diskussions shapes 
different practises 
that constitutes the 
contextualised 
precautionary 
principleArena 2
Arena e Arena f
Arena m2 Arena m1
Arena l
Arena k
Arena 4
 
Figure 4.1: The precautionary principle is shaped in the totality of single cases. 
The zigzagged lines symbolise reference to the precautionary principle. The marked arenas 
should be perceived as those arenas that are devoted special attention by the analyst; with the 
wide definition that is applied of the arena concept here will the accentuation of the 
precautionary principle always take place at some kind of arena. Furthermore, the principle 
may be at the agenda at different arenas at the same time in the same case, and the individual 
cases may not be as individual as the figure indicates, but may rather be intertwined and 
mutually interdependent, which is indicated with the grey arrow.  
The important point is that the struggle to define the precautionary principle is not a 
grand universal one, but is discretely distributed over various issues and arenas. I 
investigate debates in Danish written Medias that involve explicit reference to the 
precautionary principle. This gives a picture of the fragmented and diverse character 
of the struggles to define and use the principle that characterises the examinations of 
the concept in the following chapters .The cases, which are of very varying character 
and nature, follow each a specific course of events that crosses a number of arenas and 
sites such as those exemplified above. Furthermore is the precautionary principle not 
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necessarily a part of the active rhetoric at al stages of the individual cases; often will 
the principle be rejected as relevant, or simply omitted, shortly after being introduced, 
or the principle may simply not become explicit at the early stages or at all. We can 
say that the cases function as media for the principle.  
4.2.2 Obligatory Point of Passage and Power 
I add the notion ‘obligatory point of passage’ to my study of the processes of openings 
and closures of the concepts ‘valid’, ‘safe’ and ‘toxic’ in the specific cases. Obligatory 
point of passage has been adapted by Bijker, Latour, Callon and others for the study of 
science from military-strategic language (see e.g. Bijker, 1995, Law & Callon, 1992, 
Latour, 1988a, and Callon, 1986). The key idea in the mother concept is to use the 
landscape; topography, infrastructures etc, in such a way that attackers can approach 
only via a limited number of routes (which means the attacker more easily can be 
crushed). The notion mean in the adapted form to arrange an argument in such a way 
that it uses existing discursive and institutional arrangements in such a way that only 
specific types of arguments are valid as critic (especially Callon). Bijker adds that also 
an artefact such as a certification scheme can play the role as an obligatory point of 
passage, and in my study are harmonised test guidelines examples on an obligatory 
point of passage to validity. 
Test guidelines and good laboratory practise guidelines are a particular type of 
routines. They have been developed to secure the uniformity of testing across time and 
space, and to secure against both sloppiness and technical import-restrictions (see e.g. 
Nichols & Crawford, 1983: 61 on need to the need to improve industry’s testing 
procedures in the 1970s and pp38 on economic and trade aspects). In my analysis of 
the precautionary principle these guidelines have at least two functions. Firstly, as 
semiotic power they represents the routines that reproduce important parts of the 
testing regime and the risk assessment discourse. Secondly, they may function as 
micropolitical devises in the negotiations of what ‘valid’, ‘safe’ and ‘toxic’ means. 
In the specific struggles at the specific arenas may also more simple types of power 
come to play. We may instead use the term force to differ between the institutional / 
discursive types of power which has been discussed above. When the power-concept 
refers to the principal exemption of specific possibilities, then does the force-concept 
refer to suppression of concrete (existing) possibilities (Jørgensen & Phillips, 1999: 
60). Christensen and Daugaard (2001) has demonstrated four analytical types of 
power, of which the two corresponds to what I here term force. The first is direct force 
which is performed in the decision-situation. The employment of force is here the 
parties’ relative positions of strength, which will depend on e.g. money, position, or 
knowledge (Christensen & Daugaard Jensen, 2001: pp32). ‘A’ may use economic 
resources to buy ‘B’, or the position of ‘B’ may be threatened if ‘A’ is a superior to 
‘B’ in the same hierarchy, or if ‘A’ posses a more extensive knowledge about the 
problem and its solution. However, the decision-situation may in practise also be 
dominated by discursive structures (hegemonic discourses) that provide support for 
specific positions, so that the force is supplemented with or intertwined by power.  
The second type is indirect force which comes into play as filters that 1) limits the 
accessibility of the arena so that not all problem can gain access, and 2) limits the 
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implementation of decisions so that even though there may have been reached a 
decision, is the decision not put into practical politics (Christensen & Daugaard 
Jensen, 2001: pp50). Filter one could e.g. be definitions of which problems are 
relevant, or it could be narrowed time-limits for complaining. Filter two could consist 
of delegation of competence to execute the decision, or it could be unclear or widely 
interpretable decisions or non-decisions such as ‘more investigations needed’. Again 
will the concrete situation arguable also depend on discursive structures, and the 
employment of filters will probably not be solely interest based.  
The filter-notions do have some similarity to the obligatory point of passage, as both 
concepts describe a limited access to something. The most important difference is the 
site or arena dependency of the filter-notion and the idea of its rational employment, 
which probably is related to the positivist tradition that the filter concept comes from 
(Christensen & Daugaard Jensen, 2001: 61). In contrast do the obligatory point of 
passage-notion - it seems to me - catch both the structure and the actor-side of power, 
and it may function over time and space. We can therefore think of an obligatory point 
of passage as something that may function as a filter controlling the access to specific 
arenas. 
The following figure sum up the relation between discourses, discourse coalitions, and 
knowledge frame in the analytical frame. I have so far been relatively muted about 
what the discourses may be, but I will catch up on that in the following subsection. 
The actors draw on discourses in the creation of storylines. The creations of these 
narratives on social and physical reality build on elements from different domains and 
discourses. Concurrently is the discourses also influenced by the creation of storylines 
and discourse coalitions. A special attention is devoted to knowledge frames that 
constitute different versions of ‘valid knowledge’, ‘safe’ and ‘toxic’. The actors and 
practises of these frames will often also take part in the discourse coalition, or be used 
as a constituting part of the discourse coalition. 
Discourse 
n+one
Discourse n+two
Discourse 
n+three Discourse n+four
Knowledge Frame x:
Relevant social groups
Routines 
practices
…
Knowledge Frame y:
Relevant social groups
Routines 
practices
Other actors 
and their practises Other actors 
and their practises
Discourse coalition A:
Storyline - Actors - Practises
Discourse coalition B:
Storyline - Actors - Practises
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Figure 4.2: Relations between Discourse, Discourse Coalition, and Knowledge Frame.  
In principle will all practise be related to discourse, but to simplify the figure has the 
representation of discourses been placed in the upper part of the figure.  
Knowledge frames is perhaps best conceived of as frozen discourse or institutionalised 
discourse, as they definitely support and constitute certain discursive structures. 
4.3 Discursive struggles to define the precautionary principle 
and the regulation of chemicals  
My general research interest in this study is whether the precautionary principle takes 
part in a change of the performed chemicals regulation. This interest and a general 
hypothesis for the relations between these two are outlined below. 
Rational Risk Discourse
Constituted e.g. by the dominant Testing Regime
Industrialist Discourse
Chemicals regulation;
Hazard Assessement – Risk Assessment – Risk Management
Precautionary
Principle
Environmentalist 
Discourses
 
The precautionary principle act itself as a storyline or a boundary concept between the 
rational risk discourse and environmentalist discourses. The primary target for the 
precautionary principle (in terms of the location of practises that should be changed) is 
the actual regulation of chemicals. In this struggle to redefine the premises of the 
chemicals regulation do the precautionary principle itself involved in a discursive 
struggle as it both influence and become co-opted by the rational risk discourse. 
It is the discursive construction of the precautionary principle, as an idea and a 
specific type of knowledge in a dialectical interrelation with the social construction of 
the technologies and artefacts that enacts and materialises the principle, which is at the 
agenda in these processes. 
The types of translations at the discursive level that I am especially interested could be 
framed as what Andrew Jamison call the translation of green knowledge into the field 
of chemicals regulation (Jamison, 2001). Jamison use appropriation as related to 
translation, meaning the act of acquiring something that is translated and thereby made 
meaningful and useful in the same move.  
In SCOT terminology, the closure processes of the precautionary principle – or in 
discourse terminology, the creation of a hegemonic or dominant version of what the 
precautionary principle is and how it should be interpreted – will depend on processes 
of stabilisation and closure of the smaller practises such as methods for collecting 
legitimate data and relevant knowledge. In return, these smaller practises will depend 
on processes of hegemony and dominance at the discursive level. Therefore, the 
translation processes will involve both a discursive and a practise level.  
 PART THREE: ROOTS OF THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE  
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5 Conceptual considerations on the precautionary 
principle 
In the outset, I will give some introductory ideas to how we may understand the 
precautionary principle, and do that with reference to theoretical considerations in the 
previous chapter, with weight to the discursive level. Then I will present the historical 
background for the Precautionary Principle in environmental policy, and sketch out 
how the concept has moved into the realm of chemicals regulation.  
5.1 History of the precautionary principle 
 
M e d ic in e  e tc
C r i t ic a l  s o c ia l  m o v e m e n t  
( E n v ir o n m e n t  e tc )
( B a s ic )  L in g u is t ic  m e a n in g  o f  P r e c a u t io n
P ro a c t iv eC o n s tr a in in g
• S m a ll  is  b e a u tif u l
• W in d  tu rb in e s
• C le a n e r  te c h n o lo g ie s
• . . .
• P r o h ib it io n s
• G r e e n  ta x e s
• U n w a n te d  
s u b s ta n c e s
• . . .
B u re a u c ra t ic  
r e s p o n s e
• D i lu t in g
• F i l t e r in g
• T e c h n o lo g iz in g
• O rg a n iz in g
• P ro d u c t i f in g
S c ie n c e B u re a u c ra c y C iv ic B u s in e s s ?
Figure 5.1 Sketch of the development  of the precautionary principle from a basic linguistic 
to policy-forms of the principle, which is discussed in the present chapter. 
. 
5.1.1 Common language 
If we comprehend of the precautionary principle as the idea of taking into account the 
body of knowledge that we do not have, has the principle probably been around as 
long as humanity has existed. When we turn to the dictionary, precaution is defined as  
“[…] 1. a measure taken in advance to avert possible evil or to secure good results. 2. 
caution employed beforehand; prudent foresight. – v.t. 3. to forewarn; put on guard.” 
(The Random House College Dictionary: 1042),  
and precautionary is defined as  
“[…] 1. of, pertaining to, or characterised by precaution. 2. expressing or advising 
precaution.” (ibid) 
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At this basic linguistic level, there is nothing ‘special’ about precaution; it is not 
specifically attached to environmental problems, health issues, or the application of 
technology. Precaution is simply attached to the common sense knowledge that man 
does not know everything, and it may be favourable to act before absolute knowledge 
is established. As such, precaution can be seen as an extension of prevention. Where 
prevention is about preventing known an outcome is precaution about preventing a 
possible evil or about securing a possible good. Therefore, it is easy to find numerous 
of historical references to situations where precaution has been applied. Precaution is a 
part of human language, and to take precautions must be a part of human nature. 
In this definition, the difference between precaution and prevention seems be what is 
known, and hence the boarder line seems to be a gradient. If a problem, with the 
current knowledge, poses an uncertain threat is it precaution to attempt to prevent 
possible harm. If there did exist the knowledge that the same problem did pose a 
specific threat, would it be prevention to prevent the possible harm. However, a slight 
difference does linger in the background. Prevention is targeted at hindering 
something (bad) to happen, but precaution may as well secure something (good). 
Precaution therefore has both a positive, and a negative meaning. This will in the 
following show to be a quite important detail about the word precaution that can be re-
established at the level of the policy-concept of precaution. The English policy-
concept of precaution has tendentiously only captured the negative connotation of the 
linguistic term precaution, and this is most likely due to the anti character that has 
been characteristic for much of the discourse on environment. Meanwhile, a number 
of smaller practices, ranging from grassroots’ bottom-up activities in line with ‘small 
is beautiful’ (Schumacher, 1973), to governments support to cleaner technology-
programmes as it has been seen in Denmark and Europe, has expressed the positive 
and progressive dimension of precaution. We will return to this. 
In the following, I will study how precaution has moved from being a ‘normal word’ 
to become a policy concept.  
5.1.2 ‘Precaution’ in scientific writing – pre-precautionary principle 
As a logical result of the word ‘precaution’s common meaning, is the word to be 
found in scientific writing long before it starts to constitute a political programme. 
Based on a search in ISI web of science® is it revealed that ‘precaution’ has occurred 
regularly in scientific writing (at least) since WWII. In the figure below is the number 
of articles per year with ‘precaution*’ in the title since 1945 depicted. On the figure, a 
second series show the total number of articles in the database in the same period, 
indexed with the 1970 count of articles with ‘precaution’ in the title.  
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 Figure 5.2 Number of articles pr year with 'precaution*' in the title, 1945-2000. 
 
The figure show that the number of articles that refers to precaution in the title takes a 
more or less constant share of the total number of articles registered in the database, 
which is in line with what could be expected when precaution is a ‘normal’ word. The 
next interesting issue is which subjects precaution has been used in conjunction with. 
The absolute majority of journals that bring the articles are of the medical type. The 
issues are precautions in relation to health, infections, epidemics, laboratory practises, 
and occupational health in industries. This picture is relatively steady up to the 1970s 
where fire precautions as a safety issue in construction and architecture also become a 
much-debated topic. In the 1980s Environmental journals start to bring articles using 
the concept, most notably Marine Pollution Bulletin, and from the 1990s emerges a 
number of journals concerned with environmental issues that use the term 
‘Precaution’. However, in the whole period from 1945 to now, predominantly the 
medical journals bring articles referring to ‘precaution’ in the title. In scientific writing 
is precaution chiefly a concept used in medical language, and hence where humans 
and secondary livestock may be at risk. Only in the 1980s and ahead the idea of 
applying precaution to nature and environment becomes explicit, and this happens, as 
we shall see in more detail shortly, in the same move as the precautionary principle 
emerge as a concept. At this stage, I will say that the relation between the medical and 
environmental ‘types’ of precaution are distant, and goes back to the linguistic 
meaning of precaution. 
Most of the environment-related use of ‘precaution’ in the articles reflected in the 
figure is more related to the ‘environmental precautionary principle’ than to the 
‘medical precaution-concept’, and thus becomes a distant relative to the medical 
dominated precaution-concept. The main route of translation to the precautionary 
principle does therefore not come from medicine but rather from the critical social 
movement as depicted in figure 5.1.  
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Figure 5.3 The Precautionary Principle in scientific writing. 
The figure is based on a search for ‘precautionary principle’ in title, keywords, and abstract. 
The consulted database does not have abstracts and keywords in entries before 1991. This 
does however only introduce a minor fault, as most of the hits comes after this date. 
5.1.3 The German roots of the policy-concept 
There seem to be an overarching agreement among all authors writing about the 
precautionary principle that the concept emerged in the former West Germany as the 
‘Vorsorgeprinzip’, and the pedigree of the precautionary principle is often assumed to 
start there. Beyond this, the German history of the principle is quite interesting, 
because the precautionary principle in Germany shape part of a larger political 
programme, of which parts has been visible in the Danish national environmental 
strategy.  
The German Vorsorgeprinzip was developed in a specific social, economic, and 
political context, during an era of strong social democratic planning. In 1969 won 
Willy Brandt and the Social Democratic party the election with a highly ambitious 
environmental programme and the promise of Vorsorge, and in the 1970s and 1980s 
became the Vorsorgeprinzip part of a much broader effort to initiate and justify what 
has been called a period of ‘industrial restructuring and modernisation’ (Boehmer-
Christiansen, 1994: 43, 32). For Hajer (1995) and Weale (1992, 1993) this political 
programme was framed by an ‘ideology’ they label ‘ecological modernisation’, and 
which had, and still have, the idea of convergence of environmental and economic 
goals as its hallmark.  
Boehmer-Christiansen identify Vorsorge as state influenced planning, and trace the 
German application of Vorsorge to environmental policy to the 1970 first draft of the 
clean air legislation, which stated the intention dem Enstehen Schädlicher 
Umwelteinwirkungen vorzubeugen – to prevent the environmental effects. 
Vorzubeugen literally mean to bend beforehand and thereby reduce the risk of being 
broken, and the verb is commonly used in medicine. The same idea was expressed in 
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the 1971 Umweltprogramm (environmental programme) as Umweltplanung auf lange 
Sicht, i.e. long term planning for the environment (Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994: 35). 
In the German policy context Vorsorge emerged s a counter concept to the free market 
doctrines and narrow economic feasibility criteria, which constrained any policy 
prescriptions that demanded more than the repair of damage already done (Wey 1993: 
204 in Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994:36). The concept was, according to Boehmer-
Christiansen, particularly attractive to the new Social Democrat Administration for 
furthering environmental policy as to create a fairer society, and the Vorsorgeprinzip 
gave an important impetus to put environmental protection inside the Interior Ministry 
and Foreign affairs (Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994: 36). Vorsorge was seemingly a 
quite general translation of the new concern for the environment, which had its rise 
with the counter cultural movements in the 1960s:  
“The views and ideals of the North American environmental protest movement had struck 
a deep chord in German society. This allowed the state […] to assert themselves in a new 
policy area, often by appealing to the Germanic fondness for future catastrophes” 
(Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994: 43) 
Environmental protection was moved from the Health Ministry to the much more 
powerful Federal Interior Ministry (BMI), that with Vorsorge among its weaponry faced 
the Federal Economic Affairs Ministry (BMWi). The basic assumptions of the BMI were 
that technical progress, economic growth, and environmental protection could be 
achieved without ‘trade-off’, and in fact would advance together (Boehmer-Christiansen, 
1994: 44).  
In 1976 did the Vorsorgeprinzip appear in German Legislation:  
“Environmental policy is not fully accomplished by warning off imminent hazards and 
the elimination of damage that occurred. Precautionary environmental policy requires 
furthermore that natural resources are protected and demands on them are made with 
care” (von Moltke, 1988: 58). 
As recession struck in the late 1970s the SPD lost power and was replaced in 1981 by 
a right-wing coalition. Even though recession alone was a threat to the Vorsorge 
strategy, as it becomes harder to argue for a preventive strategy based on investment in 
technology that may or may not abate unknown future environmental degrading when 
financial shortness is lurking, did the Vorsorgeprinzip not fade out with the new 
CDU/CSU/FDP coalition. In fact, the opposite happened, most likely because Die 
Grünen – the Green Party – entered parliament, and the political need to be active in 
the environmental arena therefore did not diminish. That the Greens entered 
parliament was of course itself a result of a broad popular concern about the 
environment, which especially had its fulcrum around the Waldsterben. Possibly with 
this motivation, did Helmut Kohl and the rightwing coalition in the 1980s emphasize 
the Vorsorgeprinzip because it was taken as a market-orientated alternative to the 
Verursacherprinzip – the polluter-pays-principle – which had been the central 
principle in the social-liberal SPD-directed government’s traditional command and 
control policy (Zimmermann 1990: 3-4).  
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The strategy of furthering economic growth and environmental protection has 
probably been an attractive way to meet the onrushing green party. This reveals 
interestingly a distinctive openness of the German version of the precautionary 
principle. The Vorsorgeprinzip was introduced under the SPD government to 
counterbalance the economic feasibility criteria, and later when the CDU leaded 
government came to power was the principle stressed as an alternative to the polluter 
pay principle! Most likely, this special twist has lead to the situation as it has been 
from the 90s where Germany more or less has been detached from the formulation of 
European environmental policy. Germany certainly has high scientific-technical 
standards reflected in limit values and orders regarding minimisation and optimisation 
– in other words instruments to the modernisation of technology – but the 
implementation is totally based on volunteer programmes in the industry, and with 
very limited possibilities for public control (Pehle, 1997: 203). Examples is the very 
hesitant German implementation of the directives on public access to official 
environmental files and information, and the directive on environmental impact 
assessment (Pehle, 1997: 202). 
Environmental protection in Germany has therefore in general been a combination of 
Vorsorge and the development and promotion of cleaner technologies; i.e. the German 
strategy is technology driven, with Vorsorge as the legitimising and driving argument. 
The key policy concept was Stand der Technik, and Beste Stand der Technik, which 
was supposed to encourage investments and promote technological change, as well as 
to stimulate applied research. However, the succes of this strategy, i.e. the 
convergence of environmental protection and economic competitiveness, is depending 
on the availability of investment funds and political motivation, and here did the 
Vorsorgeprinzip play a crucial role as metaphor for this strategy of converging 
environmental and economic goels (Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994: 50-51).  
Boehmer-Christiansen (50-52) points to three specific factors that in the German 
context helped creating the linkage between metaphor and action:  
Ambitious rhetoric and programme development are encouraged by the federal nature 
of the German state, the dominance of coalition governments and the almost 
continuous assessment of politicians through elections. 
The engineering profession and not natural scientists dominate the advisory process. 
Decision criteria additional to natural scientific and economic ones are promoted, 
especially those that relate to innovation and application of new technology. 
The courts play a major role in interpretation and implementation of environmental 
regulation, deciding disputes over Stand der Technik, and whether Vorsorge has been 
satisfied. Expert advise to the courts are provided i.e. by the German Association of 
Engineers (VDI). Because there exist two legal definitions of Stand der Technik is this 
advise very important. 
This specific constellation of institutional and cultural factors, which has lead to the 
technology-driven environmental policy that stress applied rather than pure research, 
has an important consequence. The hitherto most dominating policy model for 
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environmental regulation – and especially for regulation of chemicals – is a reactive 
model, based on ‘purer’ science to prove harm before action is taken, and this model 
has a basic problem. It is based on traditional economics and natural science, which 
both require fully understood causality, or known probabilities of the problem to be 
regulated, and this lead to highly complex decision rules, i.e. as it is known from the 
European Chemicals Risk Assessment programme. Moreover, this is not altered if the 
onus of proof is moved from victim to polluter. It is commonly accepted that for major 
environmental problems is the causality between cause and effect hard to establish and 
prove in scientific terms. The transition from the ‘academic’ approach to policy is 
problematic because it is stuck in the diagnostics of the problem. The alternative 
policy model for environmental regulation, based on Vorsorge and Stand der Technik, 
bypass this problem by legitimising technical change with reference to environmental 
threats. (Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994: 56). 
Boehmer-Christiansen ironically remarks that, because of the priority given to 
technical possibilities over proof of causality, American lawyers may have a political 
bias against the precautionary principle. This is because the US process of 
environmental policy making apparently places the legal profession at the centre of 
controversy, thereby limiting the powers of the bureaucracy to make ‘complex 
judgements and to rely on inexplicit criteria’. In Germany, Boehmer-Christiansen 
writes, “this power relationship appears to be reversed, precaution giving discretionary 
powers to the bureaucracy rather than to lawyers, a development the American legal 
procession is not likely to welcome.” 
In the 1980s the strong environmental policies was in place in Germany, and as a 
logical consequence it was crucial for the German industry that the stricter 
requirements like Stand der Technik was extended to the European Union, so that the 
increased requirements could be turned into competitive advantages at the export 
markets. (See e.g. Weale, 1993: 214, Jordan, 2001: 146, and von Moltke, 1988: 57-
58). Furthermore, Jordan (op cit) has argued that this specific German configuration 
has had a conclusive importance for the shaping of European Environmental 
regulation and the emphasis on cleaner technologies. 
The German move towards using the principle internationally were especially 
accomplished with the proposals at the North Sea negotiations in 1984 (Bremen 
Declaration), and the first explicit international formulation of the precautionary 
concept was contained in the Declaration of the Second International North Sea 
Conference on the Protection of the North Sea (London Declaration) (Freestone & 
Hey, 1996: 4-5). This was probably also the reason why the English Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution ordered the report on the Vorsorgeprinzip in 
West German environmental policy in 1987 (see von Moltke, 1988), which is regarded 
as presenting one of the first formal English translations of the principle (see Haigh, 
1994: 230, and Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994: 31).  
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6 The Precautionary Principle in Denmark  
This chapter presents an overview of the precautionary principle I Denmark and serves 
as basis for the selection of the empirical study presented in the following chapter. The 
aim is to analyse changes in the Danish policy language and policy style with respect 
to the policy concept “the precautionary principle” as well as with respect to what can 
be described as precautionary practice.  
6.1 The Precautionary Principle in the Danish Media 
In this section the entrance of the precautionary principle as an explicit concept is 
analysed. This part gives broad picture of how the precautionary principle has been 
reflected in Denmark; types of constituencies, rhetoric’s, and alliances which the 
concept has been involved with. The character of the Danish debates involving the 
precautionary principle is discussed, and it is concluded that the concept ‘tap’ into 
existing practices and cases, which indicated the some kind of precaution was present 
before the precautionary principle became an established concept. This broad picture 
is the basis from which the three core cases have been taken, and the section is 
concluded with an introductory discussion of the three cases and their relevance for 
the study of the precautionary principle. 
The section examines the development and appropriation of the concept “the 
precautionary principle” in Denmark, with a focus on chemicals policy. In Danish is 
the precautionary principle, “forsigtighedsprincippet”, which is a direct translation 
from the English version of the concept. This indicates the Danish concept refers back 
to the ‘international’ concept of precaution, and not its German predecessor “der 
Vorsorgeprinzip”.  
With a point of departure in Danish Newspapers I give an overview of the use of the 
precautionary principle in popular debate in Denmark. After that I examine the first 
line of events that made the precautionary principle a Danish concept, that is, a 
concept with specific Danish meaning that somehow leads to deviation from “practice 
as usual”. Even though the precautionary principle in strict terms was new in Denmark 
in the beginning of 1990, was it the perception of Danish authorities that the principle 
had a non-spoken antecedent. In a hearing on the precautionary principle, Danish EPA 
Director General Erik Lindegaard points to the principle’s presence in a number of 
acts:  
“At first glance, the legislation does not include the precautionary principle in a way 
that jumps out and grabs you. The principle is not mentioned by name, but it is there. 
For example it states that ‘consideration must be given to the likely impact of 
pollution’. Or, as is stated in the Chemical Substances and Products Act ‘it shall be 
possible to intervene where there is a suspicion that a chemical substance is hazardous 
for health and the environment’, and so on.” (DEPA, 1998b: 6).  
I will therefore talk about both an explicit and a ‘non-spoken’ type of the 
precautionary principle. 
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The major constituencies that are involved in this process are politicians, officials 
from the Danish Environmental Protection Agency, research professionals, e.g. in the 
National Environmental Research Institute, and the National Agricultural Research 
Centre Foulum, Danish and international NGOs, and organisations representing the 
industry.  
Some of the questions I want to address are the following: Precaution is taking an 
increasing importance for the discussion of environmental issues, but why and how 
does it do that? Does precaution in Denmark make out a part of a new discourse? Or 
does it become a vehicle of change in environmental politics, or even in technology 
policy in more general? 
What is the principle and what does it do? Hajer has suggested that the principle is a 
story line. This means that the concept unites a number of disparate and hardly 
compatible worldviews and discourses. More specifically may the precautionary 
principle be a vehicle for (possible) change. 
6.2 Overview of Precaution in debates in Denmark 
Throughout the media debate relating to the precautionary principle, the principle 
mainly plays the role as an additional argument or as a codification of certain 
viewpoints and positions. The principle are used in relation to a number of different 
issues that 'lives their lives' independently of the principle at least at the outset. Hence, 
the precautionary principle does not give rise to new issues (except for itself), but it do 
give more sense in some debates than in others. The principle was – as I will come to 
shortly – introduced relatively late to the Danish scene, compared to the case in other 
countries, e.g. Germany, United Kingdom and Sweden (se Boehmer-Christiansen, 
1994, von Moltke, 1988,  and Wahlström, 1999). This might explain the maturation-
like character of the debates relating to the principle. In the early 90s the principle was 
introduced, as Danish authorities found the principle potentially useful for the Danish 
aims at the international agenda of environmental politics. Concurrently, the principle 
was 'tried out' at different cases and problems at the Danish national scene. While the 
use of the precautionary principle in the debates has a character of trial-and-error, the 
principle in some cases turn out being of minor use and in other cases the principle 
gain a significant role for the argumentation.  
In this section my aim is to give the reader a larger picture of the precautionary 
principle in Danish debate. This larger picture is based on smaller and relatively 
loosely connected bits and pieces of stories and events. The essential information 
source is an analysis of round 600 articles in Danish newspapers that explicitly use the 
precautionary principle. 
I have divided the subjects up in four broad categories, relating to environmental 
issues, and one remaining that collects a variety of uses that do not relate to 
environmental issues. The first category is chemicals and chemicals regulation, and 
this theme includes a range of specific 'problem-substances' such as brominated flame 
retardants, plasticizers, and it includes discussions relating to regulation of marine 
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pollution, of persistent organic pollutants (POPs) and European regulation of 
chemicals.  
The second theme is food and consumer protection. This category covers especially 
cases where the precautionary principle has been used discussing risks related to 
technologies applied in food production, and very often, these technologies are 
chemical technologies. The most prominent issues are genetically modified organisms, 
followed by mad cow disease, pesticides in food and groundwater and growth 
hormones in beef. Especially GMOs and hormone beef are both subjects that are 
closely connected to the negotiations in WTO. These issues are combined with a 
number of more isolated food scandals and with consumer protection, especially in 
relation to the European Union.  
The third theme is the institutionalisation of the principle in national and international 
regulation and politics, and at many levels. This range from articles reflecting 
negotiations relating to UNEP, the Danish environmental protection law, to personal 
reflections from politicians and various experts regarding environmental politics.  
The last category consists of different issues where the precautionary principle has had 
an importance. The most important issue is the debate about climate change, but a 
number of disparate issues such as impoverished uranium in ammunition, 
electromagnetic fields, radioactive pollution, or bridge building. A comprehensive 
overview can be gained below. 
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Figure 6.1 A comprehensive overview of topics related to the precautionary principle in 
Danish media debate. 
Beyond the four categories, which all relate to risks associated with technologies, the 
principle is used in a number of other contexts of more economic and social nature. In 
many of these articles, the principle is used as a rhetorical trick by referring to the 
technological-risk meaning of the precautionary principle, without having anything to 
do with it.  
The figure below indicates the number of Danish national newspapers-articles using 
the Danish term for the precautionary principle. The newspaper debate can be divided 
up in three broad periods, characterised by added and accumulated subjects. The first 
period starts in the late 1980's and continues until 1995/1996. In this period, the debate 
involving the precautionary principle was dominated by distant international 
environmental issues, and supplemented with diffused attempts to a Danish 
appropriation of the principle.  
In 1995/1996, a range of new issues emerges, related to food (BSE, GMO, Hormone 
beef, food makeup) and chemicals (endocrine disrupting chemicals, phthalates in 
PVC, and pesticides in food and drinking water).  
Finally, in the end of 1999, the precautionary principle becomes a major concept 
related to the WTO negotiations especially negotiations related to GMO and Hormone 
beef, and trade emerges as a new major angle to the subjects already established as 
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‘precaution-related’. Precaution becomes a factor that is thought to protect interests of 
health and environment against the possible threats of the global economy. 
Furthermore, the precautionary principle became a part of the rhetoric when the BSE 
issue gained renewed attention in Denmark with the first (registered) Danish outbreak 
in the beginning of year 2000. 
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Figure 6.2. The Number of articles in Danish national newspapers, using the phrase 
"forsigtighedsprincippet" (the precautionary principle) is depicted with the total number of 
articles with the subject “environment”.  
The figure covers the following Danish newspapers: Ingeniøren from 1985, Berlingske 
Tidende from January 1990, Weekend Avisen from January 1991, Politiken from January 
1993 (plus selected articles from 1985-1992), Ekstra Bladet and Ritzau (Danish news agency) 
from 1993, Aktuelt from 1996 to April 6th 2001, Jyllands Posten from September 1996, and 
Information from September 1997. Due to the limited data availability are the figures covering 
the years up to 1993, 1996, and 1997 underestimated, but except for Aktuelt and Politiken are 
the papers with lagging data characterised by not referring to the principle in the first periods 
with full text available  
It is interesting that the number of articles related to environment seems to top at 
1996/97, whereas the normal perception is that environmental issues topped in the late 
1980’s. The curve might be shaped by increased database coverage, though this should 
not be the case from 1996 and onwards. If the phenomenon is not a fabrication, then 
might the explanation be that what normally is referred to be the impact of discussions 
about environment, which might not be analogue to the number of articles about 
environment. One could assume that environment in fact becomes a ‘consumer-good’ 
in the press, and the raising curve therefore in fact reflects a combined de-
politicisation and popularisation of the coverage of ‘environment’, and a move away 
from demand for fundamental actions and towards more shallow rhetoric’s and 
symbol-politics. This reflection corresponds to some extend to Andersen and Hansen’s 
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(1991) analysis of a transition to symbol-politics in relation the politics of 
eutrophication and agriculture in the late 1980s.  
6.3 The Early Days of the Precautionary Principle 
The figure above illustrates that the precautionary principle takes an ever-increasing 
importance in the Danish environmental debate. This point becomes even clearer if we 
look at the proportion of articles that refer explicit to the precautionary principle, 
compared to the number of articles that refer to ‘environment’. 
At the figure below, the periods that I have suggested can be found. In 1989 and 1990, 
the principle was introduced, and the former Environmental Minister Lone Dybkjær 
attempted (quite aggressively) to introduce the principle in domestic politics, but was 
defeated. In the following, I will give this period more attention, applying a qualitative 
approach. After the defeat came a political shift, as Dybkjær and the Social Liberals 
left the Conservative lead Government, which however did not relate directly to the 
conflicting views on environmental protection.  
The principle now got a more humble position, and the following years were calmer 
regarding environmental issues; the opposition attempted and succeeded in 1991 to 
have the precautionary principle incorporated in the Environmental Protection Law, 
and the principle became an important part of the discussions of the Rio conference, 
and the opposition managed to introduce a CO2 tax. But concurrently with the humble 
position, was the principle in general terms broadly accepted by most of the political 
spectrum, and all parties that recommended voting yes to the Maastricht treaty 
emphasized the inscription of the principle in the treaty as a big step forward, and saw 
this as an additional argument for joining the treaty. A very important part explanation 
to this consensus creation around the principle is most probably to be found in the 
parliamentary situation that existed in Denmark since Schlüter’s Conservative 
government seized power in 1982. The Conservative lead minority government’s main 
concern was economic policy as well as maintaining power after several years of 
Social Democratic reign, and it was depending on a close alliance with the social 
liberals. But the Social Liberals did not share view on environmental issues, and did 
often not support the government on these issues. So together with the Social 
Democrats and two smaller left partier, the Social Liberals formed the alternative, so-
called ‘green majority’ (see Andersen, 1997: 265-6). In 1988 Schlüter persuaded the 
Social liberals to join his new minority coalition government, but in 1990 when the 
Social liberals left government, the green majority was re-established. As the 
precautionary principle wasn’t a much debated, and the right wing government was 
weak especially on environmental issues, was precaution accepted as a policy 
principle. 
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Figure 6.3. The figure depicts the proportion of articles with ‘environment’ as subject that 
explicitly refers to the precautionary principle.  
The number of articles mentioning the precautionary principle before 1990 is low. 
Midway in this period with low attention to the precautionary principle, in 1993, 
Schlüter resigned and the green majority literary came to power, with the Social 
Democrats in coalition with the Social Liberals, the Centre Democrats, and the 
Christian People’s Party. The new minister of Environment and Energy Sven Auken 
(who remained in office until November 2001) declared, ‘Green issues will be the red 
thread of the government’s policy’. Policy integration became a common feature the 
following years with environmental management, volunteer agreements, labelling 
arrangements and green taxes, but the precautionary principle did yet not play an 
explicit role. The international co-operation brought the precautionary principle into 
the Danish environment-related discussions, and one of the most important frames was 
the fourth North Sea Conference where both the precautionary principle and ‘the 
generation target’ for the emission of chemical substances was included in text. 
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7 Plant Growth Retardants – the First Explicit Use 
of the Precautionary Principle 
I have two aims in telling the following story, the history itself, but more importantly, 
the information the story conveys about how the system for controlling chemicals 
works. In a way this case is extreme, as it was formed by a very specific political 
situation; a situation that in fact as we shall see shortly also was about many other 
things than the precautionary principle; a situation that provoked a vivid public debate 
among the involved parties. It is also characterised by scientists that were accused for 
exceeding the boundaries that surround the normal scientific principles that are used 
for assessing chemicals. The extremity of the case also means that it may have limited 
value as a readymade paradigm in the sense of how the precautionary principle later 
would be applied, though it may have been paradigmatic in the sense of setting a new 
type of agenda and in this way shaping later practices. In turn, the extremity of the 
case does give an excellent opportunity to study how the system is stressed by actors 
not following normal procedures; this lays open a number of processes and rationales 
that otherwise would remain hidden.  
My aim in telling the story is to clearly present the rationales and arguments that were 
put forward by the actors. In principle, I refuse the possibility of telling the one true 
story; the narrator will always have to make choices and exemptions; otherwise there 
will be no story but a massive inferno of information. On the other hand, it is 
important that the story I tell is in accordance with what happened. My point here will 
be that I tell the story with a preference for some specific aspects and facets, but in 
doing this I aim to be fair and balanced. 
 The story is multi-layered. It is comprised of a very specific national political 
situation, of conflicting scientific approaches, numerous constituencies with very 
different approaches as to what is valid knowledge for the regulation of chemicals and 
the criteria for validation. It shows how institutions and rules are used to re-establish 
order and the closure around specific substances as being safe.  
The case is illustrative of the contemporary regulation of chemicals in several ways. It 
exemplifies how harmonised tests may be challenged by alternative testing rationales 
and rationalities. It exemplifies how the precautionary principle as a policy principle 
was translated into the Danish national context; the attempt to regulate in a traditional 
sense was abolished by government, but was taken over by a consumer-based boycott. 
The case exemplifies how diverse the interests around a regulatory controversy may 
be, and how the forms of alliances depart from traditional patterns in environmental 
controversy. Finally, the case exemplifies how political debate may support 
sustainable, innovative pathways. 
Furthermore the case is paradigmatic because it is among the forerunners that 
introduce a new type of environmental debate where concerns for human health 
becomes a driving force, and where environmental protection, human health, and food 
production are firmly interconnected. The case thereby intersects a transition of the 
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precautionary principle that took place during the 1990s. Jordan (2001: 143) describes 
this as how the principle was ‘transmogrified’ in its topical focus: “precaution has 
been swept up by the politics of sustainability through which environmental protection 
is beginning to more forcefully intrude into previously ‘non’ environmental sectors.” 
And such intrusions do of course not slip away quietly.  
The case includes a number of mutually adjusted but distinct subsystems, which 
operate with internal codes of practices and rationales. The case would not have 
become a case if it had not been for an unwelcome “interloper’s” attempt to apply the 
newly invented precautionary principle to the case; this “interloper” was the 
environmental minister Lone Dybkjær. She became perceived this way because she 
questioned some of the basic negotiations and institutions that founded the application 
and approval of agrochemicals, this despite agrochemicals in Denmark was the 
responsibility of the Minister of Environment. As I shall demonstrate later, her 
involvement intersected furthermore with a specific set of political circumstances that 
possibly influenced the minister’s involvement. 
In my treatment of this case I devote special attention to the experts, and their advice, 
involved with the case. Three systems for expert advise are especially interesting, the 
first targeted at agricultural advice, the second targeted at human health, and the third 
at environmental protection. The first system is the professional agricultural advice 
system, which primarily consists of the Danish Agricultural Advisory Centre (DAAC) 
which is owned and run by the farmers' unions, and also of the National Institute of 
Animal Science, that provides supportive research for Danish agribusinesses. The 
second system is represented by the National Food Agency of Denmark (NFA) which 
has responsibility for food safety and pesticide residues in food. The NFA acts as the 
local representative for the World Health Organisation, which operates the UN‘s 
global harmonisation of food safety testing programme. The WHO acts to 
institutionalise the interpretation of the existing body of acknowledged information on 
chemicals. The NFA also acts as the local representative for the OECD, which 
institutionalises the design of chemicals testing procedures. Both the WHO and the 
OECD are institutions that fall under what Latour calls ‘centres of calculation’ 
creating ‘immutable mobiles’, which are ideas and concepts that do not change 
properties with changes in space and the centres or institutions that creates them 
(Latour, 1987: pp232 & 227,236-7). The third system, the Danish EPA, mostly plays 
an involuntary and subsidiary role in the case. The DEPA has responsibility for 
approving pesticides, but takes advice from the NFA on toxicological issues. 
The case became a wretched affair because information and advice transgressed the 
invisible boarders between the domains belonging to these two advisory systems. The 
agricultural advice system is, in my description, characterised by valuing local 
knowledge, and the case takes its beginning in the normal practice of this system, 
which involves practical use of the precautionary principle (tacit). The second system 
in the case is activated when the information and knowledge of the first system 
transgresses due to media and political attention. 
As I described in the previous chapter technologies have persuasively been described 
as heterogeneous systems or networks of non-human artefacts and their human 
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makers, users, and regulators. Power is distributed across networks, and the 
components of the system must function harmoniously together in order for a 
technology to work. The safe use of a machine or a product does in this context not 
only depend on its physical chemical design and manufacture but also on the 
surrounding social context (Jasanoff 1998: 174). A central aspect of the technology is 
whether it is working or non-working. The first parameter for assessing the working or 
non-working of a chemical technology is naturally the intended functionality of the 
chemical. The obvious questions are whether the pesticide kills the pest? The straw 
shortener shortens the straw? The flame retardant retards flames? Etcetera. As we can 
see from the history of Danish chemicals regulation this type of question was among 
those that were first asked by the state, but it is the second type of question that I have 
given special attention to, which may be an even trickier question than the question of 
primary functionality: Is the chemical technology safe to use?  It is easier to discuss 
the quality and quantity of an effect you expect and wish for than to discuss an effect 
you do not want and whose effect you in principle do not know. Safe working or non-
safe working has become an important part of the working or non-working of a 
technology. From this perspective the course of events in the case led to a temporary 
non-working condition of the specific chemical technologies in question. We will in 
the following see how. 
7.1 Short Introduction to the Case 
Autumn 1989 the Danish Environment Minister refused to take action based on new 
knowledge concerning the results of experiments on plant growth retardants that had 
emerged that summer. She was strongly supported in her decisions by her advisers in 
the EPA, and by toxicologists from the Ministry of Health. The experiments had 
indicated that a commonly used plant growth retardant, namely CCC, could lead to 
impaired fertility among pigs and the question was whether this could also be the case 
among humans. The following summer the results of a new experiment using a 
different plant growth retardant were published. The results indicated that fertility was 
impaired among pigs when they were fed on grain sprayed with the plant growth 
retardant Cerone. 
The Environment Minister chose this time to prohibit all sales of plant growth 
retardants with reference to the precautionary principle and the newly held Bergen 
Conference. The prohibition provoked uproar especially from the other parties in the 
government coalition as well as from the pesticide producers and importers and from 
the grain growing farmers, all finding support in the available toxicological advice. 
After an interlude, which also included a general election and change of environment 
minister, the prohibition was rescinded, and the status quo was seemingly re-
established. But the state of affairs was not restored. Some bread producing companies 
had voluntarily abandoned using treated grain in their products, and in the following 
years consumer boycotts came to play a role for increased political attention to the 
problem. A storyline, nurtured by pig-breeder’s and horse-breeder’s continued to 
sustain suspicion against the plant growth retardants and has regularly kept the issue to 
the forefront of media headlines ever since.  
 84      PART FOUR: EMPERICAL STUDIES  
7.2 Translations within the Agricultural System 
- Or to anticipate (almost) all eventualities 
The story of plant growth retardants within Denmark started with observations in the 
field and were continued with a series of experiments conducted by the National 
Institute of Animal Science10 from 1984 to 1990, which were reported in the summer 
of 1989 (Danielsen & Larsen, 1989a & Danielsen & Larsen, 1989b) and in the spring 
1990. With the release of the last results explained the following statement the 
experiments background: 
“Observations in some Danish pig herds have indicated that the use of grain crops treated 
with certain chemicals during the growing period might negatively affect feed intake and 
reproduction in pigs. 
On this background, experiments with pigs have been conducted to study the effects on 
their production characteristics and their reproduction and health status after they were 
assigned feed/straw bedding from barley crops treated with Roundup and/or Cerone 
during the crop’s growth period.” (Danielsen & Larsen, 1990: 8)  
Cerone is a plant growth retardant with the active substance ethephon, and Round up 
is an herbicide with the active ingredient glyphosate. The previous summer the results 
of the experiments with the plant growth retardant CCC (active substance 
Chlormequat-chloride) were published.A plant growth retardant is a pesticide that 
regulates the growth of plants. The substance is absorbed through the plant’s leaves 
where it affects the hormonal control system of the plant and reduces the longitudinal 
growth of the straw, preventing lodged corn. The two active substances in question 
however, chlormequat in CCC and ethephon in Cerone, act differently as they 
influence the plants differently and are used at different phases of the growth season. 
The researchers explained the background for the experiments in the 1990-report. 
They described that the consumption of pesticides such as Cerone and Roundup had 
been increasing, and concurrently cattle and pig producers together with agricultural 
advisers from the influential institution the Danish Agricultural Advisory Centre had 
noted that some herds had seen increasing problems with, among other things, 
reproduction. This knowledge had come to the researchers attention through routine 
meetings with agricultural advisers and as questions from farmers e.g. at local 
meetings in the Farmers' Association. One of the questions that the researchers had 
encountered was whether they knew of any research concerning the effects of 
pesticides on the growth and reproduction of pigs. The importance of this question 
was obvious, as the possibility of adverse effects was alarming because the number of 
offspring was and is economically crucial for all animal breeding.  
Therefore, The National Department of Cattle Husbandry and the National Crop 
Production Centre of the Danish Agricultural Advisory Centre invited the National 
Institute of Animal Science and the National Institute of Plant and Soil Science to 
                                                     
10 The National Institute of Animal Science was a government research institute under the 
Ministry of Agriculture.  
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discuss the initiation of experiment that could elucidate the suspicion. At the first 
meeting were the two pesticides selected, not because of any specific suspicion, but 
because they were common and because they were among the pesticides that were 
used closest to harvest time. It was further more decided to invite the EPA as the 
responsible authority, and the companies that produced the pesticides, and the two 
companies behind the products and the Danish EPA participated at the following 
meetings. The invitation of these actor groups demonstrated partly a tradition for a co-
operative approach to problem-solving, partly did it demonstrate the relative 
uncontroversial character of the case at that point. 
But the researchers at the National Institute of Animal Science had actually initiated 
experiments with CCC in 1984. The Danish Agricultural Advisory Centre’s attention 
was however also directed at Roundup and that is why they initiated the meetings, 
which ultimately led to the Roundup/Cerone experiments (per com with Danielsen 
2003). The activities at this stage were meetings arranged by the Danish Agricultural 
Advisory Service, with participation from the corresponding departments from the 
National Crop and Animal Science Research institutions. At a meeting at the Danish 
Agricultural Advisory Centre on May 31st 1985, it was concluded that the experiments 
should be started.  
Participants at the meeting included the Danish Agricultural Advisory Centre, the 
National Institute of Animal Science, the National Institute of Plant and Soil Science, 
the Danish Environmental Protection Agency, and the companies Monsanto and 
Danish Shell (later Rhône-Poulenc Agro Norden)11. The two companies entered into a 
contract with the organisers of the experiments that gave them hearing rights during 
the experiments and a 90-day period for examination of the results in relation to their 
publication, and a duty to participate in the financing of the experiments.  
It was decided that the experiments should cover separate experiments with pigs and 
young bulls, and later experiments with poultry and mink were to be added. 
(Danielsen & Larsen, 1990: 10, Landsudvalget for kvæg / Jeppesen, 1985) 
Danielsen and Larsen (1990: 10) would later note, in the report on the results, that the 
two pesticides were tested and approved for dedicated use by the authorities. 
However, the authors would also stress that this testing primarily was based on 
experimental animals, and only to a limited extent on larger domestic animals. This 
was a basic reason why they found it important to initiate the experiments. In the 
following it will be clear, that this clause was very important –reading between the 
lines it could read: we know that these substances have been tested according to 
internationally approved test guide lines and in accordance with good laboratory 
practice, but we do question whether these experiments are adequate for pig breeding.  
This could have been seen as a challenge to the existing testing of pesticides, but was 
constructed not to appear so back in 1985. In this phase, the activities did not lead to 
                                                     
11 It seems that there were some reservations from the EPA and especially from the 
toxicologists from the companies. The problem was whether the tests should apply to normal 
procedure for toxicological experiments, or the suggested feeding experiments. 
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any breaks with normal practice, but followed the lines of what I term the knowledge 
frame of the agricultural advisory system. We will return to this issue later in the case.  
When the information on the adverse effects of CCC reached the Danish Agricultural 
Advisory Centre in Århus in august 1989 the adviser on duty was in no doubt as to the 
seriousness of the results (per com, Per Tybirk 2003). He received approval to issue 
warnings to the pig-breeding farmers from the National Danish Committee on Pigs, an 
elected and political forum watching over pig-breeder’s interests, and wrote a note in 
which the conclusion was assessed and compared with previous investigations. The 
note was aimed at farmers and recommended that CCC treated wheat and barley 
should comprise a maximum of only 30% of the feed for sows, and a maximum of 
50% for piglets and fatteners. The recommendation was delivered in a serious but 
relaxed tone: “One must remember that CCC treated wheat cannot be expected to 
result in large effects in livestock this year compared to last year just because an 
experiment relating to the effects of the CCC treatment has now been published” 
(Tybirk 1989: 5). Following this the recommendation was repeated in the guidelines 
for feed composition, where it can also be found today. 
So far, the practice followed what can be termed normal practice. As it is sketched 
below the advice was given in a closed loop system with a political control point in the 
elected National Danish Committee on Pigs that approved the precautionary advice. 
The researchers had succeeded in assuring the actors that the investigation was not a 
threat to plant grower’s possibilities for optimising growth,  neither was it a threat to 
the earning power of pesticide producers; and it was not a threat to the authority of the 
existing schemes for testing and approving pesticides.  
Pig breeders
Scientists
The National Danish Committee on pigs / 
Danish Agricultural Advisory Centre, division for pig breeding 
Advice: 
”Take precautions: 
aviod use of CCC and other PGR’s”
Research results
Field observations, communicated at various occations
Agricultural Advicers
 
Figure 7.1: Schematic diagram of the Agricultural Advisory System. 
The Figure shows the route of information and advice, starting with the pig-breeders. Through 
this system the informal knowledge becomes formalised. The system is sensitive to local 
knowledge and combines this with expert knowledge. It is important that the system is ‘closed’; 
the advice goes specifically to the pig breeders. 
The scene was now complete and the case was to explode on the 27th July 1990, the 
day when the environmental minister Lone Dybkjær would issue a general prohibition 
against the marketing of all plant growth retardants.  
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However, as a prelude to the prohibition, the CCC-research results and the advice to 
the pig-breeders gained public attention, which was hushed up – events that was very 
informative to those following the case! 
Now I will leave the scientists at the National Institute of Animal Science, because 
their project, to advice pig-breeders, was partly overtaken, expanded and redirected by 
new actors - environmentalists approaching the experiments from the angle of concern 
for the general health of the public, which they did acting in alliance with public 
opinion. 
7.3 The First and Defeated Transboundary Translation: A 
prelude 
In the previous section we looked at the case from the rationale of the agricultural 
advisory system. The researchers succeeded within this rationale to anticipate possible 
open enmity from actors that constituted or relied upon the established procedures 
behind approvals of pesticides. However, the transboundary translations of the 
experiment did result in disorder. The Danish EPA as the pesticide authorising 
authority and its advisers in the internationally constituted health system- the Institute 
of Toxicology - eventually brought this disorder back into balance.  
The transformation of the research into advice to farmers gave rise to debate. The two 
reports from the researchers and the advice that was given to farmers and agricultural 
advisers were also received outside of agricultural circles. The first reactions in the 
wider media were moderate. The story emerged with a notice from a news agency “did 
grain from treated crops pose a risk in human food?”  
The first reactions from the EPA and the NFA were cautious.  The EPA reaction 
stressed that they had not seen the results - as stated by Inge Kraul from the pesticide 
office to the news agency RB:  
“If the experiments at the National Institute of Animal Science complied with the rule of 
a three month spraying respite, and if they have found anything unacceptable then there 
are grounds for us to take up the matter. […] We have not seen the study from Foulum, 
but we will order it straight away. Then we can come to a decision on whether action 
should be taken immediately, or we can wait until the planned reassessment of the 
substance.” (RB, July 28 1989)  
The substance, CCC, was to be reassessed in 1992 and the central question that arose 
for the EPA was whether the reassessment should be hastened.  
The Foulum experiments and the ensuing public attention did seemingly also take 
authorities with responsibility for health related knowledge with surprise.In its 
response the head of department in the Central Laboratory12 of the National Food 
Agency, K. Voldum-Clausen, stated that it was important that the residue 
concentration in grain for bread was low enough to ensure no adverse effects in 
                                                     
12 The Central Laboratory is synonymous with the National Food Institute.  
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humans. However, to assess this it was necessary to measure the residues of CCC in 
the grain with an analytic method, and this was not available at that time.  
At this point, the problem began to fade from the public’s attention. The newspapers 
continued to write about the case, typically under heading such as “Risk associated to 
white bread”13 but, lacking the possibility of establishing causality between the actual 
residues of the pesticide and its adverse effects, further development of the story was 
halted. 
The arguments put forward by the National Food Institute had affinity to cause-and-
effect, and was framed in the language of traditional toxicology. The effects must be 
linked to a chemical concentration; this was the focal point, and the argument would 
remain central for the actors that criticised the wish to take action alone on the 
knowledge obtained from the feeding experiments.  
The Consumer Council embraced the case during the summer 1989 despite the fading 
public attention and thereby took part in the creation of the story line that became the 
connecting thread for the actor groups who criticised the widespread use of straw 
shortening chemicals: - If CCC-treated grain isn’t good enough for pigs, should 
humans then eat it?  
Carried to its logical conclusion the question raised by the Consumer Council would 
break with the negotiated conditions of the research. The probably most important 
condition was the idea of the research as being intended for advice to animal-breeding 
farmers; this prevented the research from being a critique of the general approval of 
the pesticides, an approval that actually had placed the substances in the lowest of the 
possible hazard classifications, and the most common PGR-products were and are still 
not classified as being injurious to health.  
Two years earlier the Consumer Council had called attention to plant growth 
retardants in the Pesticide Council. The reason was due to the same type of 
information received from farmers and veterinarians that in 1985 hinted the 
researchers to initiate the feeding experiments. Moreover, the Consumer Councils 
representative, Jette Juul Jensen, argued that the Pesticide Council had to take up 
problems that were discussed in society. But the request was rejected with reference to 
the lack of documentation (Miljøstyrelsen, 1987: 8-9). But in late summer 1989 the 
Consumer Council again attempted to make the responsible authorities look critically 
at the substance on the grounds that: doubt should come to the benefit of the 
consumer! 
Questions were once again directed to the Pesticide Council, and to the environment 
minister14, but none of these found cause for concern. The two answers that the 
Consumer Council received were mutually interdependent, as they in practice 
originated from the same source, namely the Institute for toxicology. 
                                                     
13 Politiken 29. juli 1989, 3. sektion side 5: Risiko ved franskbrød 
14 Information 21/11 1989: Striden om CCC: Hvem får det korte strå? (Col1) 
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Figure 7.2 Overview of the questions asked to the minister and advise given. 
 
Let us now look at the answers and their authors and institutions. It is the environment 
minister who was formally responsible for the regulation of pesticides. However, to 
ask the minister involves a chain of actors. The minister takes advice from the 
Environmental Protection Agency. However, the agency was at that time specialised 
in environmental issues and took advice from the Institute for Toxicology. The 
Institute for Toxicology was under the Environment Ministry from 1973 to 1987 as 
part of the National Food Agency, with the task of advising and investigating health 
aspects of chemicals in foodstuffs. The institute was also given the responsibility of 
providing research-based toxicological advice to the EPA in connection with the 1979 
adoption of the Law of Chemicals. When the National Food Agency was moved to the 
Ministry of Health in 1987, and later to the Ministry of Foodstuffs, the Institute for 
Toxicology, without changes, kept its tasks for the Environment Ministry 
(Fødevaredirektoratet, 2003b). Therefore, the Institute for Toxicology provided advice 
both to the EPA and the NFA. 
The Pesticide Council advises the EPA on establishing the criteria for the 
authorisation of and banning of pesticides. The Council had been established in 1980, 
following the adoption of the law of chemicals where the regulation of pesticides had 
been included; whereby approval also had to be based on an environmental 
assessment. The Pesticide Council replaced the Poisons Board. 
The environment minister designates the members of the council on the 
recommendation of the agricultural organizations: the Danish Agrochemical 
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Association15, Consumer Council, the General Workers' Union in Denmark (SID), and 
The Danish Society for the Conservation of Nature. In addition, authorities and 
organizations involved within the process can recommend members to the council: in 
this case the National Institute of Plant and Soil Science16, the National Pest Control 
Laboratory, the Danish Working Environment Service, the National Food Agency, 
and the Environmental Protection Agency.  
On September 4th 1989 Jette Juul Jensen asked the Pesticide Council to put plant 
growth retardants (straw shortening agents) on the agenda. Jette Juul Jensen was then 
head of section in the Consumer Council, and a member of the Pesticide Council. Her 
question was: 
“I will request the question of straw shortening agents to be put on the agenda for 
September 20th in the Pesticide Council, in relation to previous discussions in the 
Pesticide Council and in relation to the information that has appeared in the press on the 
basis of communication no. 748 and no. 749 from the National Institute of Animal 
Science.” (Jensen, 1989). 
We will return to the meeting later, meanwhile the Consumer Council also succeeded 
in their lobbying of the Environment and Planning Committee of the Danish 
Parliament, which was in a privileged position to ask questions of the Minister. 
Questions are always made from the Committee as a whole, but it was the member 
from the Socialist Peoples Party who adopted the issue. On September 13th Lone 
Dybkjær the Environment Minster was presented with the following question from the 
Environment and Planning Committee:  
“What steps does the Minister intend to take on the basis of the communications from the 
National Institute of Animal Science (Foulum) on feed experiments with CCC- grain and 
-straw (straw shortening agents). Please, answer the question with respect to:  
1) human health,  
2) occupational health in relation to use of CCC- preparations, and  
3) the general impact on the environment” 
(Folketingets miljø- og planlægningsudvalg, 1989, September 13) 
The Minister’s reply was sent from the Ministry of the Environment to the 
Parliament’s Environment and Planning Committee on September 20th, the same day 
as the Pesticide Council addressed the issue. The chair of the Pesticide Council was 
also the pesticides section chief in the EPA. Therefore he knew the minister’s answer 
when the Pesticide Council held the discussion, and therefore we will start by looking 
at the Minister’s reply. 
The reply started by quoting the EPA’s two-page review of the situation, which was 
followed by the Minister’s own comments. The review concluded that there existed no 
                                                     
15 Danish Agrochemical Association changed name to the Danish Crop Protection Association 
in **** (Dansk Planteværn). 
16 The National Institute of Plant and Soil Science was in ***1994 merged with the National 
Institute of Animal Science to form The Danish Institute for Agricultural Sciences. 
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reason for concern, and this remains the Minister’s conclusion, even though she made 
some modifications in the reply, as we shall see shortly: 
“The Environmental Protection Agency has performed an assessment of the 
investigations and has, after discussion of the results with the Health Ministry’s 
Commissioner in toxicology, Emil Poulsen and the Institute for Toxicology and the 
National Food Agency concluded that there exists still no support for the assumption that 
animal and human health could be affected as a result of regular use of the straw 
shortening agent CCC.” (Dybkjær, 1989:2)  
The EPA review developed the conclusion further by explaining that the EPA in 
consultation with toxicologists from the NFA and the Institute for Toxicology could 
not agree with the conclusion made by the researchers at the National Institute for 
Animal Science: “The experiments have not proved a decline in the capacity for 
reproduction among the pigs used”. Three arguments were put forward; two specific 
and one general. Firstly, the EPA claimed that the symptoms of spurred fertility i.e. 
increased frequency of absent heat and need for re-covering, are normal in pig farming 
and that the results were not statistically reliable, and therefore did not fulfil the 
minimum requirements for evidence for toxicological effects. Secondly the review 
points out that the exposure of CCC to the pigs was unknown and it hints that the 
concentration of CCC in the harvested grain was likely to be very low, exactly 
because the feed had been grown according to the rules. Finally it was noted that the 
experiments carried out at the National Institute for Animal Science were production 
experiments, and that these as such ought not to be used for proving toxicological 
effects. 
Further to the above, the EPA’s review recapitulated the research that formed the basis 
of existing authorization of the plant growth retardant CCC. This research was made 
by the manufacturer BASF back in 1968, who as importer to the Danish market was 
obliged to supply the Danish authorities with information concerning the product.  
The EPA concluded that neither those investigations, nor “a special study” of the 
effect of CCC on the sperm quality and quantity among boars showed any toxicity to 
reproduction. Further, it was noted that CCC was planned to be reassessed in 1992, 
implicitly meaning that this would give an opportunity to strengthen the regulation of 
the substance if necessary.  The EPA review ends with the following remark: 
“As regarding the most used CCC-preparations these are outside the classification for 
health dangers, because the toxicological data has shown neither acute nor chronic 
effects. CCC is hardly absorbed through the skin and toxicity by inhalation is very low. 
Therefore, only the lowest level of protection equipment required by The Danish 
Working Environment Service when working with pesticides is prescribed. The new 
examinations do not give grounds for the modification of these requirements.” (Dybkjær, 
1989) 
The meaning is clear, it is the EPA’s opinion that the original authorization was given 
on grounds of fact, and that the new research results would not change that position. 
A very specific word is used throughout the answer to stress the difference between 
the feeding experiments and the experiments behind the authorization. This word is 
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“regelret” meaning “regular” or “according to the rules”. The methodology behind the 
crop growing is described as “regelret”, meaning that only insignificant amounts of 
spray should remain in the grain used for the feeding experiments. Also, the 
experiments behind the original authorization are described as “regelret”, and likewise 
were the additional “special experiments” on boars described as “regelret” (Dybkjær, 
1989: 3). 
In contrast, the feeding experiments are described as not being “regelret”, and because 
of this the Minster’s addition to the review included that she had taken steps to have 
the researchers’ experiments repeated in a “regelret” way:  
“[…] I have approached the Minster for Agriculture concerning a replication of the 
investigation according to the rules, and with involvement of the necessary analysis. 
Further, I have approached the Minister of Health to secure that the health aspects will be 
examined thoroughly in future research.” (Dybkjær, 1989: 3). 
However, the research would not be repeated. Preliminary moves were taken in the 
coming course of the case, but for a number of reasons this track was eventually 
abandoned.  
This reply created the link for the continued public interest in the repeated research 
process. However, before continuing with these, we will take a look at the meeting of 
the Pesticide Council. Most of the directly interested parties participated in this forum, 
and the minutes from the meeting gave voice to both the questioning parties, the 
Consumer Council, and to the defending parties, namely the head of department in the 
pesticide office, the crop growing agricultural interests, the pesticide-producing 
industry, and some of the advising authorities.  
The Consumer Council’s position was identical with the one they had adapted two 
years earlier. This coincided with the publication of the investigations from Foulum, 
and on this basis the council moved to have the issue debated. 
The standpoint of the head of department was obviously in line with the 
recommendation made to the Environmental Minister. It was the agency’s opinion that 
the conclusions made by the Foulum researchers were too rigid, and that the available 
facts did not give any foundation to claims that CCC had any toxicity towards 
reproduction in living organisms. 
The only support to be found came from the representative nominated by the green 
NGO’s, who asked whether it was possible to require further research from the 
importing companies. The head of department confirmed that the legislation did give 
this option if grounds for concern for the existence of a risk had been established. But 
he maintained that such suspicion did not exist; on the contrary three independent 
experiments had shown no such effects, and the Foulum experiments could only be 
used as the basis for new experiments, designed to identify toxicological effects.  
Most of the participants disassociated themselves and the institutions they represented 
from the feeding experiments. The manager from the pesticide-producing industry was 
especially harsh in his response and the minutes of the meeting recount: 
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“[The manager] articulated satisfaction with the [the head of department’s] 
pronouncement, because he found it unacceptable that a state institution can accomplish 
such investigations without following internationally accepted guidelines. The branch 
(the Agrochemical Association) had been shocked by the fact that experiments could be 
carried out in this way and then be published. He found that the Ministry of Agriculture 
should be informed that it was unacceptable that a state institution followed such a line, 
and pointed out the danger associated with decisions taken on the wrong basis.” 
(Miljøstyrelsen, 1989: 13) 
Also the chief adviser on plant production found the investigations to be ‘very bad’, 
and a representative from another advising state institution on plant protection could 
inform that the case had been discussed, and that it was taken as a lesson that one had 
to step carefully and that one should be careful to discuss the problems already at the 
stage of experimental design. Finally, the representative from the National Food 
Agency said that his agency had over a three year period performed examinations of 
residue concentrations of straw shortening agents. 
The closure around the use of CCC as a safe plant growth retardant was maintained, 
and the institutions had demarcated themselves from the research, which came to be 
perceived as problematic. The issue of residue concentrations did, as in the Ministers 
answer to the environment and planning committee, remain the only opening offered 
for further discussions. The concentration of pesticide residues was thereby 
maintained as the obligatory point of passage, which in this case seems to have been 
quite convenient as the necessary methodologies for making this assessment had not 
yet been developed.  
Again, just as it happened two years earlier, the representative from the Consumer 
Council had to accept the rejection that “the scientific documentation is not adequate”, 
and await the new investigations from Foulum, which could possibly give more 
acceptable evidence. 
Back in the public debate the Minister’s answer was received as an outright rejection 
of the assumed negative effects of CCC; with relief among farmers, and with anger 
among environmentalists.  
In October 1989 the Danish Agricultural Advisory Centre published a “plant-growing 
communiqué” (Kristensen & Elbek-Pedersen, 1989) that, with weight on the EPA’s 
review resumed the answer the Minister had given. The communications are a normal 
mode of spreading information to farmers and this one did not differ in this sense, but 
it seems to have been important for the authors to reassure the plant growing farmers 
that the use of CCC was safe. The same type of information but with a twist of malice 
can be found in the agricultural media under the heading:  
“The Environmental Protection Agency acquits straw shortening agents – reprimand to 
the National Institute for Animal Science” (Effektivt Landbrug, nr.18, 16. October 1989: 
Miljøstyrelsen frikender stråforkortningsmidlerne).  
The message under the headline was the same as the plant-growing communiqué; it 
refers to the Ministers answer, and does not substantiate the reprimand-assertion. One 
of the researchers replied in the following issue:  
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“Nobody has received ‘reprimands’ from the Minister” (Effektivt Landbrug, nr.19, 30. 
October 1989: Ingen har modtaget »næser« fra ministeren).  
He explained that the experiment was not designed to evaluate toxicological properties 
of the substance, but “to study its influence on the productivity properties of pigs 
alone which were offered respectively untreated and CCC-treated wheat”. He further 
explained that the experiments revealed significantly increased reproduction problems 
among the sows offered CCC-treated wheat. To stress the validity of the conclusions 
he referred to a specific scientific statement that stood up to the criticism from the 
EPA: 
“The statistical test was carried out according to the rules [regelret] as a (CHI)2-test. The 
Environmental Protection Agency’s claim that the registered difference between treated 
and non-treated wheat is not statistically certain demands therefore an explanation, with 
collaborating documentation.” (Effektivt Landbrug, nr.19, 30. oktober 1989: Ingen har 
modtaget »næser« fra ministeren). 
Following this the researcher pointed out that the Minister in her reply to the 
Environment and Planning Committee had stated that the feeding experiments 
indicated that follow-up experiments should be started and designed to clarify risks for 
human health, occupational health or the environment in general. For the researcher 
the difference between the two types of experiments was important: 
“[…] the experiments carried out at the National Institute for Animal Science did not aim 
to create certainty about CCC’s influence on human health, occupational health or the 
environment in general. The background for the experiments was observations from 
praxis, where people had the interpretation that CCC-treated crops could influence 
production in a negative direction. The experiment was therefore clearly designed to 
study the production properties of pigs offered wheat sprayed with CCC in the growing 
season in accordance with normal guidelines.  
Therefore, one cannot expect an experiment as that accomplished to give answers to 
general questions about health and environmental-aspects associated with the use of 
CCC. These problems must be examined in another context, where the necessary 
expertise and facilities are present. 
Although it should be expected that this type of investigation, at least to some extent, has 
already been carried through before the substance was authorised. However, in the case 
of how CCC-treated crops influence livestock-production, there exists, to my knowledge, 
no such previous experiments.” (Effektivt Landbrug, nr.19, 30. October 1989: Ingen har 
modtaget »næser« fra ministeren). 
The researcher obviously sought to maintain the boundary between the approval of the 
substance, and the evaluation of the influence of the substance on pig production. This 
differentiation was one of the very important foundations that in the beginning made 
the research legitimate and possible. This raises the issue of locality versus 
universality; the researcher claims validity in a ‘local’ and specific context and the 
toxicologists seek universal validity that establishes the foundation for global trade. 
The problem arises when these two types of knowledge coexist and give opposing 
signals, and thereby tempts agents to attempt to make the local knowledge universal.  
In addition, the Danish Agrochemical Society expressed relief in the society’s 
newsletter (Sprøjten, oktober 1989). They denote the case as one of the summer’s 
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great “sea monsters”, and stress the minister’s consent with rejection of the problem 
made by the EPA and the toxicologist of the NFA and Institute for Toxicology.  
Among environmentalists, the decision was received with dissatisfaction, but the 
dissatisfaction did not match the great relief among the professional users. Seemingly, 
the case did not fit into the predominant types of environmental cases that had the 
attention of pro-environmentalists. The most pronounced debate followed two 
investigative articles in November 21st in the newspaper Information. The one article 
reviewed the contrast between the fact that pig-breeders as a consequence of the new 
knowledge in future would avoid the use of CCC-treated fodder, and the authorities’ 
rejection of any problems to human health, and the second treated the history of the 
authorisation of CCC in Denmark. The former article adopted an especially critical 
angle on the course of the case, and brought central quotes from animal producing 
agricultural organisations about their recommendations to farmers, and why they 
sustained the recommendations after the environment ministers reply. Orla Grøn, 
sector chief in Danske Slagterier (the pig producer’s industrial association was quoted 
in the newspaper article explaining the associations precautionary position:  
“We recommend that farmers reduce the use of CCC-treated fodder. We find it best to be 
cautious when doubts about the effects of poisonous residues exist. When we 
recommended the lower dose to the sows it was because of the considerable cost in 
reduced fertility. Therefore, we tell farmers not to go too far with CCC. Moreover, I am 
surprised the authorities are both able and willing to disallow the experiments.” (Orla 
Grøn quoted in Information November 21st 1989) 
The article also quoted Per Tybirk, the adviser in the Agricultural Advisory Centre 
involved in the case, further explaining the precautionary nature of the pig-breeders 
position:  
 “We are in agreement with the Environmental Protection Agency when it comes to the 
non-decisive character of the Foulum investigations, but we do not dare ignore the 
results. .” (Per Tybirk quoted in Information November 21st 1989) 
The article represented a nice piece of journalistic craftsmanship, but on top of this the 
article represented a severe criticism against the authorities’ position in the case. 
Possibly, because of this, the Environment Minister chose to give a reply to the article, 
which was brought the following month, and where she repeated the arguments for 
sustaining the authorisation of CCC, but also balanced her position: 
 “But I am also concerned that there nevertheless might be adverse effects from the use of 
CCC-treated grain. I have therefore approached the Minister for Health and the Minister 
for Agriculture and suggested that the two Ministries together with the Environmental 
Protection Agency organize a new research project that can demonstrate whether CCC-
treated corn poses a risk. I will come to a decision on whether the use of straw shortening 
agents shall be prohibited when we have the answer to that investigation. Also I want to 
know what’s in the breakfast rolls17.” (Information December 11th) 
 
                                                     
17 The breakfast roll is a translation of a white-bread type product that forms a core element in 
a highly popular and traditional type of Danish breakfast. 
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A group of students working with CCC in a project at Roskilde University replied to 
the article in the Information newspaper of the following week. They noted that the 
minister’s position was de facto a rejection of the problem and asked what 
investigations and what results were needed before the minister would take action. But 
the Ministers reply in December had seemingly closed the discussion. 
7.4 Enhanced Attention – The Conflict Intensifies  
Public discussions on the subject ‘plant growth retardants’ began to subside after the 
initial interest in the subject, but resurfaced again in February of 1990. A television 
team had been researching the issue for a couple of months and had produced a 
television programme. The title of the television programme was, translated word-by-
word: “Who draws the shortest straw?” In Danish the phrase “to draw the shortest 
straw” corresponds to the English expression ‘to get the worst of it’. The title was 
identical to the title of the earlier article in the Information newspaper that had incited 
the minister’s reply; also, the content and idea behind the programme was very closely 
linked to the article. What the programme added were first of all dramatic effects - 
effects that were to have such a large impact on the television media.  
The core of the television drama was a presentation of evidence of damage to humans 
and a criticism of the traditional testing regime: 
[Voice over, pictures of pigs:] “The pig is the animal that most closely resembles humans 
in its biological form. Its digestive and abdominal systems function in pretty much the 
same way as their human equivalents. We [humans] can’t tolerate what they [pigs] 
can’t!”  
[Cut to statement from Sven Juul a doctor from the Institute for Social Medicine:] “There 
are many people who suffer from infertility, and its frequency may possibly be rising, but 
as yet there has not been any significant research into the problem. There is however, 
some research that indicates that the quality of men’s semen has decreased over the last 
30 to 40 years. And although this research is not considered reliable, the research results 
do indicate a problem with men’s sperm quality and so the question is what may be 
causing this?” (Dreyer, 1990) 
The interviewer then asked the doctor if CCC could have anything to do with human 
infertility to which the doctor replied: 
“Yes it could. We know of other substances contained within pesticides that are known to 
cause infertility, DDT for example. The action of DDT is well known [...]”?” (Dreyer, 
1990) 
The doctor then explained how DDT is accumulated in living organisms and 
biomagnified via the food chain, and is known to impair fertility within animals and 
that this also could be the case with other pesticides such as CCC:  
“We do not know if this is the case in humans, and there exists only one study that 
indicates that this could be a problem for pigs, so one has to pay attention to this 
research.” (Dreyer, 1990) 
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These statements were at the best problematic, as no evidence existed for CCC having 
a tendency to undergo bio magnification or that it could bio accumulate, rather was the 
opposite indicated, plus the fact that none of these capabilities had been research-
objects in the feeding experiments. However, what had been the object of the studies 
was the fertility of the pigs, and here the doctor had a point.   
The experiments had indeed been based on a criticism against the traditional mode of 
testing pesticides and that criticism was inherent in the design of the feeding studies. 
The researchers had wished, as described above, to examine the specific effects on 
pigs offered fodder sprayed with the growth regulator CCC. They had paid attention to 
the fact that the substance had been tested and approved by the authorities, but 
questioned whether these tests would uncover effects as those that had been reported 
from the everyday use of the substance. That was the background for the experiments, 
which also had been discussed with both authorities and pesticide manufacturers prior 
to the start of the series of experiments. In the programme this rationale was turned 
and generalised.  
A biologist was interviewed about his assessment of the available knowledge 
regarding possible effects in the environment. The speaker explained that the existing 
test guidelines focus on LD50, and on the quantity that leads to impaired fertility in 
animals; and that the substance is never given in the same composition and state, as 
when it is being used “out there in nature”. In fact the biologist mainly talked about 
the side effects of herbicides and insecticides, and only gave a very general critique of 
the agent in question. 
The programme concluded: 
“And this is the status of the case, with all the unanswered questions. It is striking that all 
the directly involved parties are in no doubt. The grain-growing farmers continue to 
spray, and the authorities inform us that everything is well. The pig breeders and the 
horse breeders are just as certain but of the contrary position. So they (sic) have backed 
out… But what about the rest of us? The future will show who will get the worst of it 
“Who will draw the shortest straw?” (Dreyer, 1990) 
The programme initiated three lines of debate in the following media debate. The first 
two lines related to the development of an analytical method for measuring residue 
concentrations, and the use of CCC on fruit and grain for human food. The bread 
industries declined to demand non-treated grain for baking, and the National Food 
Agency announced that the forthcoming analytical methods for CCC would be used to 
analyse residues in both grain and fruit. The third line related to the experiments and 
was lead by a person from the agrochemical industry.  
The doomsday scenario that accompanied the programme had seemingly provoked the 
manager of DK Petrokemi A/S; one of the companies that later that year would 
complain when in July 1990 the prohibition against plant growth retardants was 
issued. The manager produced almost identical versions of an article printed in a 
national newspaper (Berlingske Tidende, February 13th 1990: Misbrug med 
perspektiv) and a professional magazine owned by the Danish Farmers' Union 
(Landsbladet February of 16th 1990: Da CCC blev henrettet i TV), where he partly 
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criticised Radio Denmark’s presentation of the case, and partly criticised the feeding 
experiments and the researchers.  
The articles were signed with no reference to the manager’s professional merit. The 
critique against the programme was relatively sober as it pointed to the weaknesses of 
the use of expert statements about possible effects towards humans and wildlife; these 
being the comparison between CCC and DDT, and the statements about the effects on 
flora and fauna. But the critique against the researchers was quite coarse and personal. 
I will elaborate on the criticism because that ‘tune’ would continue to sound 
throughout the case.  
The manager of the CCC-producing company accused the research of being “a stitch-
up” and a waste of taxpayer’s money. Beyond this, he accused the National Institute 
for Animal Science of arranging the programme because the EPA had rejected the 
conclusions of the research project and in an ironic tone of voice he went on to make a 
caricature of the researchers: 
“For shame! One should not speak this way about, nor to, the National Institute for 
Animal Science. If people will not recognize the »research« [we have produced] then 
there must exist other ways [to make that happen]. Wonder.(to do what?) I wonder if 
there are some jaunty television- fellows, who are short of a »groovy« story to practise 
on? So that one could stir up public opinion against CCC?.” (Landsbladet, February 16th 
1990: Da CCC blev henrettet I TV)  
The National Institute for Animal Science chose to repudiate the accusations. The 
researchers’ superior, Henning Staun, the director of the institute, replied in a 
following issue of the Landsbladet magazine:  
“The CCC-experiments were carried out absolutely correctly and we did not take the 
initiative with the television programme.” (Landsbladet, March 2nd 1990: CCC-forsøg 
gennemført helt korrekt) 
The director explained in his reply that the institute did not address the television-
team, and that the briefing about the experiments that was given to the journalists did 
not go beyond the communications that had been issued on July 10th 1989.  
The manager replied again:  
“[…] we have a Ministry of Environment that is the decision-making authority and who 
decide what may be classed as hazardous or non-hazardous. I will not enter into a 
polemic over your CCC-experiments. I will just place it on record that the EPA is in 
disagreement with you and have rejected your experiments as being without scientific 
basis and validity.” (Landsbladet March 23rd 1990: Manipulation af ikke-fagfolk) 
His point of view was that if the National Institute for Animal Science did not agree 
with the Ministry’s assessment of the experiments, then they should discuss this with 
the Ministry directly. He accused the National Institute for Animal Science for 
performing extra-parliamentary activities: 
“[…] [You] involve a population that do not have an earthly chance of seeing the 
manipulation behind the scenes and a population that doesn't give a damn if the TV 
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addressed you or you the TV. You have under all circumstances given the TV the 
foundation to produce a programme, which you neither can be proud of; and you should 
have seen that risk. I doubt this approach appears from SH’s [the National Institute for 
Animal Science] objects clause […]” (Landsbladet March 23rd 1990: Manipulation af 
ikke-fagfolk) 
The Director, in his reply to this statement explained that the activities of the National 
Institute for Animal Science were in line with the institute’s objects clause and that he 
found it very reasonable that the institute’s research results were available to all 
including the television programme makers. Further, he explained and documented 
that the EPA did not reject the experiments on their scientific merits: 
“I shall add, for your information, that the EPA recently approached a statistical expert at 
the Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University, who analysed and assessed the results 
of the experiment.  The conclusion forwarded to the EPA read as follows: - Assume that 
there is no effect from the addition of CCC to the fodder. And assuming that the 
experiments are correctly carried out (and I see no reason to question this) then the 
chance of achieving a result with such a marked tendency as that observed, then the 
accumulated effect of the three variables mentioned (heat, the need for re-covering, 
pregnancy) is about 1 to 2 pct.” (Landsbladet April 6th 1990: Statistik og 
formålsparagraffer) 
At this point the discussions over the television programme stopped, and the next 
round of media attention targeted at the problem was awaiting the publication of the 
results of the second series of experiments with Cerone and Roundup.  
7.5 Second Round – The Precautionary Principle Enters the 
Agenda 
In June 1990 the results of the experiments with the second straw shortening agent 
Cerone, and the Herbicide Roundup were published. This time public attention was 
limited to debate in professional journals such as “Svineproducenten” (The Pork 
Producer), and the pig section of Landsbladet. The frontlines were unchanged. The 
conclusions were in line with the conclusions drawn from the former experiments. The 
Danish Agrochemical Association criticized the conclusions as going too far. Per 
Kristensen, Manager for the association stated: 
“We find that the design of the experiments do not warrant the certainty arrived at by the 
conclusions. The experiments are feeding experiments, but when one wants to speak 
about mortality and toxicity it demands a regular toxicological investigation according to 
current laboratory methodologies.” (Landsbladet June 22nd 1990) 
The critique was moderate compared to what had earlier been issued from the DK 
Petrokemi Manager, and Per Kristensen stressed that it was not targeted at the 
National Institute for Animal Science but at the experiment’s design together with the 
conclusions. The conductor of the experiments was interviewed in the same article. He 
was not surprised by the criticisms and repeated that the objective was not to perform 
a toxicological study, but to investigate the effects of the agents in doses determined 
by normal agricultural practice. 
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The conductor of the experiments, Viggo Danielsen published a short article in the 
journal Svineproducenten, also in June 1990 (mid June). Here he gave an account of 
the latest experiments. There were both positive and negative effects from the two 
pesticides tested. The positive effects were improved feed assimilation and growth 
among young pigs, and the negative effects were reduced offspring and reduced 
survival potential of piglets when treated straw was also used as bedding. The article 
concluded:  
“While earlier it has been shown that CCC-treated wheat among other things may give 
occasion to reproduction problems among pigs, the recommendations for breeding 
animals must be that grain treated with straw shortening agents should be used with 
caution”. (Svineproducenten No 6 medio June 1990) 
A pig breeder requested in the following number of the National Association of Pig 
Breeders to work for a prohibition of plant growth retardants: 
“It is hard to see any other option than a prohibition, but what consequences will that 
have for the pig breeder? None, except from increased certainty of getting rid of 
reproduction problems (reproduction is the sow’s productivity).I find it important for the 
farmer to be able to defend what we do and  also to pay attention to the unsuccessful 
things we have done, and then to adjust our ways, even when it actually costs us money. 
It seems to me stupid not to do anything and to leave it to others such as environmental 
groups to do something about the problem. And this inevitably leads to unfavourable 
publicity for our products, which in turn is detrimental to our sales.” (Svineproducenten 
No 7 mid June 1990) 
The pig breeder had earlier contacted the National Association of Pig Breeders and 
was of the opinion that the association, in collusion with landowners, were reluctant to 
react. The general secretary of the association reassured the readers in the same issue 
of Svineproducenten that the association would suggest that feeding grain in the future 
should be labelled.  
The battle lines were drawn with on the one hand the researchers and the National 
Institute for Animal Science insisting on the validity of the research, and the National 
Food agency and the EPA insisting on the opposite. This was stated clearly in a 
newsletter from the National Food Agency in April 1990:  
This is the opinion of the National Food Agency: […] the tendencies that have been 
observed are not statistically certain, and are very normal in common agricultural 
practice. Furthermore it is uncertain what amount of CCC the pigs have consumed, 
because there had not been an analysis of residues of CCC in the feed.  
The pesticide producers used the arguments produced by the NFA and the EPA to 
defend the use of the plant growth retardants. The pig breeders refused to use treated 
straw and grain, and they did this with support from the consulting services in the 
Farmer’s Association.  
7.6 The Lightning Prohibition  
The closure around the straw-shortening agents as safe seemed to hold, even though 
the conflict was clear. But then, the unexpected happened on July 27th 1990. The 
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Environment Minister Lone Dybkjær decided to prohibit the sale of all plant growth 
retardants containing CCC or ethephon. 
No actor on the contemporary scene had expected this move, neither the 
environmentalists, nor the agricultural actors. Among the agricultural actors the 
decision was criticised as being populist and it was postulated that the prohibition was 
triggered by media attention. The mood is well captured in the following quote from a 
contemporary leading article in the agricultural newspaper Landbrugsmagasinet, 
which was owned by the Danish Family Farmers' Association:  
“The lightning prohibition order came […] in connection to a planned television 
programme about the Foulum-straw-shortener-experiments, which the television 
programme makers had informed the Environment Minister [Lone Dybkjær] about, as 
they wanted a statement from her. But the television crew had barely turned their 
machines on before a call from a high ranking official in the Ministry of the Environment 
informed them that the minister with, immediate effect, had prohibited the sale of straw 
shortening agents […]. 
Finally it must be admitted that a prohibition against straw shorteners wasn’t necessarily a 
catastrophe. It may yet prove to be a useful means for reducing the use of nitrogenous 
fertilizers, and in addition help in reducing the rate of production of crops than the set-
aside scheme. But the prohibition should be carried out at the EC wide level to prevent 
Danish farmers from being at a competitive disadvantage in relation to other crop 
producers within the EU, just because a short cut happened with the Environment 
Minister when the television camera were turned on at Foulum.” (Leading article in 
Landbrugsmagasinet August 30th 1990: Kortslutning i stråforkortningen) 
But the prohibition was also received with some surprise among pro-environmental 
actors.  This group of actors seems to have been remarkably silent throughout the 
development of the case. The reason for the muted response was conceivably the 
unexpected character of the move; the environmentalists’ position is captured in an 
investigative article in the Information newspaper of August 17th.  
The author of the newspaper article was Jørgen Steen Nielsen, who was a very 
competent writer on environmental issues. The article examined the controversy – 
some of the quotes have been reproduced elsewhere in this chapter – but the article 
gives us also a clue about how the case was seen among those who felt that the 
environment was an important issue. The main point, which we also will be able to 
retrieve in Dybkjær’s argumentation, is the focus on the structural level. Previously, 
PGRs were not considered necessary because the proportions between the ear and the 
straw were ‘sustainable’. This proportion was then dislocated due to increased use of 
fertilisers and plant breeding, which was compensated for by the use of PGR’s: 
“The straw shortening agents are not in harmony with the contemporary ecological 
[organic] message. Today they are not allowed either. Like a bolt from the blue Lone 
Dybkjær (The Social Liberals) announced on July 27th that CCC, Cerone and close on 40 
other growth regulators were prohibited with immediate effect.  
The prohibition will not only remove a chemical xenobiotica from Danish agriculture, but 
also it will bring about a reduced use of nitrogenous fertilizers, because the use of less 
fertilizer is one approach to reach a reasonable balance between the bearing capacity of 
the straw and the weight of the ear.  
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The price is reduced yield and thereby a smaller earning for the farmers, but this may be 
the necessary price for ecological [organic] sustainability.  
With the prohibition Lone Dybkjær has send a clear signal to her colleague, the 
Agricultural Minister Laurits Tørnæs (the Liberals), about the type of change there is 
needed to secure the sustainability of the agricultural reform Tørnæs is to present the 
coming spring. […]  
But this is not the actual reason for Dybkjærs prohibition against the straw shorteners. It 
is, as any reader of the summer newspapers will know, the suspicion that the agents may 
be dangerous to pig’s health – and humans – that has triggered the prohibition.” 
(Journalist Jørgen Steen Nielsen, Information August 17th 1990) 
Today, thirteen years later, Lone Dybkjær explains the shift from the rejection of the 
problem in September 1989 to the general prohibition against plant growth retardants 
with three factors (Dybkjær, 2003). It was not an abrupt shift, she argues, it was not 
her who changed her mind, but the evidence that was altered in the summer of 1990. 
She stresses that her reply to the Environment and Planning Committee consisted of a 
replication of the EPA’s review, and the following short notice where she had 
pronounced that the issue should be investigated further. The rejection in 1989 was 
therefore based on the best advice available, and the prohibition was based on 
additional evidence and input from professional users.  
The move towards the prohibition in 1990 was motivated by contact with professional 
users (breeders), who were worried by the possible side-effects of the straw shortening 
agents. The investigation tipped the scale by adding further evidence against the 
agents. According to her own statement her decision was therefore thought through 
and not sudden: 
“It was a case that we assessed continuously, and it was discussed at great length. It was 
not a sudden decision. It was a type of decision where you think carefully before you take 
it because you know that you will stir up a hornets nest.” 
It is one of the cases where I took a decision without consulting any of our government 
partner’s environmental spokesmen and much less their agricultural spokesmen. There 
was no reason to ask them – I knew what the answer would be. I knew they would say 
no. […] One can discuss whether this was breaking an agreement, my own party would 
definitely say so, but it is sometimes necessary to break an agreement if one wants to go 
through with a case or wants to submit a problem for debate. […] It was a hard-nosed 
decision- they were against everything I proposed. It was a struggle every step of the 
way. It was a struggle from day one when the Social Liberals entered the coalition 
government: The environment was definitely not a ‘favourite-subject [for the remaining 
coalition parties].”  
Lone Dybkjær refuse to concede that it was pressure from the media that made her 
take the decision back in 1990: 
“Media debates always play a role in connection with political decisions. Media pressure 
does sometimes force through decisions and there is no doubt that media attention in 
those days had a very strong focus on environmental matters - the environment was a 
high-profile subject back then. But it is not the media that takes decisions and I was not a 
single-issue politician; I was definitely not the media’s darling (tool)!” (Dybkjær, 2003) 
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Interestingly the prohibition order was not supported by new expert-statements from 
the Ministers advisers. Dybkjær explains this the following way: 
“I used the precautionary principle, […] and, after all, the precautionary principle is about 
political balancing. You use the scientific certainty as an argument if scientific certainty 
exists. The precautionary principle says ‘you do not have scientific proof that it should 
not be prohibited, and consequently you prohibit it.  
The precautionary principle gives a term to a feeling that you are careless about nature 
and about our descendants. It is the experiences of the past 25 years with chemicals and 
nuclear power that has given a word when the precautionary principle becomes a concept. 
It wasn’t a concept before, just as sustainable development wasn’t a concept before the 
Brundtland report was written.” (Dybkjær, 2003) 
In hindsight it is likely that the prohibition order had been considered, but that the 
renewed media attention helped push it into reality. But let us take a look at what 
contemporary sources such as documents and articles  can tell us about what happened 
during the days leading up to the issuing of the prohibition order on Friday July 27th.  
The following is an extract from the Ministry’s press statement: 
“The Environment Minister stops the sale of growth regulating agents – namely 
CCC. 
The Environmental Minister has today asked the Environmental Protection Agency to 
stop the sale of growth regulating agents for the agricultural sector (chlormequat chloride 
and ethephon), which are better know under their everyday names as CCC, Cerone, and 
Terpal. […]  
Even though the available experimental evidence still must be considered as uncertain, 
there are now considerable doubts concerning the products that we can no longer 
countenance the use of CCC, Cerone, and Terpal, as well as about 40 other similar 
agents. I have therefore asked the Environmental Protection Agency to stop the sale and 
use of these agents. I have also asked the Environmental Protection Agency to perform a 
thorough assessment of the case, in such a way that any doubts can be clarified. In this 
case, it will be up to the product manufacturers to produce additional evidence addressing 
the concerns raised before any decision can be made on the future use of the products in 
Denmark, state. Environment Minister Lone Dybkjær.” (Miljøministeriet, 1990) 
Simultaneously, the EPA began to send out revocation orders to all companies selling 
agents containing the two active substances. The revocation order cited as reason for 
the prohibition the accumulated scientific evidence concerning the agents. 
Furthermore, it was stated that any possible complaints, e.g.  made by the producers or 
retailers, would not have a delaying effect on the imposition of the prohibition order 
by referring to the basis of the revocation order (Miljøstyrelsen, 1990: 3).  
The decision that any complaints should not have any delaying effect will in the 
following be referred to as the ‘appeals-leads-to-non-delay’ decision. This extra twist 
of the prohibition was carried forward by a specific logic. The core prohibition was 
targeted at the sale of straw shorteners. Normal practice was that when a prohibition 
order was issued the pesticide producer would issue a complaint concerning the 
validity of the order, which would then have a delaying effect on the imposition of the 
prohibition order itself. Therefore the practical effect of prohibition was dependent on 
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the ‘appeals-leads-to-non-delay’ decision. The CCC agents and analogues were not to 
be used before the first quarter of 1991, and Cerone and analogues are often used even 
later in the growing season. However, the planning and choice of crops is made during 
the fall.  
The prohibition prompted reactions marked with surprise from all parties. A veritable 
uproar took place in the press, led by the agricultural interests. 
7.7 Prompt Responses 
Before we turn to what happened on the political scene, will we pay attention to a 
number of responses that developed in different directions. The actors who had been 
active in the previous events of the case made their positions clear, which did not 
involve any major deviations from earlier statements. What the reader perhaps should 
pay special attention to in the following is the central disciplinary role played by 
representatives from the agrochemical industry. 
The National Food Agency was still of the opinion that no problem existed:  
“The results are absolutely not alarming. Both the Swedish and the German limit values 
for the residues of Cerone in bread grain are way higher than the levels demonstrated in 
the Foulum experiments.” (Knud Voldum-Clausen in Berlingske Tidende August 1st 
1990) 
7.7.1 The Agrochemical Industry 
Also the pesticide producing industry was in opposition to the prohibition. Chairman 
for the Agrochemical Association in Denmark Per Kristensen, Director in Monsanto 
was highly irritated by what he perceived as the EPA’s volte-face and asked: “What 
shall we do with the Environmental Protection Agency now? […]” (Per Kristensen in 
Effektivt landbrug August 2nd 1990: Hvad skal vi nu med Miljøstyrelsen?) 
He pointed to the EPA’s earlier rejection of the CCC-experiments as relevant, as he 
found that there was no principal difference between the experiments with CCC and 
Cerone, and stated on this basis that the prohibition was performed ‘over the heads of 
the EPA’. He called for uniform standards and criticized the use of the experiments on 
that basis as a basis for political action: 
“If Foulum and other state experimental laboratories are to participate in the procurement 
of documentation for the approval or banning of pesticides then they must live up to the 
requirements and standards that are called for in GLP (good laboratory practice) by both 
Danish and international experts The state experimental laboratories should abstain from 
participating in the serious and important work within toxicology, if they cannot do this.” 
(Ibid) 
The agrochemical industry came to intensify the criticism especially of the Foulum 
experiments, as we shall see shortly. 
7.7.2 The Farmers 
But among the agricultural interests unity rapidly began to splinter. The axis for this 
divide was a disagreement between the grain-growing and the pig-producing interests. 
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They were not in line with the otherwise dominating tendency in Danish agriculture, 
where the farmers had learned to stand shoulder to shoulder, not least in relation to the 
very intense discussions concerning the effect of fertilizers on the aquatic 
environment. 
At the outset the grain-growing farmers were in solidarity with the pig-producers, 
even though they were also very critical of the prohibition:  
“We have a very competent Chemicals Inspectorate in Denmark, and no clues have been 
found showing that the agents do inhibit the fertility of pigs that eat the treated grain. We 
are therefore very surprised by the sudden prohibition. It should have been investigated 
closer, and we feel that we should have been consulted prior to the prohibition. […]  
We stand shoulder to shoulder with our farmer-colleagues in animal production. And if 
there are signs that the use of plant growth retardants inhibits the fertility of pigs, then it 
is our opinion that their use must be stopped. But there exists no foundation to say so.” 
(Vice-president Poul Siegumfeldt from the Association of Grain-producers in Berlingske 
Tidende July 27th 1990) 
The Chairman of the National Danish Committee of Plant Grower’s Niels Th. Ilsøe 
found that the prohibition was morally ambivalent as long as it is possible to import 
grain from treated crops. And the Chief Adviser for plant growing, Kaj Skriver, 
assessed that it would become very troublesome to continue growing rye, and also 
wheat of bread making quality.  
Vice-president of the National Federation of Large Farmers Union Anders Lassen 
commented that if the prohibition was legitimate, then it was without practical 
meaning, if it was not accompanied with prohibitions in the countries that export grain 
to Denmark. Otherwise the prohibition would only function as a very unfair reduction 
of Danish farmers’ competitive power. (Kristeligt Dagblad July 30th 1990) 
But statements from pig-producers were much more direct. The pig breeders were in 
line with the prohibition. This was of course consistent with their earlier position in 
the case, but it also represented a rupture with earlier practice, where the different 
branches of agriculture – at least seen from the outside – would stand ‘shoulder to 
shoulder’, not least when the issue was environmental regulation. One has though to 
be aware that the issue among pig breeders was not seen primarily as an 
environmental issue but rather as discussion of optimizing production. The statements 
came promptly from the Danish Pig Breeders that represents the largest Danish pig 
producers: 
“When we cannot have a declaration clarifying whether forage grain is treated with plant 
growth retardants or not then the pig-producers must welcome Lone Dybkjær’s 
prohibition against these agents. The experiments carried out at the National Institute for 
Animal Science suggests that the plant growth retardants have a negative effect on pig 
reproduction, even though the experiments are not too extensive.” (President for Danish 
Pig breeders, Erik Jantzen in Berlingske Tidende July 27th 1990) 
But such a lack of solidarity was not accepted, so when the chairman of The 
Federation of Danish Pig Producers and Slaughterhouses (Danske Slagterier) Bent 
Sloth was cited in Politiken for welcoming the prohibition he was asked to see reason 
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by the chief of public relations from the Danish Agrochemical Association, Torsten 
Buhl: 
“[…] If it is true that Bent Sloth has made the statements reproduced in Politiken and 
Landsbladet, then he must have taken a wrong turning. But, as mentioned above, I doubt 
that Bent Sloth has said any such thing. He is usually such a reasonable man who will 
know absolutely that the slaughterhouses as well as the remaining agricultural interests 
have a vital interest in ensuring that environment and agricultural policy is based on 
reasoned and objective arguments.” (Torsten Buhl in Landbrugsmagasinet August 9th 
1990: Misforståelser af Bent Sloth om stråforkortning)  
The ‘offensive’ quotes had been published in Politiken and Landbrugsmagasinet: 
“It creates mistrust for the politicians when the prohibition comes this late. The straw 
shortening agents have been in use for years, and it is most unfortunate that the 
authorities have not investigated such agents before they were marketed […]” (Bent Sloth 
in Landbrugsmagasinet August 9th 1990: Ministeren har været alt for længe om at gribe 
ind) 
The position was in line with the statements the researchers had presented that same 
spring - although the substance was approved by normal toxicological tests they had 
not undergone a more realistic test, such as the feeding experiments. 
Bent Sloth clarified his position in the same issue that brought the contribution from 
the chief of public relations from the Danish Agrochemical Association. On the one 
hand he criticised the abrupt character of the prohibition, but on the other hand he 
maintained the critique: 
“I have earlier raised the problem of straw shortening agents’ effect on pig fertility in the 
Agricultural Joint Council on Research and Experiments, but was informed that no 
justification of a prohibition existed. There have now been conducted new experiments. 
These results ought to be discussed in the Research Council for Agriculture before any 
political decision is made? There is plenty of time before April next year.  
No one in agriculture, neither grain-growing farmers nor pig producers, wants to use 
straw shortening agents that may  influence animal fertility. We have used these agents 
in good faith based on the expert advice of the experimental laboratories that perform 
tests and give approvals.  
The Environmental Minister’s prohibition, at a totally unnecessary moment, is a blow to 
our faith in the politicians and their officials” (Bent Sloth in Landbrugsmagasinet August 
9th 1990: Lone Dybkjær for hurtig med sit forbud). 
In the end the two branches of agriculture did make up. The chairman of the National 
Committee for Pig Production and the chairman of the National Committee for Plant 
Growing were in mutual agreement that the prohibition represented a far too strong 
and unwarranted interpretation of the experiments. Almost all pig producers are also 
plant growers and intensive use of manure increasees the need for straw shortening. 
They were interviewed together in the main Danish agricultural magazine, 
Landsbladet:  
“Bent Sloth has forgotten to think. The doubt shall of course come to the benefit of the 
pig producers. But I find that we have done that with our recommendation of a maximum 
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of 30 percent treated grain in the feed for breeding pigs” (Erik Skovgaard Kristensen, 
chairman of the National Committee for Pig Production in Landsbladet August 1990: 
Beklager forbud mod stråforkorter) 
7.7.3 The Agricultural Researchers 
The third strand of debates, which the agrochemical industry engaged in, was targeted 
at the Foulum researchers who had produced the evidence that eventually lead to the 
prohibition. 
The prohibition came in fact also as a surprise to the researchers. The following quote 
shows this but also gives us an insight into the researchers’ basic opinions about the 
solidity of the experiments, which probably may be part of the explanation as to the 
eagerness with which the agrochemical industry put in to the discussion against the 
experiments, the researchers, and their research institution.  
“One feels a little ‘knocked about’ in a debate like this one, and I am surprised that Lone 
Dybkjær made such a substantial decision. I am of the opinion that our results in the long 
term should give rise to a phase out of straw shortening agents. But it is debateable 
whether the prohibition should be that hasty. Perhaps it should have come into force over 
a two-year period [?]. […] 
One could easily get the suspicion that human fertility may be influenced by drawing an 
analogy from pigs to humans because both rye and wheat for bread grain is sprayed with 
the straw shortening agents. But it is not possible to conclude anything such as this from 
our experiments, and I do not know how one should manage investigating it.”(Viggo 
Danielsen in Viborg Stiftstidende July 31st 1990, p9: Forsker overrasket over sprøjte-
forbud)  
Soon, the criticism against the experiments started to rise. It was the director of 
Rôhne-Poulenc, who later would participate in a television feature along with the 
minister and a number of other involved actors, who took the lead as the most active 
critics. The main point of the criticism was that the experiments were not in line with 
OECD guidelines for toxicological experiments, and the conclusion that the use of 
Cerone treated crops led to a decreased number of offspring was based on results from 
only nine sows, and that the active substance in Cerone, ethephon, was proved to have 
had no effects on the reproductive capability of rats, and that residues could not be 
detected in the grain.  
The criticism gained support in statements and reports from Christian Friis KVL and 
Professor D.E. Noakes of the University of London, both experts in their fields, who 
had made reports at Rhöne-Poulenc’s request: 
“Rhône-Poulenc Agro Norden’s conclusion on the experiments is [in conformity with 
Professor Noakes’] that the experiments are so defective that any conclusion about the 
effect of the investigated agents is impossible.  
One must be able to request that the same strict requirements that exist for the 
documentation for approval of a pesticide also must apply if a substance is desired 
prohibited. That has not been the case in this instance.” (Jan Stranges in Effektivt 
Landbrug August 6th 1990: Forbudet er basere på resultater fra kun 9 søer) 
A leading article from the agricultural magazine, Landbrugsmagasinet, commented 
that: 
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“The experimenter and his chiefs should have paid more attention to the fact that they 
were moving in a political and dangerous landscape, as already last year they were in the 
foreground with a couple of reports […]” (Leading Article in Landbrugsmagasinet 
August 9th 1990: Forbud på spinkelt grundlag) 
The Association of Scientific Workers at the National Institute for Animal Science 
responded by stressing the right to, and importance of, free research and the freedom 
of speech (John E. Hermansen in Landbrugsmagasinet August 23rd 1990: Research 
results should not be straw shortened) 
Also, the Director of the National Institute for Animal Science found it necessary to 
respond to the criticism. He was concerned that the institution’s credibility in some 
instances had been questioned, and stressed that research was impartial and focused at 
providing solid advice to Danish farmers:  
“That results are published, which are found inconvenient in some circles, ought not to 
lead the agricultural press to cast doubt on the research institutions work. Nor would it 
serve the agricultural interest if research results were to be assessed on the basis of their 
usefulness as arguments in the political debate.” (A. Hjortshøj Nielsen in 
Landbrugsmagasinet August 30th 1990) 
Dansk Landbrug asked the researcher to respond to the criticism directed against the 
experiments. In an article on August 27th 1990 he pointed the researcher to the main 
critisism that came from the company selling Cerone, that in fact had participated in 
the planning and financing of the experiments, and he referred to the background for 
the experiments as he had done almost one year before when the debates had cantered 
around the CCC-experiments (see also p94). He responded explicitly to the criticism 
of the experiments as not complying with the OECD test guidelines, and the criticism 
against the number of animals in the experiment. Again the reply was a repetition of 
earlier replies. The OECD test guide-lines had not been followed because they apply 
to experiments with laboratory animals and because the experiments:-  
“[…] should have a tight connection to practice, were they carried through as feeding 
experiments according to established methodologies.” (Viggo Danielsen in Dansk 
Landbrug August 27th 1990: Korte strå, færre grise).  
Regarding the number of animals, the researcher stated that the two experiments in 
total had comprised 95 sows with 267 farrows, and that the conclusion regarding 
Cerone was based on results from 47 sows that brought forth 177 farrows with 1949 
piglets.  
The debate continued until the middle of September involving titles such as “Rigging 
experiments on short straws and pig-breeding” (Jan Stranges), “Criticism against 
Cerone-experiments is out of proportion” (Viggo Danielsen), and “How nine sows 
became 95” (Jan Stranges).  
The debate continued to revolve around the same issues. Were the experiments valid 
with or without compliance to the OECD test guidelines? Were the experiments 
twisted or not? Further to this did the researchers’ ask why the manager hadn’t used 
his opportunity as a member of the steering group to comment or oppose the 
experiments before the report was published, and he stressed, that the criticisms ought 
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to differ between the experiments and the prohibition. The end of the debate coincided 
with the Environmental Appeals Board’s decision that the complaints should have a 
delaying effect, meaning that the preparations could be freely sold again. We will 
return to this shortly. 
7.8 Promoted Motive and Motivations for the Prohibition 
The fierce reactions from the agricultural sector may be better understood if we turn to 
the EPA’s and the Minister’s argument for a contextualisation of the prohibition. The 
Deputy Director-General of the EPA stated in the middle of August that an important 
aspect in the valuation of the Foulum research was the fact that the research was 
performed by a research institution belonging to the Ministry of Agriculture: 
“No matter what one might think of the experiments, the Ministry of Agriculture’s 
experts at Foulum are not just anybody. We cannot just ignore it when they, for the 
second time, present the conclusion that straw shortening agents influence pig, 
reproduction. We – as the Environmental Protection Agency – are the responsible 
authority in relation to public health.  
I do not know whether the results hold true when other and more profound studies have 
been made, but the precautionary principle prompts us to intervene.” 
[Interviewer:] – But the experiments must have some creditability in your opinion. Surely 
you don’t intervene with a prohibition on the basis of anything?   
 “The experts of the Ministry for Agriculture have invested their good reputation in these 
results. If we choose to ignore them, we probably would be open to even more severe 
criticism. I find that we acted prudently by intervening, at least until we get more 
knowledge.”  (EPA Deputy Director-General Hans Henrik Christensen in Information 
August 17th 1990)  
The Minister argued furthermore that the prohibition should be seen as a minor part of 
a larger necessary change of Danish agriculture if it is to become sustainable. 
Dybkjær argued that the costs of a prohibition will be more than outweighed by saved 
expenses among pig breeders due to reduced fertility and also saved expenses from the 
purchase of fertilizers. She argued for a structural re-organisation of Danish 
agriculture:  
“[…] 
We shall in the coming years readjust and secure Danish agriculture, which is sustainable 
both in terms of economy, environment, and health. We shall clean up that jumble of 
subsidy schemes, which among other things make up the European Common Agricultural 
Policy. The Aim is an economically independent agriculture, which shall be secured by, 
among other things, a price and market policy that incorporates environmental 
considerations as a central element. We have to acknowledge that we can only secure 
sustainability if reasonable doubts about substances and methods of production are made 
in favour of the environment and the health of the nation.  
There is in fact, international agreement that we shall use such a precautionary principle. 
We must therefore prepare our selves for future cases a la the case about straw shortening 
agents, concurrently with our knowledge being enlarged. 
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[…] this development has started internationally, according to the National Bureau for the 
Cultivation of Plants. Straw-stiff winter wheat is marketed in the United Kingdom and in 
France, but is perhaps not yet suitable for the Danish winter. We can probably have 
variants of straw-stiff winter rye on the market in three to four years. I wonder if the 
possibilities for Danish agriculture wait around the corner. It is also in this perspective 
that we have to see the straw-shortener case. 
[…] The customers for the agricultural products in industry and consumers are co-
determining how Danish agriculture should develop. The customers of the agricultural 
products in industry and consumers should, from now on, set up claims to the agricultural 
methods of production and the quality of the products. 
But not least the farmers themselves have a fundamental interest in developing 
agriculture in a sustainable direction. 
The intensive, heavily specialised and industrialised agricultural sector results in, and this 
can be demonstrated, a number of ‘sustainability-problems’, and there is a need to halt 
these problems and then correct them. This is a possibility because Denmark has the 
natural foundations for agricultural production that are effective, profitable, and safe for 
health and the environment. 
Danish agriculture has been able to re-organize before. This can happen again, and this 
must happen again. Much is at stake so we must not let things slide.”(Environmental 
Minister Lone Dybkjær in Politiken August 14th 1990: “Debat: Landbrug må forædle sig 
til miljø...”) 
In the quote the Minister combined ecological modernisation type of arguments with 
the prohibition, and she thereby attempted to question one of the criticism’s strong 
arguments, namely the cost of not using the straw-shorteners. But she did also extent 
the case’s scope to include a structural level which, anything equal, would trouble the 
Liberals and the Conservatives in the coalition government.  
7.9 Crisis in the Government 
Let us return to the political processes that followed the prohibition. We will now step 
two weeks back in time. 
The decision started a crisis in the government. The Ministry of the Environment had 
only cursorily informed the Ministry of Agriculture about the coming prohibition. The 
agricultural spokesmen of the two other parties in the coalition government, the 
Liberals and the Conservatives, were furious. The two spokesmen were, as active 
landowners and farmers, personally affected by the prohibition, and they found that 
the prohibition represented a break with the governmental alliance between the 
Liberals and the Conservatives on the one side, and the Social Liberals on the other 
side: 
“»The Minister for Environment simply cannot take such a, for the agricultural sector, 
crucial decision without first consulting the other parties in the government. And we will 
under no circumstances take part in a prohibition,« says Bernt Johan Collet. The 
Ministers solitary approach »does not follow the rule of the game in this government, 
where it is customary to converse,« he adds.” (Agricultural spokesman Bernt Johan 
Collet, the Conservatives, quoted in Berlingske Tidende July 28th 1990) 
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Also, the Liberals took the prohibition very seriously: 
“The agricultural spokesman of the Liberals, Peder Sønderby, will take the prohibition up 
with Lone Dybkjær at a spokesmen-meeting on August 9th. I am surprised that the 
prohibition was issued, and that she did not discuss it with us first. Peder Sønderby is a 
farmer and has 12 hectares growing rye. He states that without straw shortening agents 
the grain crop would now be lying across the fields. They [the straw shortening agents] 
lead to a larger yield. But it is true that there exists a fear of side effects from these 
agents. And the pig breeders have drawn it to our attention that we must be cautious 
about what we use. But it would be a catastrophe for agriculture if we had to do without 
the growth regulators, stated Peder Sønderby.” (Agricultural spokesman Peder Sønderby, 
the Liberals, in Ritzau, July 28th 1990) 
On Sunday, the second day after the prohibition was issued the permanent secretary of 
the Ministry of the Environment, Leo Bjørnskov, asserted that the Ministry of 
Agriculture had been informed about the coming prohibition: 
“We informed the Ministry of Agriculture on Friday that we, on the basis of the report, 
considered intervening. If the Ministry of Agriculture had had serous problems with this, 
it would have been discussed more profoundly, but that did not happen.” (Politiken July 
29th 1990 section 1, p8) 
The Minister of Agriculture was on holiday, and refrained from giving any comments 
until one and a half months later in mid September. The case seems to have been 
politically very sensitive, as we shall see shortly. The minister explained his silence 
with the necessity for the mutual respect between the ministers regarding their 
respective spheres of competence (see e.g. Danmarks Erhversradio September 14th 
1990 0730, transcript from Presseklip).  
The Ministry of Agriculture selected a cautious strategy, and shortly after the 
emergence of the debate, in mid august, the ministry asked the Royal Veterinary and 
Agricultural University of Denmark to assess the research that prompted the 
prohibition. The Agricultural University requested a group of scientific staff with 
relevant specialities – mainly professors – to perform a profound assessment of the 
Foulum experiment (Willeberg et al., 1991: 1). This group started to work 
immediately, but did so in the background and without interference from the public 
debate. The final report was delivered eight months later: where it came to play a role 
for the symbolic conclusion of the case. We will return to this later.  
The divide between the agricultural interests and non-agricultural interests including 
the members of the core government in the two parties was emerging. A contemporary 
political commentary in Berlingske Tidende assessed that the conflict potentially 
could mean the end of the coalition government, which it warned against:  
“Conservative wishes for a tightening of refugee legislation have made the Social 
Liberals bristle in advance. And the Liberals’ desire for reductions of public expenses and 
interventions against transfer payments will hardly be received with Social Liberal 
warmth. So far the cooperation between the Liberals, the Conservatives, and the Social 
Liberals has been amazingly easy. And it would be incomprehensible if an affaire about 
straw shortening crop sprays should shorten the government’s lifetime.” (Berlingske 
Tidende August 4th 1990: Blæsevejr).  
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The basis for the coalition government was a common perception of economic policy 
as the most important issue. When Prime Minister Poul Schlüter formed his first 
minority government in 1982, the main concerns were economic policy and 
maintaining power, and this was supported by the Social Liberals (Andersen, 1997: 
265). 
This attitude was a moderator on the agricultural interests, who otherwise lined up for 
a major clash with a very harsh criticism of the Environment Minister and her 
prohibition: 
“The Minister’s attitude does not create a durable basis for future cooperation, said Bernt 
Johan Collet. He will not comment on whether the Conservatives will demand Lone 
Dybkjær’s removal as Minister of the Environment, but does state that: This mode of 
cooperation, where the minister from one party takes decisions without negotiating with 
the remaining government parties, cannot continue in the long run.”  (Bernt Johan Collet 
in Berlingske Tidende August 4th 1990) 
7.10 The “Precautionary Principle” Enters the Agenda 
Minster for the Environment Lone Dybkjær maintained her position at the meeting; 
the prohibition would be maintained until the agents were proved safe: 
“We have reached a new époque for environmental policy where it is a necessity to let 
reasonable doubt favour the environment […]  Doubt has been created around the agents 
by means of the experiments from Foulum. This doubt shall benefit human beings, but 
certainty has not been created. And we must produce that certainty. The future of the 
substances on the market can be decided when we can present the renewed 
investigations.” (Minister for the Environment Lone Dybkjær in Berlingske Tidende 
August 10th 1990: Lone Dybkjær står fast på forbud mod vækst-middel) 
Further she maintained that the prohibition was not in conflict with EC law as the 
prohibition was directed towards sale and not towards use of the agents in question 
(Ibid). The day for the spokesmen’s meeting saw the conservative/liberal newspaper 
Berlingske Tidende announce that the prohibition was in disagreement with EU-law 
(Berlingske Tidende August 9th 1990: Advokater: Forbud mod vækstmiddel i strid 
med EF-regler) 
In Radio Denmark’s six o’clock News the Environment Minister amplified her 
position and rejected the Liberal’s and the Conservative’s agricultural spokesman: 
“I told the spokesman [of the Liberals and the Conservatives] that I would maintain the 
prohibition against the sale of straw shortening agents, and I do so because I find there is 
so much doubt in this case, and that it therefore is correct to let the precautionary 
principle apply, that is, there should not be anything on the market that we are not sure is 
safe.”  
Interviewer:” But you could with ease just have talked with the agricultural sector, as, at 
least, the pig producers seemingly supported you?” 
“Well I could have talked with the agricultural sector, but I would also have known the 
answer. I could anticipate the reactions that I would’ve received, you know, the grain-
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producers disagree, and the pig-producers agree, and then it must be my decision, of 
course.” 
Interviewer: “Now, there are only signs of the straw shortening agents being harmful to 
pigs, and the pig producers themselves have worked out to how reduce the use of the 
agents,  because they don’t want these agents getting into their animals. Couldn’t you just 
accept that business has managed the problem this way?” 
“No, because pigs, so to speak, are closer to humans, and so it could be argued that what 
happens with pigs could also happen with humans. Except that I subsequently have 
received some results from the National Institute for Animal Science, who has performed 
experiments on other areas with these straw shortening agents. They have tested [treated] 
feed on young bulls, and they have tested it on mink, and in both instances there is what 
is called physiological change in the animals. That is to say, changes take place in the 
animals.”  (DR’s Radioavisen August 9th 1990, transcript from Presseklip, 90.08.10) 
The spokesmen for the Liberals and the Conservatives became even more furious. The 
public could after the meeting read in Berlingske Tidende that the two spokesmen 
seemingly were ready to let the crisis end the life of the coalition government, but also 
that Dybkjær kept a stiff upper lip: 
“And Collet will request that Lone Dybkjær’s decision is taken up at the government’s 
top-level – the Coordination Committee – in order to order the Minister to revoke the 
prohibition. »Now, Collet does not have a seat in the government and it must be up to the 
prime minister to decide whether this is an issue for the Coordination Committee, « 
replied the Minister for Environment Lone Dybkjær.”  (Berlingske Tidende August 10th 
1990: Lone Dybkjær står fast på forbud mod vækst-middel) 
Even though both the Liberals and the Conservatives requested the case be treated in 
the Coordination Committee, this did not happen. At a meeting between the chairs of 
the government parties and Prime Minister Poul Schlüter (the Conservatives) on 
August 17th, instead it was decided to await the negotiations and investigations at EC 
level, and the outcome of the case at the Environmental Appeals Board (Politiken 
August 18th 1990 section 1 page 8: Stråforkorterne tabte). Dybkjær later wrote in a 
memo (festschrift) to Schlüter that Schlüter, on his own initiative, supported the 
prohibition and (in deviation from normal practice) informed her about this personally 
with a phone call. (Dybkjær, 1999:280) 
The straw shortening agents had at this point clearly become a part of the intra-
governmental power game, and Dybkjær had won the first battle. By deciding not to 
follow the recommendation from the Conservatives and the Liberals to discuss the 
issue in the coalition-government’s Coordination Committee, the Prime Minister had 
chosen to avoid an open confrontation over the issue, and to wait and see if the case 
would be resolved from the outside. In fact the coalition government did have several 
problems with cooperation among the three partners, and of these this issue was 
probably a minor one (Bille, 1998: 74-85). In hindsight the crisis was managed in such 
a way that it disappeared as a major conflict for that coalition government. 
During 1990, the internal tensions of the coalition government increased. The budget 
compromise for 1990 had been relying on votes from the extremist rightwing party 
‘the Progress Party’ (Fremskridtspartiet, a Danish populist party with tax reduction as 
its platform). Until this, one of the Social Liberal’s mottos had been: “Rather close to 
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the hurdle18 than close to the Progress Party” (Bille, Nielsen, & Sauerberg, 1992: 15). 
The dependency of the Progress Party represented a disruption with the Social 
Liberal’s strategy of creating compromises across the middle of the political spectre.  
Since the Social Liberals had joined government with the Conservatives and the 
Liberals in 1988, the little middle party had been facing opinion polls that forecast 
ever decreasing electoral support, (Bille, Nielsen, & Sauerberg, 1992: 27). 
Furthermore, the party was provoked by the coalition partners’ populist refugee 
policy, which among other things made the party request the Parliament’s 
Ombudsman to examine the Conservative Minister of Justice, Hans Engell’s, practise 
in a specific case (Polinfo September 26th 1990). When Foreign Minister Uffe Elleman 
(the Liberals) sent a corvette to the Iraq-Kuwait Gulf War, had it also been in the teeth 
of the Social Liberals. 
Up to the Social Liberals’ party conference, which took place on September 15th, the 
president of the party Thorkild Møller could inform the party that it had been engaged 
in rendering the party visible in the government, and that examples on this were 
Environment Minister Lone Dybkjær’s preservation of the South West Jutland coastal 
mudflats, and prohibitions against straw shortening agents in agriculture. According to 
Møller this was a new policy – doubt must come to the benefit of the environment – 
part of the Social Liberal counter weight to the two coalition partners. (Thorkild 
Møller in Politiken September 14th 1990: Markante udspil før radikales landsmøde).  
But even though the Environment Minister and her party had succeeded in 
maintaining the prohibition internally in the coalition government, she did foresee that 
it could be difficult to sustain the prohibition:  
“They [the chemical industry] will use all means available to knock down this decision. 
stated Lone Dybkjær at the Social Liberals summer convention yesterday. She stressed 
that Denmark as such is so small that as a market it is uninteresting for manufacturers. 
But she pointed out that they fear other countries may follow the Danish example and 
prohibit the straw shortening agents. The environment minister anticipated that it will 
turn out to be tough because the perspectives are so immense. She appealed to everybody 
to help back up the prohibition. The single citizen can do quite a lot. The point is really 
that the citizens comprehend this and seek to support it, stated Lone Dybkjær. 
(Environment Minister Lone Dybkjær in Politiken August 19th 1990: Forbud med 
problemer) 
Dybkjær had been interviewed for a feature about the straw-shorteners on the very 
popular Sunday television news, which was broadcast on the evening of the same day, 
where she brought with her the precautionary principle as argument for the 
prohibition. The feature brought also statements from the main actors involved in the 
case:  
                                                     
18 ‘Hurdle’ understood as the minimum percentage of the votes necessary for a party to be 
represented in parliament. The Social Liberals were relatively close… 
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The TV-feature and especially Environment Minister Lone Dybkjær’s performance in 
the Sunday television news was given the following comment in Berlingske: 
“The Precautionary Principle [forsigtighedsprincippet]. Minister for the Environment 
Lone Dybkjær claimed yesterday in the Sunday Television News that this term covers a 
new principle, which shall apply when the slightest doubt about a substance’s possible 
danger exists. She made her statement in connection to the prohibition against straw 
shortening agents, which have come under suspicion. The scene is laid for an armoured 
The Pesticide producer: “[…] the results show nothing. 
[…] What annoys us here is that this influences our 
ethical reputation and our scientific reputation, and we 
will therefore now demonstrate that there exist no 
negative effects to health from Cerone or Cerone treated 
crops - not to animals or to humans.” 
The Farmer’s Union: “It is a new approach the 
Environment Minister has taken up; that the 
prohibition is issued suddenly from one day to the 
next. We can normally discuss things like that if we 
are sure they are built on a scientific basis.” 
The Consumer’s Council: “I really think that it is very 
pleasant that Lone Dybkjær acts to do something before 
it is too late. It is often necessary to have ‘corpses’, so 
to speak, before any legal intervention is performed.” 
The Minister: “When there is doubt about the harmful 
effect to humans or the environment, then the 
precautionary principle must come into force, that is, we 
should not say yes to anything where doubt about the 
effects exists […] You may say that the precautionary 
principle is new, but we use it regularly when new 
substances enter the market; we are then very careful 
with testing. You can say that this is the first time we 
have acted this promptly on an existing substance.” 
The Scientist: “We observed that the litter sizes went 
down by about one piglet when we used barley treated 
with Cerone, compared with untreated barley” 
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battle. For the time being, we have been given a new phrase - The Precautionary 
Principle. […] (Gert Smistrup in Berlingske Tidende August 20th 1990). 
At this point it might be useful to take stock of the situation: the prohibition was 
issued, the actors had made their positions clear, and it had been announced that the 
case was to be tested at the European Union Commission and at the Environmental 
Appeals Board. 
Lone Dybkjær had appealed to the public to support the decision. One of the two 
major Danish industrial bakeries (the Schülstad group) announced shortly after the 
appeal had been issued that they would seek to avoid growth-retarded rye for black 
bread. The head of research of the Schülstad group had stated to Radio Denmark’s 
regional radio stations, Holstebro, Radio Midt and Vest that "the positive thing about 
the Environment Minister’s prohibition is the process it has started in the agricultural 
sector". 
7.11 The Confutation of the EPA Decision  
A formal complaint had not yet been issued by September 19th, the day when the 
minister brought the precautionary principle with her on to the television news, and 
where the other parties had made their cases. The Danish Agrochemical Association 
had announced that it would issue a complaint, but the association was not directly 
afflicted and could therefore not complain on behalf of its members. The association 
arranged instead coordination meetings to secure that all importers and manufacturers 
submitted complaints to the Environmental Appeals Board.  
7.11.1 Environmental Appeals Board  
The first complaint arrived at the Environmental Appeals Board on August 23rd 1990 
from DK Petrokemi and Shell Kemi A/S, shortly after the Sunday news. During the 
succeeding days additional complaints were forwarded from BASF Danmark A/S, 
Rôhne-Poulenc Agro Norden, Plantekemi Odense A/S, KVK Agro A/S, Danish 
Cooperative Farm Supply and the Danish Farmers' Union, and JBC Handel ApS 
(Miljøankenævnet, 1990: 3).  
The appeals were targeted at both sales prohibition and the ‘appeals-leads-to-non-
delay’ decision. Furthermore, it was stressed in most of the complaints that the 
decision regarding ‘appeals-leads-to-non-delay’ was taken before mid September. The 
following is reproduced from the front page of the written complaint submitted to the 
board from the lawyer representing the Danish Cooperative Farm Supply and the 
Danish Farmers' Union:  
“I would like to point out, to keep the record straight, that (among other things) there are 
claims laid as to attach the claim for delaying effect, and that request is made to the 
Environmental Appeals Board, out of consideration for the farmer’s possibility for 
disposing and for the supply-situation, as to arrive at a decision regarding this issue 
before the middle of September.” (Gaarden, 1990) 
It was immensely important to have the EPA’s iron grip loosened. If the alliance of 
plaintiffs could succeed in having the ‘appeals-leads-to-non-delay’ decision lifted, 
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then the pesticide industry could sell the products legally and the farmers buy 
supplies. Then it would be up to the individual farmer to decide whether to comply 
with a possible later prohibition. 
The Board followed the plaintiff’s request and focussed its work at a part decision 
which was made on September 17th 1990:  
“The Environmental Appeals Board revokes the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
decision that the announced sales prohibitions shall be obeyed notwithstanding the 
complaints to the Board.” (Miljøankenævnet, 1990: 21) 
The decision regarding the actual sales prohibition was postponed until the board 
could receive the requested remarks regarding the complaints from the Environmental 
Protection Agency. The Board stressed that the part decision did not take the 
prohibition as such into consideration, but would only come to a decision on whether 
the EPA was entitled to deviate from the principal rule (§53 subsection one) that 
complaints should have a delaying effect. (Miljøankenævnet, 1990: 14) 
The part decision was accompanied with an elaboration of the complaints and the 
EPA’s dispositions.  
The grounds for the Board’s decision fall into three parts; the juridical aspects of the 
paragraphs the EPA decision pointed to, the solidity of the evidence behind the EPA’s 
decision, and finally the EPA’s administrative procedures in relation to the decision.  
The EPA’s decision was made with reference to the Law of Chemicals § 53 section 
two. This article says that the controlling authority may set aside the principal rule of 
right to complain (§ 53 subsection one); “[w]hen particular health reasons calls for it”. 
This rule had been established to give ‘the authorities’ the possibility to immediately 
execute a prohibition in instances where serious health risks or environmental damage 
threatens.” (Remarks to the bill L 162 sessional year of the Danish Parliament 1988-
89) 
The board assessed therefore that the EPA would only have been entitled to use it if it 
was the agency’s assessment that the “use of the growth regulating agents involved a 
serious danger for health or the environment”; and that had not been the case. 
(Miljøankenævnet, 1990: 15). Central to the board’s argumentation was that the 
prohibition was made with reference to § 38 subsection 1, which says that “an 
authorisation can be redrawn if new information pledges for this”. But, the board 
stated that if the EPA had assessed that the use of the growth regulating agents 
involved a serious danger for health or the environment, then the appropriate section 
would be section 38 subsection 2, which says that “an authorisation must be redrawn 
provided the concerned substance or preparation involved serious danger for health or 
the environment” (italics added).  
The board also criticized the EPA for not having made a supplementary assessment of 
the results of the Foulum experiments. The board stated that it was found problematic 
if isolated research results that raise doubts about e.g. health aspects of a substance or 
a preparation alone could lead to the use of the ‘appeals-leads-to-non-delay’ clause. 
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The board’s opinion was that the consequences of such an interpretation of the law 
would be difficult to grasp. 
The board did furthermore refer to earlier cases where the EPA had revoked 
authorizations for the sale and import of specific substances, which the EPA regarded 
as particularly dangerous for health and particularly harmful to the environment. The 
EPA had therefore decided that the right to the sale and import the substances would 
cease after one year. These decisions had not referred to the ‘appeals-leads-to-non-
delay’ clause. The board found therefore that:  
“ – also with reference to equality principles – that it is inadvisable to assume that 
isolated results – no-matter what the authors’ conclusions – can form the basis of a 
decision as the one the agency has reached pursuant to the § 53 subsection 2 of the Act, 
for the board presented cases.” (Miljøankenævnet, 1990: 19) 
The board pointed also to the EPA’s earlier rejection of the seriousness of the results 
of experiments with CCC, a judgement for which the EPA seemingly had not made its 
reassessment clear. 
Finally, the board remarked that the specific course of events further weakens the 
EPA’s case. According to the information available to the board, the results of the 
Cerone-Roundup experiments were given to the EPA as members of the steering 
group for the experiments in April. The EPA had approved Cerone on April 18th, EK 
Chlormequate 700 on June 29th, and CCCCC 460 on July 24th. And the prohibition 
was issued on the 27th, only three days after the last authorisation. 
The board found that the parties should have had the possibility to produce a statement 
before the prohibition was issued. The board did agree that situations could occur 
where considerations for health and the environment would be so weighty that a 
decision must be take immediately and without hearing the other parties. The Board 
did however also find that:  
“the respective authorities’ preparation of the administrative procedures should be 
implicated in the assessment of the legitimacy of such a course of actions”. 
(Miljøankenævnet, 1990: 21) 
The Environmental Appeals Board’s part decision was a defeat for the Minister and 
the decision to ban the plant growth retardants. The EPA had been criticised not just 
for taking a decision on an uncertain basis; but also the main argument against the 
EPA’s decision had been created by the EPA itself one year earlier. The course of 
events had shown a lack of consistency between the EPA’s day-to-day work and the 
decision, and the latter seemed to be enough alone to reject the use of the ‘appeals-
leads-to-non-delay’ clause. It was stressed in the decision that it did not involve or 
influence the assessment of the prohibition itself, but some of the elements of the 
assessment of the ‘appeals-leads-to-non-delay’ decision would most likely also have 
relevance for the main assessment.  
It was furthermore specified that the rejection of the EPA’s decision was “carried 
unanimously”, which is an unusual wording compared to other decisions taken in the 
Environmental Appeals Board, signalling that a complete agreement was reached 
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among the board members. The specific wording, in Danish “enstemmigt”, does not in 
fact, occur in other decisions made by the board.  
The board members are nominated jointly by a number of branch organizations 
including the Confederation of Danish Industries and the Agricultural Council of 
Denmark, and jointly by the Environmental Protection Agency and the Danish 
Working Environment Service. The most pro-environment member of the committee 
was Professor Bro-Rasmussen. He recalls that he was used as an expert in the 
Environmental Appeals Board, and that he was generally contrary to the decision 
made by the Board. He remember the specific case as haute école legalism. He was 
called as an expert in the testing of chemicals, but recalls that the chairman of the 
committee had impressed on the committee that they only should assess the validity of 
the use of ‘appeals-leads-to-non-delay’ clause, and that he therefore was 
professionally sidetracked: “the legalistic manoeuvres did not need any professional 
insight, and the jurists could in fact have done this alone”. If we look at the part 
decision this becomes very clear as it is stated: 
“The board has carefully considered whether the circumstance that an isolated experiment 
at a research institution or the like raises doubts about e.g. the health consequences of 
certain substances or preparations in its self may justify the Environmental Protection 
Agency […] decision that eventual complaints to the board will have no delaying effect. 
[…] According to the opinion of the board is this not the case […]” (Miljøankenævnet, 
1990: 18) 
It was the opinion of the board that it would take more than one series of experiments 
to justify the use of the ‘appeals-leads-to-non-delay’ clause, no matter how well-
performed the experiments were.  
Bro Rasmussen’s approach to the case was that the Institute for Toxicology had 
rejected relevant experiments: 
“I complained during the discussions in the board: [remembers] why Emil Poulsen 
[Manager of Institute for Toxicology] discarded experiments even though they looked 
sensible. And when he justifies why he should not take the results seriously he did so 
with reference to the experiments as not being regular laboratory experiments. […] It 
annoyed me very much that he on that basis actually discarded […] production 
experiments, (quotes part decision p9 which reproduced the statement made by the 
Institute for Toxicology to the Minister for Environment in November 1987): It must be 
remarked on in general that the accomplished experiments at the National Institute for 
Animal Science are production experiments, and that they as such should not be used as 
production of evidence for toxicological effects. Thus it corresponds that to discard 
epidemiological data in human-toxicology, and not just epidemiological data but actually 
experimental and controlled epidemiological data. It annoyed me but I was just brushed 
aside in the board’s decision. […] We (the board) were not supposed to take decisions on 
the prohibition and its background, but only on the issue whether complaints should have 
a delaying effect.” (Bro-Rasmussen, 2003) 
Bro-Rasmussen stress that he was never invited to participate in the board’s 
assessment of the prohibition. The simple explanation for that, as we shall see shortly, 
is that that assessment was never made. 
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In the Ministry of Environment the decision was received as unwelcome news: 
“Seen from an environmental angle it is an unfortunate decision. The decision shows that 
our law and legal details aren’t at the foreground of the development. On the contrary 
[…] the law blocks environmentally sound solutions” (Dybkjær 1990**) 
7.11.2 Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Health 
The difficulties for the prohibition accumulated. The Ministry of Justice produced a 
note in which the sales prohibition was assessed with respect to EC law. The note was 
presented immediately before the environment board had decided the ‘appeals-leads-
to-non-delay’ decision was invalid. 
In the note it was stated that restraints on commerce could be introduced if it is 
substantiated by concern for human and animal health, or by concern for the 
environment, but based on the Treaties on the European Economic Community and 
the legal usage practiced by the Chambers of the Court of Justice the following 
assumption also existed:  
“a product that legally can be marketed in other EEC-countries is not dangerous to health. 
This assumption can be invalidated, but the burden of proof lies with the Danish 
Environmental Protection Agency. Hereby will there be attached great importance to the 
results of international scientific research just as it will be taken into consideration 
whether the research results, which the EPA rely on, have been produced on a 
scientifically sound basis.” (Justitsministeriet, 1990: 5).  
Important for the scientific soundness, stated the note, was the link between residue 
concentrations and limit values, a causality which had not been established in the 
Foulum experiments. The note concluded that the sales prohibition constituted a 
barrier to trade, which was in conflict with EU law as the prohibition was assessed as 
both disproportionate and arbitrary (Justitsministeriet, 1990: 7). The assessment of the 
decision as arbitrary was based on the fact that the prohibition was only targeted at the 
sale of straw shorteners and not the import of treated grain.  
The simple explanation for the Ministry of Environment’s emphasis is quite logical, as 
importation of treated grain belongs to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health. The 
Ministry of Environment had in fact requested the Ministry of Health to consider an 
intervention with regard to the import of grain. The Minister for Health, Ester Larsen 
(Liberals), replied to the Environment Minister Lone Dybkjær (Social Liberals) a few 
days after the Environmental Appeals Board had made its decision:  
"It is the opinion of the Ministry of Health that no problems are associated with humans 
eating products treated with straw shortening chemicals". (Ester Larsen 1990**) 
The opinion was based on advice from the Institute for Toxicology, and as such did 
not deviate from earlier advice the institute had given. 
The note from the Ministry of Justice concluded that the revocation of the 
authorizations for the importation and sale was assumed to be against the EEC treaty.  
The reaction in the Ministry of Environment was to attempt to demonstrate how the 
precautionary principle could be worked into the legislation. October, Lone Dybkjær 
stated that the precautionary principle could come to play a role for the approval of 
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new substances on the market and for the actualization of cleaner technology in 
industry (Lone Dybkjær in Politiken October 18th 1990: Tvivl skal komme miljøet til 
gode).  
It seems as if the Minister at this point had waived the possibility to have the straw 
shorteners prohibited. It was quite obvious that her formal advisers, i.e. the Institute 
for Toxicology and the Environmental Protection Agency were, at best, sceptical 
towards the health effects of the straw shorteners, and the Environmental Appeals 
Board’s part decision came as a trump on this discrepancy between the Minister and 
the experts. Furthermore ,a general election was in the offing, which attracted media 
attention and increased the focus on traditional ‘strong issues’ namely economic 
policy, and in general the years from 1990 to 1993 have been described as a calmer 
period regarding environmental issues (Andersen, 1997: 266). 
When the sale of the straw shortening agents was permitted again many farmers 
purchased extra supplies, which in fact made total pesticide consumption explode in 
1990 (Dansk Agrokemisk Forening Pesticid statistic) 
7.12 New Government – Prohibition on Ice 
The attention to the case now diminished. The coalition government faced problems 
with a totally different issue, namely economic policy; and the electoral campaign was 
primarily focused on this. 
The election was a defeat for the Social Liberals and the party did not join the coming 
government. When the new government took over on December 12th it consisted of the 
Liberals and the Conservatives; and a new Minister of Environment was appointed. 
The new Minister was the Conservative Per Stig Møller, who was a newcomer when it 
came to environmental issues.  
At this point the case was neutralised and contained, and did not warrant any specific 
political attention. Dybkjær, who had raised the issue, was not in office anymore, the 
‘appeals-leads-to-non-delay’ decision had been lifted, and the afflicted parties had 
issued appeals. The straw shortening agents could be sold again, and there was no 
need for hasty decisions, and the actors who were in positions to take decisions could 
with ease await the investigation from the ad hoc committee at the Royal Veterinary 
and Agricultural University of Denmark.  
All debate about the prohibition faded out, and did so in spite of the fact that the part 
decision in principle did not affect the prohibition itself. The compelling explanation 
for this is that the primary driver behind the very intense debate, which escalated up to 
the part decision, was driven by agricultural and especially agrochemical interests. 
After the part decision these parties were probably confident that the prohibition 
would fall, and did not need any further media attention. It was simply assessed that at 
this stage the battle was in practice won.  
Also in the Ministry of Environment the attention to the case faded out; the latest 
document related to the prohibition was in fact dated January 30th 1991, which is 
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seven months before the prohibition was revoked on August 2nd 1991. Certainly, the 
issue had no longer any political attention. 
7.13 The Prohibition is Finally Exorcised 
The Environmental Protection Agency did, on August 2nd 1991, finally revoke the 
prohibition. The press statement justified both the prohibition and its withdrawal. It 
refers to the Foulum experiments and stresses the Institute’s close connection to the 
Ministry of Agriculture, and the Danish Agricultural Advisory Centre’s 
recommendation to pig-breeders as to the limiting of the use of straw shortened grain 
in fodder. The withdrawal was based on the assessment made by the expert group at 
the Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University, which the EPA interpreted this way: 
“It is not documented that sows fed on grain treated with straw shorteners produce fewer 
piglets than other sows.”  
The primary argument for the withdrawal was therefore the critical evaluation of the 
Foulum experiments. 
The press statement further explained that the straw shorteners in question were to be 
reassessed in 1992. The reassessment would naturally be based on the internationally 
accepted OECD test guidelines that had been brought forward all along the 
development of the case by the toxicologists and the industry. The logical 
consequence was naturally that the pig-feeding experiments were contained as far as it 
concerned authorisation of the straw shorteners.  
The EPA had received the report from the ad hoc committee in April, four months 
before the revocation was executed. The Division for Research in Pigs and Horses at 
the National Institute of Animal Science was not satisfied with the evaluation, and 
therefore produced a reply to the evaluation, which was directed at both the manager 
of the National Institute of Animal Science and the EPA. The reply was accompanied 
by a letter signed by the head of the Division for Research in Pigs and Horses. In the 
letter it was stated that the division maintained and supported the conclusion that the 
spraying agents could have a negative impact on some reproductive properties among 
swine, and warned against acquitting the spraying agents of this.  
The EPA rejected the objections made by the researchers at the National Institute of 
Animal Science, based solely on the argumentation for the revocation of the 
prohibition on the evaluation (see e.g. Miljøstyrelsen, 1991). 
7.13.1 The Evaluation and the Foulum Researchers’ Response 
But let us turn to the evaluation and the researchers’ comments. The ad hoc committee 
consisted of six experts with specialisms in toxicology, statistics, reproduction, 
feeding, and epidemiology. The evaluation went through the background for and 
purpose of the experiments, the accomplishment of the experiments, and the reporting 
of the results. Finally the evaluation discussed and concluded on the solidity of the 
Foulum report. 
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Central for any evaluation is the basis of valuation. When the Ministry of Agriculture 
approached the Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University the object was an 
“interpretation and assessment of the raw material behind report no 677 from the 
National Institute of Animal Science”. This can be interpreted as the evaluation of the 
experiments on the premises that are common for that type of experiment. The ad hoc 
group also maintained that this was the aim of their work. But the ad hoc group’s 
report also reflected the aim of their evaluation in terms of practical politics, namely 
the critical remarks that had emerged with the public and political attention that came 
with the prohibition. (Willeberg et al., 1991: 1) 
It had been one of the Foulum researchers’ central points during the debate in 1990 
that their research should not be evaluated as formal toxicological experiments, but as 
production experiments. Furthermore, it had been of the utmost importance for the 
researchers to stress that the experiments and the conclusions should not be evaluated 
on the basis of how they were used politically. The researchers did therefore point to 
this: 
“It is unreasonable if [the criticism in the press] is taken as a starting point for an 
‘interpretation and assessment of the raw material behind report’. […] The report ought 
to be assessed on the tenability of its conclusions, and not on the basis of how the results 
are being used and covered publicly and politically. (Danielsen & Larsen, 1991: 1). 
The key issue for the Foulum researchers was most likely to champion their legitimacy 
as scientists and experts. It was obvious that if the research was evaluated as 
experiments leading to regulation of a chemical substance then they would have to 
comply with the rather strict OECD test guidelines, which they did not do.  
The evaluation seems to balance between these two poles: evaluation of a normal 
feeding experiment, and evaluation of an experiment that is used as basis for a 
prohibition. The ad hoc committee did on the one hand recognize that the experiments 
were “feeding experiments of a type, with which [the National Institute of Animal 
Science] has a wide experience of”. (Willeberg et al., 1991: 5, 9) 
On the other hand there are throughout the evaluation expressed criticisms that extend 
the scope of the evaluation from a feeding experiment to a more conclusive 
experiment that aimed at giving directions for regulation. It is stated that the type of 
experiments were criticized as not being useful for a conclusive assessment of the 
possible side effects of the straw shortening agents. It is also stated that the ad hoc 
group cannot fully accept that exposure to Cerone and Roundup treated grain and 
bedding influences the piglet’s survival potential, because the reporting did not 
specify the cause of death -cause-effect- (Willeberg et al., 1991: 6). In the discussion it 
was suggested that the pigs had been exposed to different doses as to disclose dose-
response effects, and that the report discussed explanations for the effects in the shape 
of biological mechanisms (Willeberg et al., 1991: 9).  
The evaluation puts forward a differentiation between experiments that are hypothesis 
generating and experiments that are hypothesis confirming as a key point of criticism. 
It is stated that the report has a limited value for hypothesis confirmation, as the 
experimental plan did not explicitly indicate what variables would be central and how 
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they were to be analysed, and it is concluded that the experiments were of the 
hypothesis generating type. Furthermore it is stated that only hypothesis confirming 
experiments of a verified design-type should be used for the type of conclusions that 
are given in the Foulum report: 
“The observations made of a number of reproduction-parameters are useful in a 
hypothesis generating study, but do not live up to the requirements of investigations of 
reproductive toxicology. The investigations may on this basis lead to errors, therefore 
lacking detection of the effects of the crop sprays on the animals’ fertility and 
reproduction. When it is concluded on page 54: “Among sows reproduction was 
characteristic including heat, remating and farrowing rates not significantly influenced by 
any of the chemicals”, this may therefore be correct but it could also be incorrect, because 
the registration has been too inadequate and imprecise for such a general conclusion.”  
This point of the criticism can be boiled down to the experiments being as such 
acceptable, but that the character of the conclusion belonged to the established domain 
of testing of reproductive toxicity, and therefore was problematic. This was also 
rejected by the Foulum-researchers. In the reply it was stated that the experiments 
were not planned or carried out as reproductive toxicological experiments, and 
maintained that the conclusions were concrete and based on the observations made in 
the experiments. 
This criticism is also remarkable because it is the one of the two concrete points given 
in the conclusion of the evaluation. The second concrete point of criticism, which can 
be related to the Foulum report’s conclusion, was less precise. It regarded the central 
issue of whether the experiments could give a basis for the conclusion that the use of 
Cerone-treated grain would negatively influence litter size at birth. The ad hoc group 
found that this was not the case:  
“It is therefore questionable whether the demonstrated difference in experiment one is an 
effect of Cerone in the experimental group or is a coincidental high value in the control 
group, which can occur despite randomizing, not least because of the high number of 
parameters included in this hypothesis generating research.” (Willeberg et al., 1991: 10)  
The ad hoc committee fastened upon the relatively high number of live-born piglets in 
the control group in experiment one. The Foulum researchers also rejected this 
criticism. They pointed to the fact hat the ad hoc group erroneously referred to the 
figure of totally born piglets and not live-born pigs, which was lower. They 
maintained furthermore that the statistical analysis supported the conclusion. 
In the end of the 10 page reply the Foulum researchers gave a general comment to the 
ad hoc committee’s report. They found that the ad hoc committee lacked a basic 
understanding of the problem behind the experiments and that the evaluation therefore 
was based on a false premise: 
“In our opinion the report exceeded the given mandate, as it seems as if the assessment 
has been made under consideration of the political decisions and the public debate, which 
the report gave occasion to. This is manifested by, among other things, the fact that 
statistically, certain effects on litter size and survival rate, despite verifying tests and 
recognition, are attempted to be explained away.” (Danielsen & Larsen, 1991: 10) 
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The criticism against the Foulum experiments did, all things considered, both raise 
questions on the experiments on the premise themselves, and discussions which 
touched upon how an experiment that should be used to assess the toxicity of a 
chemical should be designed. The Foulum researchers’ reply did contain answers to 
most of the critique, answers that do sound reasonable for a non-expert.  
Whether these replies were adequate to reject all the criticisms is beyond what I am 
able to assess, but I am perfectly sure the reply is so solid that it should have been 
taken into account when assessing the experiments. Furthermore, it is not the aim of 
the present study to judge who was right or wrong but rather to assess the types of 
arguments and framing used by the actors involved. This leads us to the level beyond 
the questions, whether the statistical models were correct and the litter sizes were 
normal or abnormal.  
We can see that the researchers had answers ready for the criticism, and we can see 
that these answers did target both the detail level, and the design level. We can also 
see that the researchers were very much aware that the ‘battle’ could be lost at the 
design level. They had in fact attempted to safeguard themselves against every 
contingency, first in 1985 when both the EPA and the pesticide producers had been 
invited to discuss the experiments’ design, and in the spring of 1990 when they had 
stressed in the report that the experiments should be seen as supplementary to the 
existing and required toxicity testing; and again in the summer of 1990 when one of 
the researchers, just after the prohibition was issued, expressed the opinion that he was 
surprised by the hastiness of the prohibition.  
7.14 Epilogue to the Case 
The two substances chlormequat-chloride and ethephon were routinely reassessed by 
the EPA in 1992 where they passed without any public attention. The assessments 
were based on the internationally recognized laboratory tests, which earlier had given 
authorisation to the substances. Ethephon, traded under the brand name Cerone, has 
not attained any attention since the case, but chlormequat-chloride, traded as CCC has. 
Chlormequat-chloride counted for about 90% of all straw shortening agents sold in 
Denmark. 
The issue gained media attention again in 1998. Again it was a television documentary 
programme that initiated the debate. By and large it was the same evidence that was 
presented, and most of the programme was devoted to a thorough investigation of 
what happened during the heat of the case in 1990. The occasion was that the Danish 
authorities had now developed a reliable methodology to assess residues of CCC in 
cereals (Hjortshøj, 1998, Granby & Poulsen, 1997: 5), and that residues had been 
detected. 
Another issue, that of hormone like substances, had emerged since 1994, which gave 
new life to the problem (Løkke, 1998: 62pp). A prominent Danish researcher Philippe 
Grandjean from the field of social medicine supported that, if the substances in 
question gives an effect on semen quality and if it is an enduring effect, then one 
should look differently at the uncertainties rather than the authorities had done so far, 
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and therefore be more responsive to the research results that had been produced at 
Foulum in 1985 to 1990 (Hjortshøj, 1998). Grandjean had also been very active in the 
debate endocrine disrupting substances One of the main features of that case was the 
oestrogen hypothesis, which implied that it could possibly be a wide range of chemical 
substances and pollutants that had led to decreased semen quality etc. (Sharpe & 
Skakkebaek, 1993, Løkke, 1998). There was a ‘need’ for the identification of these 
incognito substances, and hence the straw shorteners did, as a possible problem, fit 
nicely into the problematique of hormone-like substances.  
Since 1991 two processes had been developed by 1998 relating to technology and the 
market, this probably furthered the responses that followed. As Lone Dybkjær had 
pointed out during the debate in 1990 straw-stiff crops were under development, and 
in connection to the abolishment of the prohibition in 1991 the succeeding Minister 
for the Environment Per Stig Møller (Conservative) supported this strategy.  
The straw-shortening chemicals are also used in horticulture to regulate the growth of 
potted plants, and the development of alternative technologies to accomplish this had 
also started and are still running as a common research project between the Royal 
Veterinary and Agricultural University and the Danish Institute of Agricultural 
Sciences . The second strand of processes was a part of the bread industry that had 
started the production of bread baked with grain grown without straw shortening 
chemicals. The firm the Danish Bakeries, owned by COOP-Denmark19, had made 
contracts with farmers to ensure a supply of non-treated rye for black-bread in 1997.  
The debate evolved during 1998. COOP-Denmark could announce that the sale of 
black-bread without straw shortening chemicals increased. The issue received 
attention in the Parliament in the summer. Minister for the Environment Svend Auken 
replied to the Environment and Planning Committee that the substances had been 
reassessed and approved in 1995, and that the issue whether the use of the substances 
should be regulated had to await the results of the ongoing assessment of pesticide use 
in Denmark, the so called Bichel-Committee (Auken, 1998 and Bichel, 1998). 
Because of the intense public debate and the detection of residues, the Danish 
agricultural organisations in 1997 suggested a stop to the use of straw-shortening 
chemicals in crops for bread grain. (Ritzau November 6th 1998: Landbrug vil stoppe 
brug af stråforkortere and Aktuelt November 21st 1998: Landmænd dropper 
stråforkortere).  
The voluntary agreement did seemingly mitigate the debate, and it returned to a 
‘normal’ level. But repeated findings of residues in bread grain during the following 
years culminated in the summer of 2001 with a grass roots consumer organisation 
ordering an examination of ‘OTA solgryn’ which is the Quaker Oats’ rolled oats brand 
in Denmark. The objective was to bring imported cereals into focus. As a result of this 
the public’s attention to the issue grew again and the sale of the specific brand went 
down by 20% in the major Danish grocery conglomerate Dansk Supermarket A/S 
(Danmarks Aktive Forbrugere, 2001). Quaker Oats decided in February 2002 to use 
non-treated oats in the product: 
                                                     
19 The Danish Bakeries was sold to Schülstad Bakeries A/S in 2000.  
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“The unfortunate publicity for our product has caused heavy damage, even though we 
have complied with current legislation. The consumers’ reaction has been very clear and 
we listen very carefully to that.” (Mangaging director Hans Blomgren, Quaker Oats 
Scandinavia in Politiken February 27th 2002, 1. section, side 11: OTA bøjer sig for pres) 
The media attention to straw shortening chemicals has not yet ended, and topics in 
2003 was lacking compliance with voluntary agreements among farmers and 
resistance at the retail stage against the phasing out of treated grain.  
It is very important to note that it is now generally accepted that plant growth 
retardants should be avoided. Almost no politician in the Danish Parliament would 
today stand up at the rostrum and announce that straw shortening chemicals should be 
used on grain produced for human consumption. When, in the beginning of 2003, it 
was again demonstrated that there were residues present in grain, which should have 
been grown without straw shortening chemicals, Politiken wrote: 
“[…] there exists a wide-ranging agreement in Denmark that the substance 
[Chlormequate-chloride] must be entirely removed from the food chain. The very fact 
that there exist common EU limit values means that Parliament cannot unanimously 
prohibit the substance.  
»I will urge the trades and industry to enter into a voluntary agreement that can phase out 
the use of straw shortening chemicals; it should be possible to accomplish this, « says 
food Minister Mariann Fischer Boel (Liberals). […]” 
(Politiken April 8th 2003: Det er umuligt at undgå stråforkorter) 
There exists no new investigation in to the problem, so it is not due to scientific proof 
that this change has happened. The Danish Veterinary and Food Administration did in 
July 2003 prepare a note to the Parliament Committee for Food, Agriculture, and 
Fisheries in which they concluded that the use of chlormequat-chloride (which is the 
most frequently used straw shortening chemical) does not pose a risk to human health, 
and that the experiments that founded the criticisms against the substance, forthwith 
the Foulum-experiments, are not trustworthy (Fødevaredirektoratet, 2003a). The 
assessment was made on the same basis as the earlier assessments in 1989, which had 
been reassured by WHO examinations in 1995 and 1998, also based on the same types 
of tests.  
Has the political culture developed to become more precautionary? Is the attention and 
acceptance of the problem due to long-term media and NGO-pressure? Is information 
such as quantities of residues important for the construction of public opinion? Might 
the changed attitude be explained by the attention to sex-disturbances due to hormone-
like substances that, meanwhile, had developed? Possibly we have to see the case in 
combination with a ‘meta’ precautionary principle, which invokes at a cultural level, 
and which is developed through multiple processes and experiences. 
7.15 Analysis 
Let us start the analysis of the case by taking a step back. The reason we have looked 
at the specific case during the last fifty pages is that it represents the first explicit use 
of the precautionary principle and that the case posed a threat to existing established 
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practices. I will in the following perform the analysis partly with the terminology from 
discourse analysis, partly with terminology from the SCOT-framework.  
As we shall see these are two sets of terminologies; both overlapping and 
complementary. Both frameworks are concerned with stability and change; the 
discourse framework would use these words, and within the SCOT-framework the 
terms would be closure and broken closure. The case shows us how stability is 
achieved in the perception of whether the straw-shortening agents are safe or not. 
Before the Foulum research results were disseminated in 1989 and 1990 the 
established truth was that the substances were safe. This was based on tests performed 
under a very specific test regime. The harsh debate in 1990 can be perceived as an 
attempt to force back the routine categories; hence the debate can be seen as a struggle 
between two different discourses, which are connected by the storylines. 
Let us start by identifying storylines and discourse coalitions, and examine their 
development during the stages of the case. The suspicions that led the farmers, the 
agricultural advisers, and the researchers at Foulum to initiate the examination of the 
straw shorteners were formed as a storyline: pesticides may have detrimental effects 
on pig production despite formal authorisation. We will call the coalition of these 
actors the… ‘Animal Production Discourse Coalition’. This storyline was met by a 
counter storyline, which the EPA and the pesticide producing companies adhered to, 
and which is institutionalised especially in the more than 100 different OECD Test 
Guidelines (OECD, 2003): Hazard evaluations must comply with internationally 
accepted test guide lines for toxicological tests to be valid. The obvious conflict was 
reconciled as the agricultural discourse coalition could draw on the institutionalised 
practise for feeding experiments, and therefore was partly independent of the 
definitions and categorisations put forward by this ‘Test Guideline Discourse 
Coalition’.  
At the early stage of the case, that is before the first research-results were published in 
1989, the Animal Production Coalition succeeded in convincing the Test Guideline 
Coalition that the research was relevant and that it should be initiated as feeding 
experiments and not as regular toxicological experiments, but how did they do this ? 
We can perceive the development of the case as various translations that transform the 
issue. The first translations are distant and muted in my case description. These are the 
farmers interpreting the pigs and the other animals and their production properties, and 
it is the agricultural consultants interpreting the clusters of local and, probably, partly 
tacit knowledge among the farmers.  
We enter the scene; or rather we gain access to the case through written accounts when 
the Animal Production Coalition encounters the Test Guideline Coalition. We could 
say the Animal Production Coalition succeeded in creating an obligatory point of 
passage when they proceeded with the feeding experiments with support from the 
pesticide producers and the EPA.  
We can see from the contemporary sources that the Foulum-researchers did not only 
focus on the key question - whether the pesticides were likely to cause impaired 
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reproduction and growth among pigs; they simultaneously worked on the social 
networks that surround the reduced problem. The very idea of the research was in fact 
created in the network of farmers, advisers, and scientists from the agricultural 
research sector.  
During these early stages of the case there occurred a number of very important 
translations. In the problematization of the problem and in the determination of the set 
of actors and their identities the research and the feeding experiments were established 
as an obligatory point of passage for the question of whether the pesticides in question 
were problematic for pig-breeding and production. That means that in the situation it 
was acknowledged that if one wanted to gain knowledge about the uncertainty that 
was raised through the concern of the pig-farmers’ and their consultants, then the 
suggested experiments were the only possible way to proceed. This is illustrated 
below. 
Obligatory point of passage :
Whether PGR’s impair growth and reproduction among pigs shall be investigated
through full-scale close-to-reality feeding experiments
The Pigs The Pesticide producers The regulator 
(DEPA)
The researchers Pig producers & their Advisers Plant growers & their Advisers
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Figure 7.3: The feeding experiments were established as an obligator y point of passage in 
the early stages of the case. 
The two discourse coalitions are marked with dotted lines, and it is shown that the pigs were 
captured by the animal growth coalition. 
We can say that these two coalitions of the interpretation of the pesticides refers to 
two different knowledge frame, a concept that finds inspiration in Bijker’s 
technological frame concept  and Kuhn’s disciplinary matrix (see section 3.2.2 above 
on page 51 for a discussion of these concepts). The two discourse coalitions agreed 
that the experiments were carried out with respect to the knowledge frame of applied 
agricultural research, and that the interpretation with respect to the knowledge frame 
of internationally harmonised regimes for toxicity-tests was independent of this. The 
two knowledge frames are sketched out below: 
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Elements of the knowledge frame Knowledge frame of applied agricultural research  
Goals: Support of agricultural production / Agribusiness 
Key Problems: Relevance for farming context; complex reality  
Problem solving strategies: Tests in systems as close to reality as possible (in situ type). 
Ad hoc and problem oriented 
Requirements to be met by problem 
solutions: 
Reliability towards farmers and the farmers’ organisation. 
Some level of scientific rigor  
Current theories: The usual stuff (design and analysis of experiments - 
statistics), knowledge of farm-system,  Sensitive to tacit 
knowledge among farmers + … Investigate composite effects 
Testing procedures Avoid animal models – test directly on species in question 
Design methods and criteria  
Figure 7.4: Knowledge frame of applied agricultural research 
The knowledge frame is constructed on the basis of the empirical presentation of the case. It is 
the Animal Production Coalition that has a high inclusion in this frame. 
 
Elements of the knowledge frame: Knowledge frame of internationally harmonised (toxicity-)test 
regimes 
Goals: Harmonisation of chemicals regulation, sharing knowledge  
Key Problems: Enabling free trade, reproducibility, animal models relevant 
for human health, prioritising chemicals under concern. 
(chemical universe) 
Problem solving strategies: Tests in simplified systems, Easing replication of tests. (in 
vitro type) 
Requirements to be met by problem 
solutions: 
Scientific rigor, reproducibility, reliability towards OECD test 
guidelines etc.  
Current theories: Cause and effect, dose-response, toxicology, The usual stuff 
(design and analysis of experiments - statistics) 
Testing procedures Animal models 
Design methods and criteria  
Table 7.1: Knowledge frame of internationally harmonised toxicity-tests regimes 
The knowledge frame is constructed on the basis of the empirical presentation of the case. It is 
the Test Guideline Coalition that has high inclusion in this frame. 
It is likely that the two members of the Test Guideline Coalition had a common 
adherence to the toxicity-test regime as it prevents non-resolvable discussions. Several 
studies have shown that the existence of different expert communities and hence 
different approaches to assess the same problem can render the role of expert advice 
ineffective in a controversy. The development of harmonised international standards 
can be seen as a countermove to this (Halffman, 2003: 112-113, Jasanoff, 1986: 75). 
The standardised tests and laboratory practise guarantee a basis that is necessary for 
the functioning of the regulator and it guarantees the producers clear unambiguous 
rules, which is important for the stability of the sale of the products. In this sense the 
regulator and the regulated are tied together in a contractual relationship with the 
internationally accepted test guidelines and standards for good laboratory practise as a 
fulcrum.  
We could ask why the test guideline coalition after all did accept the obligatory point 
of passage presented by the animal production coalition. In short the explanation is 
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probably that even though the obligatory point of passage did concur with issues 
normally treated in accordance to the established toxicological knowledge frame, then 
it could be argued that the investigation design would not threaten the established test 
procedures as the tests was targeted at animal production.  
Firstly the animal production coalition acknowledged the formal testing that had given 
approval to the use of the substances, and it was therefore possible to keep these two 
issues apart. Secondly, were the established test procedures and the tests performed 
with the pesticides in question, targeted at detecting problems related to residues in 
human food? The suggested test-design was targeted at pigs, which is in fact a target 
organism that has been investigated in relation to neither ethephon nor chlormequat 
(see e.g. WHO, 1994 and JMPR & WHO Core Assessment Group, 1999).  
We can develop the analysis presented in Figure 7.3 further to explain why the actors 
accepted the feeding experiments as an obligatory point of passage. The actors 
perceived all that we can call different obstacle problems with the possibility of non-
intended side effects of the plant growth retardants.  
Within the Animal Production Coalition the obstacles were problems related directly 
to the possible effect of the chemicals. The pigs were lined up as the central but muted 
actor by the coalition20, and the coalition was built up around the problem of possibly 
negatively affected growth and reproduction. For the pig producer these are two of the 
most important production properties, which are tightly connected to the profitability 
of being a pig-producer, and which is an enduring subject within pig-production (see 
e.g. Udesen & Thorup, 2003).  
The general problem of maximising profit was therefore legitimately translated into 
the specific question of the specific pesticides, so as to render it possible to avoid 
pesticides with damaging effects. Also the plant-growers belonged to this coalition in 
the early stages of the case, when the conflicting interests between plant growing and 
pig production had not yet materialized.  
Within the Test Guideline Coalition the picture was quite different. The coalition 
consisted of two members at this stage of the case; the pesticide producers and the 
Environmental Protection Agency who were responsible for the regulation of the 
substances in question.  
It is obvious that the pesticide producer’s prime goal was to sell the pesticides that are 
the primary product of their business. Two properties are important when a pesticide is 
marketed. To make the pesticide sell the farmer must believe that it will help him 
increase his earnings, it must increase the work yields or decrease the needed input of 
work, and in this sense the pesticide producer becomes an ally to the farmer.  
                                                     
20 Pigs was just one among the four different species that was selected as central actors, which 
possibly was negatively affected by the use of the straw shortening chemicals, but I delimit the 
attention to the pigs.  
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But the possible side effects of the pesticides are important also. This is both a 
question of formal regulation – it must be demonstrated to the regulator that the 
substances pose no threat to health or the environment – and it is a question of 
informal regulation as the farmer and downstream users should believe in the safety of 
the product. This was the issues that were at stake for the pesticide producers. The 
agricultural actors’ suspicion of the specific pesticides added uncertainty to the 
functionality of the pesticides.  
Also, the EPA was faced with increasing uncertainty. The EPA had authorised the use 
of the pesticides, and as such guaranteed their safe use. It is furthermore important to 
see that the experiments were supposed to be carried out within the agricultural realm, 
with very specific production-related questions, and by a research organisation 
belonging to the Ministry of Agriculture. It is therefore likely that the EPA saw the 
need for the clearing up of whatever substances that were considered suspicious in the 
pesticides in question and concurrently perceived the problem as being isolated as an 
agricultural one. 
These considerations are sketched out below in 
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Figure 7.5. This constellation would remain stable until the case developed into its 
next stage, here coined by the expert who represented Rôhne-Poulenc in the task 
group that followed the experiments: 
“We did touch on that discussion, but people were not very concerned. The problem did 
not arise before Viggo Danielsen started deriving conclusions for which there was no 
support according to our toxicologists’ opinion – and of other toxicologists. As a 
production study – that was our opinion all along –it was a very good idea, which we 
would support, we knew that Foulum was very experienced, inclusive of Viggo 
Danielsen, so that was ok, and that was why we agreed to [take part in the financing] 
(Arne Agger, 2003) 
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Figure 7.5: Translations of the Active Actors’ Obstacle-Problems. 
 
The next stage of the case started when the first experiments were published. It is 
important here to understand that the experiments were divided up into two separate 
experiments. The first concerning CCC (chlormequat-chloride) had no task group, and 
the second concerning Cerone (Ethephon) and Roundup (Glyphosate) had a task 
group.  
The publicity to the two experiments can be seen as two different and separate courses 
of events. They both follow the same scheme. First, the closure of the pesticide as safe 
is attempted to be reopened. This happens as a result of a specific storyline that 
connects otherwise separate discourses, and the effect is a rupture in the reproduction 
of the routine categories that constitute the closure, namely the formalised criteria for 
valid testing of chemicals and pesticides. Then starts a debate which aims to reinstate 
and maintain the routine categories. And in the end the closure is around the specific 
substances as safe and secure and maintained. 
The perception of straw shortening agents, e.g. CCC, as being safe were and are based 
on the voluminous piles of documentation made by the producers in confirmation with 
the prevailing test guide lines. We can perceive this as a double closure. The first 
closure concerns the test guide lines, and the second closure is the closure around the 
specific pesticides as being safe. It is the second closure that is threatened directly, 
whereas the first closure is only threatened indirectly.  
The pig-industry reacted promptly when the CCC-experiments were published by 
advising the pig producers to limit the use of CCC treated grain. The storyline for the 
Animal Production Coalition was confirmed: pesticides may have detrimental effects 
on pig production despite formal authorisation - CCC should be avoided. This was 
picked up by the Consumer Council which had experienced the pesticides earlier. The 
result was the core storyline that has politicised the case ever since it was constructed: 
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“If CCC-treated grain isn’t good enough for pigs, should humans eat it?”  
This storyline connects the hitherto isolated agricultural discourse on the possible 
adverse effects of CCC to a public discourse on safety. The story line resounded in the 
Parliamentary Environment and Planning Committee that raised questions about the 
safe use of the pesticides to the Minister of Environment. We can dig out the micro-
politics of power relationship that reproduced and stabilised the closure firstly from 
the Minister’s answer, which was constructed by the Environmental Protection 
Agency, secondly from the discussions in the EPA’s Pesticide Council, and thirdly 
from the first reactions from the EPA and the Food Agency. 
In this process the scope under which the Foulum investigations were established as an 
obligatory point of passage for the investigation of the adverse effects of the specific 
pesticides, transgressed. Suddenly, the investigations appeared not as a specific 
business related production-study but as a study used to argue that the permission 
perhaps was given on an inadequate basis, and hence that the testing procedures used 
were possibly inadequate. A new situation did therefore supersede the situation 
outlined in 
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Figure 7.5. The two discourse coalitions did now enter an antagonistic relationship as 
outlined below:  
  Plant Growth Retardants – the First Explicit Use of the Precautionary Principle      135 
The Environment & Planning Committe
The Pigs (Representing pigs)
used in experiments confirming with the 
applied agricultural research knowledge frame 
The Pesticide producers
The regulator (DEPA)
+ NFA toxicologists
The researchers
Pig producers & their Advisers
Plant growers & their Advisers
Experimental animals (mainly rats) 
(Representing humans)
used in experiments confirming with the 
internationally harmonised (toxicity-)test 
knowledge frame 
The Consumer Council
Animal 
Production 
Coalition: 
Test 
Guideline 
Coalition
Environment 
& Health 
Coalition:
The Pigs (Representing humans)
“If CCC-treated grain 
isn’t good enough for 
pigs, should humans 
then eat it?”
 
Figure 7.6: New Constellation of Discourse Coalitions 
The appearance of the third discourse coalition changed the relationship between the Animal 
Production Coalition and the Test Guideline Coalition. Suddenly the relationship was 
redefined by the third coalition so that the obligatory point of passage earlier defined now was 
of minor interest. 
The Environment and Health Discourse Coalition was at this point sparsely populated 
by the Consumer Council and the Parliament’s Environment and Planning Committee. 
In the interpretation of the plant growth retardant CCC there were grounds between 
the two discourses with respect to the interpretation of the experiments, and the basic 
idea that the possibility of a detrimental effect should lead to action; that is a common 
affinity for a precautionary principle-type of argument. But the Environment and 
Health Discourse Coalition transformed the experimental results from being specific 
production related, to universal and therefore the Test Guideline Coalition started 
interpreting the experiments according to the knowledge frame of internationally 
harmonised (toxicity) tests.  
The key issue was validity. The conclusions made by the Foulum researchers did not 
comply with the conclusions obtained in the experiments by which the substance was 
approved. The dividing line between valid and non-valid was defined by the Danish 
word ‘regelret’ (English: regular, according to the rules), which referred to the 
international harmonisation of toxicological investigations.  
The key sub-issues to validity were dose-response and cause-and-effect-relationships. 
The Foulum experiments had not involved variation of dosage, in fact the doses were 
likely to be very low compared to the doses used in traditional testing; no method for 
detecting residue-concentrations was available at that time so no concentrations were 
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known. Neither did the experiments include any theories to explain how the measured 
effects came about.  
As the Foulum experiments did not follow these rules, the results were perceived as 
invalid and rejected. We can follow the actors that were represented in the Pesticide 
Council, and observe how they supported the reproduction of the valid/invalid 
dividing line. We can furthermore see how the consultant from the crop growing 
agricultural sector in the Pesticide Council marks a shift from the Animal Production 
Discourse Coalition to the Test Guideline Discourse Coalition by dissociating 
themselves from the experiments.  
The investigation was rejected as irrelevant by the EPA and the Minister, and it was 
also rejected by the Pesticide Council. The challengers from the Environment and 
Health Discourse Coalition accepted the rejection. Therefore, the closure around CCC 
as being safe was sustained.  
But the new storyline continued to linger. A representative for the Animal Production 
Coalition, Orla Grøn, maintained the relevance of avoiding the straw shortening 
chemical in feed for pigs, but he did furthermore also question the fact that the EPA 
rejected the experiments (see above, page 95). He therefore approached the 
Environment and Health Discourse Coalition, and this position was also reproduced 
later. 
The Foulum researchers worked at maintaining the validity of the experiments, and the 
central issue was to retain the obligatory point of passage that had been developed and 
respected up until the Health and Environment Coalition precipitated its breakdown; 
the boundary between production studies and toxicological studies was important for 
the validity of the studies, as the researchers stated: 
“Therefore, one cannot expect an experiment as that accomplished to give answers to 
general questions about health and environmental-aspects associated with the use of 
CCC. These problems must be examined in another context, where the necessary 
expertise and facilities are present. 
” (Effektivt Landbrug, nr.19, 30. October 1989: Ingen har modtaget »næser« fra 
ministeren, also quoted at page 94) 
Radio Denmark took up the case and made a feature that balanced the two storylines 
and combined it with comparisons to DDT, and with a critique of the standard 
toxicological investigation. A major vendor of the specific pesticide reacted 
vigorously and attacked both Radio Denmark and the researchers, without differing 
between the two storylines. The boundary between the two storylines of the Animal 
Production Discourse Coalition and the Environment and Health Discourse Coalition 
became less clear through these processes, and seen from the outside the two 
discourses could seem to be amalgamating. The researchers’ attempts to mark the 
difference did not bear fruit. 
We can see how the Minister for the Environment was torn between the Test 
Guideline Discourse Coalition and the Environment and Health Discourse Coalition 
both in terms of interpellation and attraction. She toned down the outright rejection 
  Plant Growth Retardants – the First Explicit Use of the Precautionary Principle      137 
made by the EPA of the Foulum experiments and the Environment and Planning 
Committee’s questions both in the reply and subsequently in the press. She had given 
her assurance that she was also concerned with the possible prospects, and that she had 
asked the Minister for Health and the Minister for Agriculture to further investigate 
possible risks associated with CCC treated grain. 
We can use the notion of interpretative flexibility to grasp the quite different 
perceptions of CCC. The traditional environmentalists saw the substance as an 
unnecessary technology that enabled the farmer top dressing the crops and thereby 
pollute the aquatic environment with fertilisers. The pig producers saw the substance 
as a fertility damaging pesticide that reduced the profitability of production. The crop 
growing farmers saw the substance as a necessary technology for the production of 
bread grain. The pesticide producer and the EPA saw the substance as a very safe 
growth regulator. The possibility for increased interpretative flexibility was tightly 
connected to a weakening of the closure around CCC as safe. But the openings that 
had been looming had not succeeded. Thus far the closure around CCC had been seen 
as safe and stable  
These different groups also saw different solutions to the problems. Compared to the 
analysis performed by Wiebe Bijker of bicycles the present analysis contains an even 
more outspoken mixture of technical and social solutions. The actors present both 
social and technical solutions to the perceived problem.  
The case would have been over and done with if the Minister for Environment had not 
shifted position to the Environment and Health Discourse Coalition during 1990. We 
can only point at possible explanations for this shift, which has been covered in the 
previous section. She had announced that she would act if new evidence made that 
reasonable, but the criteria for ‘reasonable’ had seemingly changed. In 1989 her 
statement said that the new evidence should be based on ‘regelrette’ (according to the 
rules, meaning OECD test guidelines and GLP), but the experiments publicised in 
1990, which prompted the new position, were based on the same design experiments 
publicised in 1989.  
Secondly, the Minister and the Social Liberals had in 1990 chosen an offensive 
strategy on environmental issues to make the party more visible in the coalition 
government and counteract its decreasing electoral support. Thirdly, Denmark was 
involved in the global negotiations to prepare the 1992 UN Conference on 
Environment and Development in Rio, which was a follow-up on the Brundtland 
Report. The precautionary principle was one of the three contested issues that divided 
the US from other participating actors, especially the European negotiators at the 
Bergen ECE Conference in Norway 8th to 16th of May 1990 “Action for a Common 
Future”.  
The Minister referred to the international obligation to use the precautionary principle 
and proposed that this principle would come to play an increasing role in future. The 
fourth and more speculative factor was the specific settings of the development of the 
case that made it ‘comfortable’ for the Minister to use. The basic research and the 
conclusions that indicated the problem was performed under the Ministry of 
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Agriculture and the Ministry of Environment could therefore not be accused of bias in 
the research; the ministry would not have been able to make, initiate or finance similar 
experiments – this is clearly indicated by the EPA’s first response to the CCC-
experiments. Furthermore, the pig producers had made a breach in the normally very 
strong alliance among Danish farmers, which potentially could make the prohibition 
more politically viable.  
Whatever the reason, the Minister changed to the Environment and Health Discourse 
Alliance with support from the Animal Production Discourse Coalition, and dictated 
that the EPA should prohibit products containing the two substances.  
The Minister for Environment
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The Environment & Planning Committe
The Pigs (Representing pigs)
used in experiments confirming with the 
applied agricultural research knowledge frame 
The Pesticide producers
The regulator (DEPA)
+ NFA toxicologists
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Plant growers & their Advisers
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internationally harmonised (toxicity-)test 
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isn’t good enough for 
pigs, should humans 
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Figure 7.7: Changed Configuration of Discourse Coalitions 
 
UP until this point it was the EPA and the Minister who had taken the lead in the 
rejection of both the Animal Production Discourse Coalition and the Environment and 
Health Discourse Coalition. We see that the Test Guideline Discourse Coalitions’ 
rejection of the questions raised by the Environment and Health Discourse coalition 
followed a strategy which involved the centre of the testing regime. 
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Figure 7.8: Centre and periphery in the testing regime. 
The Minister’s changed position was seen as a threat to the centre of the regime. 
When the minister shifted to the Environment and Health Discourse Coalition the core 
of the Testing Regime was therefore left open to attack. The toxicologists in the 
National Food Agency who had supported the EPA’s rejection of the questions raised 
against the authorisation of the substances were suspended (dismissed), as their advice 
was not needed anymore. The shift created a distinctive opening of both the closure 
around straw shortening agents as safe, and indirectly an opening of the closure 
around the testing regime’s monopoly as a guide for the regulation of pesticides.  
The Pesticide Producers were now left as the most active actors in the Test Guideline 
Coalition even though they found increased support from the crop producing farmers. 
The agrochemical industry started to work on three fronts. The breaches between the 
agricultural branches had to be overhauled, and the pig farming interests needed to be 
reminded that they also were dependant on the general interests of farmers. The 
second front was the Ministry of Environment, which had to return to normal practise 
in the assessment of pesticides. The third front was the Foulum experiments and 
especially the conclusions that gave nourishment to the criticism of the Environment 
and Health Discourse coalition.  
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Figure 7.9: Openings and (re-)closures of straw shortening agents as safe. 
 
But the processes that led to the final closure of the straw shortening agents was not 
dependant on the eagerness of the agrochemical industry alone and its attempts to train 
the erring branches of the agribusiness and particularly the Foulum researchers.  
 140      PART FOUR: EMPERICAL STUDIES  
We can see that the decision on whether the prohibition was legitimate or not was 
displaced to a number of arenas. As an internal issue in the coalition government, 
agricultural interests in the Conservatives and the Liberals attempted to have the 
prohibition reversed in the government’s Coordination Committee; this however did 
not succeed. The argument for not treating the case in the Coordination Committee 
was that the case was to be tested at the Environmental Appeal’s Board and against 
EU-law. Jurists dominated both these two arenas.  
The Minister for Environment had furthermore asked the Minister for Health to 
investigate the health aspects of the straw shortening agents and the possibilities for 
prohibiting the importation of straw shortened grain. And the Minister for Agriculture 
asked the Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University to assess the solidity of the 
Foulum experiments.  
These four arenas played the most important role for the final closure of straw 
shortening agents as being safe, and showed how different types of power came in to 
play. The decision made at the Environmental Appeal’s Board is particularly 
interesting.  
The decision can be seen as a major defeat for the prohibition against the straw 
shortening chemicals; this was the Minister for Environment’s contemporary 
perception, and the decision put an end to the agrochemical industry’s continuous 
attacks on the Foulum researchers.  
The board can be seen as an institutionalised filter that retrospectively deactivated the 
EPA decision. In fact one of the members of the board committee did have an affinity 
for the Environment and Health Discourse Coalition, but he was not able to express 
support for the openness of the warnings provided by the Foulum experiments. The 
reason for this was that the board was asked by the agrochemical industry (the 
plaintiffs) to assess the validity of the ‘appeals-leads-to-non-delay’ decision only, 
which the board had accepted. The Board’s decision was therefore based on an 
assessment of the EPA’s decision. The assessment was based on compound evidence 
pointing to failures in the EPA’s administration of the case, but the board’s decision 
was based mostly on minor judicial faults in the combination of the grounds for the 
‘appeals-leads-to-non-delay’ decision. 
The assessment made by the Ministry of Justice shows a very strong affinity for the 
Test Guideline Discourse Coalition, which is very logical. The Ministry’s assessment 
took its starting point in the EEC free-trade regulations, which is an integrated part of 
the philosophy behind the test regime; tests are harmonised to ensure the same product 
is assessed the same way in all countries. As a logical consequence it was concluded 
that the assessment of the prohibition was in conflict with EEC free-trade regulations.  
The third arena was the Ministry of Health that again launched action from the 
Institute for Toxicology for an assessment of the substances. The Institute for 
Toxicology gave advice in concordance with earlier advice; the substances do not pose 
any risk to health. 
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The fourth arena was the scientific assessment of the Foulum experiments made by the 
Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University. There was a paradigmatic difference 
between the Foulum researchers and the evaluators. The request for mechanisms etc is 
an issue which is easy to fulfil with ‘traditional’ types of toxicity evaluations. But the 
Foulum researchers did not limit their research to established techniques and known 
mechanisms.  
The ‘traditional’ types of toxicity evaluation tests test the effect of the chemical under 
test conditions where the chemical is given directly, either orally or by injection. In the 
Foulum experiments the interest was more explorative, and the reply to the evaluation 
implied that the second step could be more comprehensive and – in the language of the 
KVL report – of a hypothesis confirming character.  
One of the conflicts was the difference between ‘traditional’ science (mode 1 science) 
and regulatory science (mode 2 science) (Gibbons et al., 1994, Jasanoff, 1994). 
Regulatory science is characterised by its contextuality. The Foulum researchers’ 
context was Danish pig production. The toxicologists’ context was the free market in 
terms of the OECD and EU regulations for good laboratory practice. We can talk 
about a type of stiffened mode 2 sciences. The KVL-scientists’ context was a 
combination of the norms of the toxicological expert’s international norms, and 
disciplinary science in a more traditional sense. The KVL-researchers suggested 
modifications to the experiment that would increase the statistical power but also 
multiply the size and costs. They were not bound by the functional rationality of the 
two other groups of researchers.  
On this basis the EPA decided in the summer of 1991 to abolish the prohibition, which 
in fact had only been active during 21 days in 1990 and in a period where no farmer 
would consider purchasing straw shorteners. The EPA’s position was and still is well 
captured in the following quote from Leif Mortensen, head of EPA pesticide 
department. Leif Mortensen explained why the straw shortening agents were approved 
(early spring 1990): 
“The investigations that have been made are the standard investigations we demand to be 
able to review the effects of substances before they are approved. We take decision on 
whether there are any negative effects. That is the procedure with all applications and if 
we find any [negative effects] then the [substance] is prohibited, [but] we did not find 
anything here, so we cannot see any basis for an intervention.” (Leif Mortensen, head of 
EPA pesticide department, in Dreyer, 1990) 
This position has – with the temporary exemption in 1990-1991 – stayed unchanged in 
the Environmental Protection Agency and the National Food Agency; today the straw 
shortening case is seen as a periodically returning issue, which does not have any 
environmental or health-related relevance (se e.g. Fødevaredirektoratet, 2003a, 
discussed briefly above at p127).  
All in all, the case can be seen as an analogy corresponding to the US EPA 
experiences with taking action on the basis of preliminary or questionable scientific 
results, resulting in intensive political fire and sometimes the overruling of decisions 
in courts. US examples are saccharin, nitrites, Love Canal and formaldehyde, where 
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scientific findings were cautiously incorporated into decision-making (Brickman, 
Jasanoff, & Ilgen, 1985: 154). 
7.16 Discussion 
The case contains the first explicit Danish use of the precautionary principle. We have 
seen how institutional arrangements together with industrial interests were able to 
dismiss the new evidence. We have thereby seen the difficulties an actor or a discourse 
coalition will be met with if it wants to question the evidence by which existing 
practices are approved and authorised.  
We can also see the case as an instant in the transition from an industrial society to a 
risk society. By way of example we can use the note made by the Ministry of Justice 
in 1990. The note did not relate to the risks which the Foulum experiments indicated. 
By contrast, the note focused on reproducing the reasoning that originally had made 
the substances legal; without acknowledging that the substances naturally would be 
assessed as ok anything else would imply that the experiments behind the original 
approval were flawed, which nothing indicates! In a reflexive approach it would be 
accepted that our perception of a risk is constructed through the assessment; hence a 
substance may be constructed as harmless in one investigation/design, and less 
harmless in another investigation/design. By the sole focus on the one test-design as 
revealing the one truth, the Ministry of Justice is represented as being part of the ‘old’ 
industrial society.  
The elements of transition came with the Environment and Health Discourse 
Coalition, and found clear expression with the Minster of Environment who 
interpreted the situation in a terminology which is best described as being of the 
ecological modernisation type. Most noteworthy was a chronicle (quoted above) 
where she attempted to abolish the anachronistic relationship between ecological 
considerations and economic/industrial interests, and where she linked this to the 
precautionary principle. Here the prohibition was seen just as one minor part of a 
larger necessary reorganisation of Danish Agriculture. 
The Minister herself was nevertheless entrapped by parts of the rationality that 
governed the Test Guideline Discourse Coalition. She followed the advice from the 
EPA and the NFA to reject the Foulum experiments as irrelevant when the first 
questions were raised to the Minister in 1989. Later when the prohibition was issued 
the argumentation was still subordinated to the toxicological rationality with a strong 
focus on the single substances, even though she also argued with a multiplicity of 
reasons why the substances were problematic, and why alternative technologies could 
be advantageous. 
We can therefore see the prohibition as a policy-reaction which reaches back to 
traditional command and control measures, but which is also furthered by a discourse 
coalition that draws on a terminology that indicates transition to a risk society, which 
has many resemblances with the ecological modernisation discourse which were 
developed in Europe at that time.  
  Plant Growth Retardants – the First Explicit Use of the Precautionary Principle      143 
We can observe alterations in the applied strategies used to cope with the partisan 
knowledge from the Foulum experiments, when we look at the wider development of 
the case. The immediate reaction was to apply a prohibition, and to stress the 
possibility to develop alternative technologies. When that failed, due to the judicial 
and, especially, the institutional settings, the new strategy was to work around 
juridical barriers and attempts to have the precautionary principle incorporated in the 
Environmental Protection Law. This was however an irrelevance for the regulation of 
pesticides, as these are not regulated by that law.  
We can perceive the EPA’s abolition of the Foulum experiments as a realisation of the 
experiments’ incompatibillity with the international conventions and European 
regulations on pesticides. In return the experimenters and the pig breeder’s 
organisations were resolute in their decision to avoid the prevalent straw shortener 
CCC (and analogues). This provided good subject matter for both exponents of the 
Environment and Health Discourse Coalition, and for media attention.  
These more populist processes have led to a type of partisan self-regulation of straw 
shorteners on the Danish market, which in fact had made it possible for politicians to 
sympathise with the Environment and Health Discourse Coalition’s attempts to get rid 
of the straw shortening agents in human food. We can therefore interpret the latest 
development of public and political attention to straw shortening chemicals (i.e. 
chlormequat-chloride) as a kind of bypass of the still (very) stable 
scientific/toxicological closure of the straw shortening chemicals as safe. We can say 
that in this specific case expert (toxicological) knowledge of the substances was 
established as an obligatory point of passage that ‘protected’ the perception of the 
substances as safe in the early discussions, but that this ‘bypass’  has since made it 
possible to discuss and criticise the substances by evading that obligatory point of 
passage.  
The obligatory point of passage still controlled ‘certified’ expert knowledge but no 
longer gave unique access to the political debate. The co-existence of these two very 
different perspectives on straw shortening chemicals is obvious as it is the Danish 
Veterinary and Food Administration that both vouch for chlormequat as being safe 
and also performs the testing that reveal residues in grain for human food. The latter is 
just based on regulations to prevent misrepresentation; if a brand is marketed as “free 
of straw-shorteners” this is tested by the authorities, and therefore the NFA serves 
both the Test Guideline Coalition and the Environment and Health Discourse 
Coalition.  
The Minister was correct when she foresaw the case to be the first of many more to 
come where emerging knowledge would lead to swift reactions from the authorities 
(see quote above at p109). The later cases of interventions with references to the 
precautionary principle fall crudely in to two categories. The first comprises pesticides 
where actual prohibitions and voluntary withdrawal of products from the market has 
been the case; this development had a comprehensive focus and deviates therein from 
the straw shortener-case. The second type resembles the straw shortener case in the 
sudden awareness of formerly unknown potential negative effects as reason for public 
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and political attention, but these cases deviate as they were mostly resolved without 
prohibitions or law making. 
 It is emerging knowledge, especially, about food or substances in food that has led to 
‘snap’ references to the precautionary principle, but also consumer goods that for 
example children come into contact with, which has given rise to the principle’s verbal 
usage.  
Case (examples) Action 
Sunscreen containing 4-MBC EPA recommendation not to use the specific sunscreens on 
children under 12 years. 
Phthalates in toys for infants (under 3-
years) 
Prohibition against phthalates in toys for children under three 
years. 
Triclosan (used in toothpaste etc.) Recommendation to avoid Triclosan in consumer goods 
Creosote (Arsenic) for wood 
preservation in sandpits 
The EPA recommended that the sand be shifted regularly and 
that new sandpits were made out of non-preserved wood 
Olive oil (Norwegian authorities found 
a lot with residues of the carcinogenic 
benz(a)pyren) 
The NFA requested retail shops to remove olive oils if the 
content was not documented. When the contaminated source was 
identified and isolated the olive oil bottles back went on to the 
shelves.  
Functional food and vitamins Denmark voted against the EU-directive that allows vitamin 
enrichment of food-stuff.  
Food Make up Denmark voted against the EU-directive that allows use of 
nitrates for colouring meat.  
Antimicrobial feed Additives (in meat 
production) 
 
These cases do to some extent show that the authorities reactions to emerging 
knowledge and the precautionary principle has not yet been stabilised. One lesson that 
has been learned is to avoid prohibitions based on single experimental results, which 
in the straw-shortener case had proved to be untenable. Nevertheless, many of the 
cases are yet still characterised by hesitating authorities pushed by NGO and media 
attention.  
7.17 Pesticides 
It is with the first type of application of the precautionary principle, related to 
pesticides regulation that I find the most interesting lessons about the application of 
the principle of precaution. The Danish history of pesticides regulation, of which the 
straw-shortener case is one special and atypical instance, contains remarkable 
examples, which will prove useful in the discussion of the regulation of industrial 
chemicals.  
The straw-shortener case took place concurrently with the halfway evaluation of the 
first Danish Pesticide Action Plan. The Danish Parliament had adopted the plan in 
1986, and it represented the first tightening of the regulation of pesticides since the 
prohibition of the persistent and bio-accumulating organ-chloride insecticides, e.g. 
DDT, Aldrin and Dieldrin in the 1970s.  
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In the beginning of the 1980s the consumption of pesticides had increased 
significantly, and a general fear was that this could lead to negative impacts on animal 
life and possibly also the groundwater. The action plan involved that both the volume 
of active substances and the frequency of applications should be halved by 1997, and 
that half of the reduction should be obtained by January 1st 1990. Furthermore, the 
most problematic pesticides were to be reassessed and if necessary removed from the 
market. (Per Christensen: Pesticiderne rykker I fokus). 
To secure this, amendments were made to the Act on Chemicals in 1987 so that 
producers and importers had to reapply to have the ‘old’ pesticides (re)approved. The 
‘old’ pesticides had been assessed in the Poison Council, but only with respect to their 
risk to human health and domestic animals (bees) and the authorisations were without 
time limits (Lynæs et al., 1998: 119). Secondly, future authorisations would always be 
time limited, five and ten years respectively depending on the substance. Thirdly, a 
substitution principle was introduced for the assessment of pesticides:  
“Authorisation cannot be given to a pesticide if there exists other agents or methods with 
the same field of application, which on the basis of existing investigations or experiences 
is considered to be substantially less dangerous to health or substantially less hazardous 
to the environment, cf. §35 subsection 3[21]” (Kemikalieloven 2000/4/12, §35, subsection 
2) 
Fourthly the assessment was now based on an assessment based on sharpened 
environmental and health criteria and the approval was to be based on an aggregate 
estimate over the assumed risk if the substance was used. The 1987 amendment was 
also made necessary as the Environmental Appeal’s Board in 1985 had put a question 
mark against the reassessment of the ‘old’ pesticides that had been initiated when the 
Law of Chemicals was put into force October 1980.  
The regulation of pesticides had been regulated by a separate act before, but was in 
1980 incorporated into the Law of Chemicals, where environmental considerations 
were also included. The sharpened set of criteria included that specific environmental 
and health related properties of a substance could result in the rejection of approval, 
e.g. unacceptable high mobility which indicated the substance would be a threat to the 
groundwater (Lynæs et al., 1998: 119-120). 
At the halfway evaluation of the Pesticide Action Plan, it was clear that the partial 
aims for 1990 were far from being fulfilled. The volume of used active substances and 
the frequency of applications did not show a reduction of twenty-five per cent on the 
figures of the 1981-85 reference periods. The reassessment of the most problematic 
pesticides was seemingly being dragged down by means of complaints and piles of 
counter-evidence from the agrochemical industry for every prohibition the 
Environmental Appeal’s Board made (see Lynæs et al., 1998). 
                                                     
21 The following subsection of the Law of Chemicals contains a sentence that indicate that the 
substitution rule will be annulled with EEC harmonization of the pesticides regulation, and an 
exemption of biocides regulated by an EEC directive. 
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This situation also sheds light on the straw-shortener case and the EPA and the 
Minister’s handling of the case. On the one hand the straw shorteners were not 
problematic in the eyes of the EPA, especially compared to the substances that were 
known to be problematic; hence it was more or less a waste of time to focus on the 
straw shorteners. The case provided on the other hand a situation where the otherwise 
untouchable agricultural alliances proved to have a breachable point.  
The drawn out treatment of the complaints entailed wide discontent, and therefore was 
a policy window for tightening of pesticide regulations, which turned up in the 
beginning of 1994. It was one of the pesticides, atrazine, that due to complaints had 
not been banned, which turned up in the groundwater in considerable concentrations at 
a specific location, namely Ejstrupholm in 1993. 
The Danish Parliament now discussed the issue intensively, and the delaying effect of 
complaints was removed from the Act of Chemicals. The producers now had six 
weeks to comment on the EPA’s basic assessment, and the sections on party hearing in 
the administrative act (section 19-21) was abolished. A reference to these sections had 
been a part of the Environmental Appeals Board’s justification of its decision in the 
straw-shortener case.  
Now the EPA’s decision could not be appealed to the Environmental Appeals Board, 
but the EPA was obliged to obtain an external expert statement, and the Pesticide 
Council was to give an utterance on the EPA decision (Kemikalieloven 1996/1/16: 
section 35e subsection 1-4). In 1995 the possibility for the producers to ask questions 
to the external experts stopped, because producers in specific cases had raised so many 
and so extensive a range of questions that the hearing procedure became too time 
consuming in comparison with the law’s aim (Lynæs et al., 1998: 121).  
With the limitations to the agrochemical industry’s access to hearing and complaints, 
the phase out of the most problematic ‘old’ pesticides gained momentum. The 
reassessment was finalised in 1996. In 1994 20 pesticides with seven different active 
substances were prohibited, amongst these atrazine. In 1996 a further 110 pesticides 
with 12 active substances and in 1997 about 40 pesticides with 10 active substances 
were prohibited. Moreover about 550 of the ‘old’ pesticides were not approved by the 
reassessment, either because the producer did not apply, or because the application 
was rejected on account of insufficient documentation (Lynæs et al., 1998: 118).  
The Danish pesticides regulation and especially the reassessment of old chemicals are 
based on a very specific assessment scheme that stresses specific inherent capabilities 
and that stress the presence of alternative methods or agents that can do the same job 
but with a considerably smaller risk to health and the environment.  
This is an approach that we will see emerging in the regulation of industrial chemicals, 
which also will be discussed in the next and final empirical chapter. 
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8 Regulating Chemicals 
/ From post facto to precaution 
The events that we have dwelled with during the last 60 pages were one minor 
incident among a number of situations and cases where the basis of regulation of 
chemicals was questioned. The case gave us access to how agents of a number of 
constituencies interact and react when the established system for assessing chemicals’ 
side effects is being pushed and threatened. In addition, it showed us how general 
concerns about non-wanted effects of chemicals (pesticides) were expressed even by 
the agriculture with terms that drew on a precaution-like base. The case in itself did 
not lead to the developments that we will study in the following, but it makes out an 
important basis for the understanding of the micro powers that stabilize and conserve 
the systems that we now will examine in broader terms. The straw-shortener case can 
in fact be seen as one of the results of the increased awareness of unintended effects of 
chemicals that partly will be unfolded in the following. It can – as one incident among 
others – be seen as laying the ground for the profound critique of the European 
chemicals regulation that emerged in the end of the last century, and which we will 
return to in the end of this chapter. 
Three major themes will have my attention in the following. The first is the build up 
of the OECD chemicals testing regime and of the European chemicals regulatory 
regime, especially the sixth amendment. The second theme is the critique that partly 
propelled this development and that in Europe in the late 1990 manifest itself in a 
profound critique against the European regime for chemicals regulation. The third 
theme is the current revisions of the European chemicals regulation. 
In an attempt to find the roots of this critique we will look at some of the discussions 
that in Denmark constituted the concern for how chemicals should be handled in 
society. The discussions of the 1970s is shown partly to link up with the critique that 
in the early 1990s lay the foundations to the revision of the European chemicals 
regulation, which began in the late 1990s and has not ended in 2004. 
The story that will be winded up below is about how environmental and health 
concerns developed and have influenced the modes of regulation, and especially what 
role the precautionary principle has played and may come to play in the continuing 
narrative of chemicals and chemicals regulation.  
The story will therefore touch upon the social construction of the testing regime that 
dominate the regulation of chemicals, and which today are being challenged explicitly 
by the precautionary principle. It will be clear, from the following pages, that the 
construction of the testing regime itself was influenced if not ‘kicked off’ by a radical 
critique that indeed was resting on arguments closely related to what today is being 
comprehended as the precautionary principle. 
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However, a detailed study of the construction of the testing regime will not be made in 
the present context, as this would grow beyond the scope and possibilities of this 
study. 
The development of the internationally harmonised approach to management of 
chemicals can be divided into a number of phases that actually matches the present 
structure of the general paradigm for chemicals management. The regulatory 
discussions of the 1970s related to mostly to hazard identification and hazard 
assessment. In the 1980s was these discussions extended with risk assessment, not 
least out of the demand for an economically balanced approach. During the 1990s was 
risk management added as the new mantra in the regulation of chemicals. All in all the 
development can be comprehended as going from the concrete effects of specific 
substances to the abstract regulation through management. 
In broad terms, the precautionary principle helped start the process in the early 1970s, 
but the need for a precautionary approach was not seen in the circles that developed 
the actual practises and tools. We can say that the demand for precaution was 
answered by an approach that was characterised by strong storyline which central 
message was that humanity now had the tools and capabilities to foresee and forestall 
adverse effects, and that this would lay open the possibility to continue to ‘reap the 
rewards’ from chemistry. Consider for examples the quote below that characterises the 
heyday of the first phase of development of the chemicals management framework: 
“Relatively few of the many thousands of chemicals on the commercial market today 
appear to pose serious problems to man’s health or environment. From those that do not 
we have reaped many rewards. The problem is that we do not know enough about which 
chemicals actually do create problems. For the fact remains that any chemical can pose 
hazardous consequences when misused or inappropriately handled, stored or disposed. 
Recognising this essential dilemma, industrialised countries began in the early 1970s to 
take steps to seek to resolve and try to anticipate the problems posed to man and the 
environment by chemicals. It was quickly realised that action by any one country alone 
was inefficient and often insufficient; effective management of chemicals is a challenge 
of global concern and demands a significant degree of international collaborative action. 
This international dimension to the control of chemicals can be characterised in terms of 
the enormity of the task of managing chemicals; the common challenge posed: the extent 
of world trade in chemicals; and the global character of some chemical hazards.”  
(Nichols & Crawford, 1983: 107) 
This certain rationality was used to encapsulate the problem. 
Around 1990 the second major phase began to take shape, and concurrently it became 
clear that the approach had some flaws. This development was probably related to the 
growing public attention to the general problem of chemicals. Until this point the 
public attention to chemicals (in Europe) had primarily been attached to high-risk-
sites; such as dumps, production-sites and major spills. I unwind some of the 
background of the European chemicals regulation as it was in the 1990, before I 
proceed with the 2000s revision of the regulation. We will ‘jump’ between several 
levels, namely Denmark, Europe, the OECD, and to a limited extent the UN, as I draw 
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up an account of the development of the European chemicals regulation with a 
somewhat selective Danish perspective.  
8.1 Changing perceptions of chemicals  
In the following two sections are the changing perceptions of chemicals lined up. We 
start with the early Danish regulation of chemicals and continue with more general 
reflections on the changes in the western worlds’ perceptions of chemicals after the 
end of WWII. 
8.1.1 The first regulations: Poisons and Pesticides. Ad hoc’ism 
This section gives an overview of the history of Danish chemicals regulation up to the 
beginning of modern environmentalism and environmental policymaking. A focal 
point of the description is the changing perceptions of chemicals and their adverse 
effects (toxicity etc.). The section aim at understanding the background and 
development of the principles the present regulation is based upon. The present 
regulation of dangerous substances is characterised by a long history of gemmating, 
which ultimately has led to a very complex set of rules. 
The first regulation of chemicals in Denmark dates back to the Danish Law of King 
Christian V, and was aimed at pharmaceuticals and poisons, their production, 
distribution and use. In a royal ordinance from 1687 is it stated that only chemist’s 
may produce and sell medicaments, and in 1779 was it added that dangerous 
preparations only could be sold to ‘non-suspicious’ persons. Furthermore were 
poisons to be kept separately, not to be mixed, and locked away. In 1796 was the 
regulation of chemists supplemented with a special ordinance on poisons. Eight 
specific poisons were only to be sold by royally privileged chemists; rat poison only to 
persons approved on a document with the priest’s signature, and other poisons could 
be sold to artisans and manufacturers. In 1843 was the regulation liberalised; the 
number of poisons regulated was reduced to seven, authorised materialists was 
allowed to sell poisons to artisans and manufacturers. At the same time was a national 
regulation of colour-additives to foodstuff introduced, as only colouring agent stated 
on a positive list could legally be used. (Pagh, 2002).  
In 1871 took the Health Commission (consultative body; in Danish: 
Sundhedskollegiet) initiative to have the regulation improved, but it should take quite 
some years before the regulation would be renewed again. Especially the widespread 
use of arsenic resulted in many accidents. It was normal practice, for example, to fight 
vermin and skin diseases on livestock by washing with an arsenic solution. The 
consumption of arsenic for this purpose was in 1875 round two and a half tonnes per 
year, and the Health Commission was concerned about the free accessibility to 
poisons. The strong resistance arose from representatives of the bourgeois in the 
parliament seeking to protect the rights of the individuals against state-guardianship 
(Engberg: 131-139). The arguments have a striking similarity with the contemporary 
watchword of the American National Rifle Association (NRA), ‘Guns don’t kill 
people, people kill people’. The preparatory Folketing Committee’s rejection of the 
proposal stated that “The proposal does not pay regard to the interests of the 
production, business life, and the population, and it does that without getting closer to 
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the purpose, namely preventing accidents and crime.” The preparatory Folketing 
Committee noted, to the proposed limitations to the use of arsenic for livestock 
washing with arsenic, that, “the essence of the problem is that the user must be a 
conscientious and watchful man who always takes the necessary precautions.” The 
dominant opinion saw not the accessibility of the chemicals – hence – not the 
producers, nor the distributors, but the individuals using the chemicals as the problem. 
An ideological barrage that protected the liberty of the subject, using the personal 
responsibility as the prime argument, blocked the preventive regulation. 
At last, in 1931, a general Law on Poisons that gathered the various rules on chemicals 
replaced the regulations from 1796 and 1843. The Law on Poisons was introduced 
with reference to the same problems as those the Health Commission had pointed to in 
the previous century: increased access led to an increased number of accidents where 
chemicals was involved, such as murder attempts, suicides, and accidents due to 
mistakes and confusion. The situation had been further aggravated, because of 
growing industrialism and the increased commercial use of chemicals.  
The law was targeted at chemicals that were poisonous or hazardous to health, and the 
chemicals were selected because of experiences with their deleterious effects. It was 
especially in the growing agricultural sector the new chemicals found use, where 
poisons were widely used to control vermin and weed on crops and livestock. 
The intention of the law was to extend the control with the uses of poisons and to 
prevent confusion, but beyond this, did the law build on the earlier regulations, i.e. 
stating that manufacturing of poisons requested permission, that labelling was 
requested, and that poisons was only to be sold by those approved by the law. (Pagh, 
2002: 76). Unlike the earlier regulations, the 1931-law contained a complete list of 
substances that was regarded as poisons or poison-like. The list comprised about 75 
substances and compounds plus preparations of these. Examples of substances are 
arsenic, mercury-compounds, prussic acid, potassium cyanide, chloroform, morphine, 
opium, and strychnine.   
In 1932, the Pesticide Law passed was by the Danish Parliament. Contrary to the 
Poison Law was the purpose of Pesticides law to gain control with the quality of the 
growing number of agents, of which many had shown useless or even harmful for the 
crops the farmer wanted to protect. The law was largely a result of pressure from 
manufacturing and agricultural interests that had opposed the Poison Law, which was 
seen as a confining and constraining regulation. The Pesticide Law, which was 
targeted at pesticides for crop-protection, was in 1948 extended to encompass all 
agents for controlling plant diseases, weeds, and certain vermin (excluding rats). 
Especially swindle with preparations proclaimed to contain DDT and 
Hexachlorocyclohexane appears to have caused problems (Pagh, 2002: 77). To gain 
control was anybody who produced, imported, or sold pesticides obliged to notify this 
to the police. In 1939 was the competence moved to the National Chemicals Control 
(in Danish: Kemikaliekontrollen) that had been established in 1932 to perform control 
with the marketing and storage of pesticides. The regulation gave authorisation to the 
approved products, but stated minimum requirements regarding labelling of active 
compounds and fillers. This regulation was however supplemented with a general 
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prohibition against products with additives that reduced the effect of the active 
compounds, or that made the product more poisonous or dangerous than stated on the 
products label. In 1948 was further a rule of state recognition of pesticides. The rule 
did not hinder the marketing of products not recognised, but was simply a state quality 
assurance of the efficacy of recognised pesticides.  
The sole focus on efficacy that had dominated the legislation up to and including the 
1948-Pesticide law was gradually modified in the following years. The Poison Law 
was not able to fully counter the risks the pesticides posed to humans and livestock, 
which ultimately led to a revision of the Pesticide Law in 1954. The revision did two 
things. It increased control by introducing an approval system masked as a notification 
system. Like that the law gave the Minister of Agriculture authority to specify 
additional regulations on manufacturing and labelling, and it gave the Minister 
authority to prohibit sale of pesticides, “beforehand clarity over the agents toxicity to 
man and creature is established” (translated after Pagh, 2002: 78). This authority was 
indeed used, as marketing of a pesticide was prohibited unless the Poison Board, 
which also was established with the law of 1954 (in Danish: Giftnævnet), had 
classified the pesticide in one of the four then existing hazard classifications.  
In the same move was pesticides totally exempted from the regulations of the Poison 
Law, as long as they complied with the regulations in the Pesticide Law with respect 
to the prevention of hazards, i.e. the labelling requirements. 
In 1961 was the two regulations revised mainly to align the words of the law with the 
practise of the authorities. However, to the pesticides regulation was added two new 
fields where the Minister gained authority. The first was the possibility for regulating 
transportation of pesticides, which reflected the growing production and consumption. 
The second was the possibility for prohibiting marketing of pesticides that posed a risk 
to human health and / or livestock, and to prohibit products containing pesticides that 
serve pointless purposes. The backdrop for the latter was pottery-swallows intended 
for decorative purposes, but covered with the poisonous pesticide Parathion, and 
window cleaner agents with DDT. 
In Denmark chemicals remained being regulated by the pesticide law and poison law 
until 1979 when the Danish Act on chemicals was passed. 
8.1.2 Changing perceptions of Chemicals; ‘toxicity’ and ‘hazard’ 
In the aftermath of the WWII were chemicals and especially industrial chemicals an 
unconditional good. This has changed:  
“There was no horizon. There were new polymers, which make up plastics and fibres, 
coming out every year. Then we had PVC. Then we had nylon, which came out just 
before the war. Then we had all sorts of polyesters ... You could go into a laboratory and 
they would tell you: “We are going to put out a new fibre every year, for – forever ...” 
If I went to a cocktail-party, when I was in pharmaceutical research, and people asked me 
what I do, and I said I was in pharmaceutical research. They would say: “Oh, that’s 
wonderful. You’re doing so much for us. You’re saving lives; you’re making our lives 
better. You’re extending lives. That was great. That’s changed. The reaction is very 
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different now: - “Oh, you are the person that help us to spread these horrible things and 
kill all these birds, does this and stops us doing that”. Very different reaction. Much more 
critical. People say: “Well look, how can we control this beast, that’s been forced on us. 
These people – these so-called scientists – have let the genie out of the bottle. And it is 
not a beneficial genie. It’s a disastrous genie. It’s a bit like Pandora’s Box, you know. 
Once you’ve opened it, you can’t control it. You can’t control what’s happening”.  
(Allan Hayes, Manager of one of Europe’s leading chemical industry-conglomerates, ICI, 
in the TV-broadcast “Den kemiske arv” (The chemical legacy), DR1. April 18th 200122) 
The processes that initiate changes in the perception of what 
toxic/dangerous/hazardous means will often start from crossings of knowledge and 
insights originating from very different domains; crossings that can be analysed as 
emerging storylines. It is experiences and awareness emerging from everyday life, 
professional context, and scientific discoveries. The environmental social movement 
has played a central role for the synthesis of different perspectives and emerging 
knowledge, and for an active public debate. It is therefore a complex combination of 
contextualised lay knowledge and scientific knowledge, social movements, etc., that 
prepare the ground for changes in the perception of what toxic/dangerous/hazardous 
means. It is crucial to stress that such changed perceptions not rest on scientific 
discovery. An example is the discussions over endocrine disrupting chemicals that 
have gained much attention worldwide since the middle of the 1990s (see e.g. Løkke, 
1998, Colborn, Myers, & Dumanoski, 1996, EC Commission, 2001a). Already in 
1950 it was demonstrated that DDT had a strong endocrine disrupting effect that 
dramatically influenced the development of both the primary and secondary sexual 
characters among cockerels (Burlington & Lindeman, 1950). Scientific discovery do 
not do it alone; changed perceptions of ‘toxicity’ and the safety of chemicals are 
intrinsically linked with changes in discourse. We can say that the possibility of 
perceptions of chemicals as more than good things represents specific parts of the 
developing environmental consciousness (Jamison et al., 1990, Hajer, 1995:8-41, 
Beck, 1986). 
An important step on the road from the changed perceptions to changed regulation is 
the adaptation of new perceptions in pro-active national states and especially in 
intergovernmental politicy-making on environmental issues, which often has no 
juridical binding character (see e.g. Haas, 1992 or Brickman, Jasanoff, & Ilgen, 1985). 
Such contemporary but not formally or legally functional conceptions of chemicals are 
exemplified below. 
                                                     
22 It was a recent publication by the very active Danish NGO The Ecological Council that gave 
me attention to this distinctive quote (Rank et al., 2003). That is hereby acknowledged. 
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Some contemporary definitions of how chemicals may be dangerous to health and the 
environment 
Hazardous substances. At the 4th International Conference on the Protection of the 
North Sea was hazardous substances defined as “substances, or groups of substances, 
that are toxic, persistent and liable to bioaccumulate. In this definition toxicity should be 
taken to include chronic effects such as carcinogenicity, mutagenicity and teratogenicity 
and adverse effects on the function of the endocrine system.” (Esbjerg Declaration, 1995: 
37, Italics added) 
Persistent organic Pollutants (POPs). At the Stockholm Conference under UNEP were 
the following definition of POPs made: 
“persistent organic pollutants possess toxic properties, resist degradation, bioaccumulate 
and are transported, through air, water and migratory species, across international 
boundaries and deposited far from their place of release, where they accumulate in 
terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems” (Stockholm Convention, 2001: 1) 
Heavy Metals are metals or metalloids that has a density higher that 4,5 g/cm3 , mainly 
lead, nickel, Cadmium, platinum, zinc, mercury and arsenic. 
 
We can make a crude sketch over the development of the changing perceptions of 
chemicals, and especially their toxicity. 
We have looked at the emerging regulation of chemicals in Denmark from before the 
Ages of Enlightenment and up to the final separation of the pesticides regulation from 
the regulation of poisons in the 1960s, and we have noticed that the regulations only 
was targeted at substances (uses) which obviously could have a damaging effect; 
poisons and pesticides. The perception of toxicity was especially based on the 
experiences with arsenic-based pesticides, which could lead to acute poisonings. We 
can call this perception for the classical poisoning. In this understanding, it is 
conceivable that DDT was perceived as a miracle cure that was awarded the Nobel 
price in 1947; DDT is not acute toxic but kills insects effectively (if they have not 
developed resistance towards the pesticide). This perception was dominated by a 
nature-society dualism, and a view of nature as resilient; chemicals were seen as man’s 
helper in controlling nature, and possible negative feedback-loops from nature was 
even considered. 
The next conceivable step in the development of perception of chemicals was still 
based on the perception of pesticides. The fears about pesticides gained a new twist in 
the 1960s. It was cancer that dominated the public debate, and the highly influential 
book by Rachel Carson, The Silent Spring (Carson, 1962) summarised a number of 
new trends in the perception of chemicals, and helped launch the modern 
environmental movement (Colburn: 167, Jamison & Eyerman, 1994: 99-100). In this 
perception was the fate of nature and humanity united; it was the effect of persistent 
synthetic pesticides and their durable and diffuse effects on both humans and wildlife 
that gained attention:  
“The new environmental health problems are multiple – created by radiation in all its 
forms, born of the never-ending stream of chemicals of which pesticides are a part, 
chemicals now pervading the world in which we live, acting upon us directly and 
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indirectly, separately and collectively. Their presence casts a shadow that is no less 
ominous because it is formless and obscure, no less frightening because it is simply 
impossible to predict the effects of lifetime exposure to chemical and physical agents that 
are not part of the biological experience of man.” (Carson, 1962: 168 quoted from 
Jamison & Eyerman, 1994: 97) 
Jamison and Eyerman have a very interesting point about Carson’s case-choice. In 
mid-1950s was the working title of the book was Man Against the Earth, and it was 
thought as critique against the contemporary technological optimism. It was not just a 
critique of the manmade pesticides but a critique of “the entire chemical and 
technological war against nature”. But she realised that it would be effective focus on 
one type of pollutant (Jamison & Eyerman, 1994: 99), which turned out to be true 
indeed. The Silent spring has been proclaimed to be an uniting work that has played a 
very important role for activation of critique against pesticides and especially DDT 
and for the shaping of the environmentalist side of the critical social movement (See 
e.g. Eyerman & Jamison, 1991: 102-103, Dunlap, 1981: 3, 7, and Graham, 1970). We 
can frame the new conceptualisation of the disadvantageous side of the pesticides as 
the insidious poisoning. In the words of two OECD experts on the management of 
chemicals have the “concepts of »poisonous« and »harmful« […], over time, been 
extended from acute and obvious effects to include also subacute and chronic effects” 
(Nichols & Crawford, 1983). 
The third major step in the development of the perception of chemicals had probably 
already been taken by Carson, but it did not gain broad reference before the 1990s. We 
may again point to a book balancing on the edges of science, journalism, and fiction, 
and which managed to pick up lurking criticism and make new combinations of 
existing knowledge. In 1996 was the book Out Stolen Future by Colborn, Myers, and 
Dumanoski published. The 1996 US Vice president Al Gore wrote in the foreword:  
“Our Stolen Future takes up where Carson left off and reviews a large and growing body 
of scientific evidence linking synthetic chemicals to aberrant sexual development and 
behavioural and reproductive problems.” (Al Gore in Colborn, Myers, & Dumanoski, 
1996: vi) 
Centrally in this new perception was that the categories of effects now was 
dramatically broadened – cancer had until that point taken centre stage – the 
toxicologists dose-response dictum was questioned, and industrial chemicals as such 
was included as possible suspects (see Løkke, 1998 for an elaborate discussion). We 
can call this third perception of the adverse effects of chemicals for the broad 
exposure.  
Elements of a ‘precautionary principle’ way of thinking were present already in Silent 
Spring. The critique made by Carson was based on a broad collection of evidence and 
knowledge. It anticipates a future which is seen as unwanted, and it visionary as is 
shows other possible directions and tracks that could render the extensive use of 
pesticides unnecessary; it call for precautionary actions both in terms of do’s and 
don’ts, which can be tracked all the way up to present regulations of pesticides and 
changing practises in agriculture in direction of organic principles. In this sense, the 
silent spring live up to contemporary definitions of the precautionary principle of the 
21st century (see e.g. EEA, 2001, and the discussion in chapter [above]). In broad 
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terms, Silent Spring related to the fear for cancer that had been present in the US 
society for decades. In 1958 succeeded the Senator James Delaney in introducing a 
landmark anticancer provision into the US Food and Drug Act, which has been 
denoted the first introduction of a precautionary principle into modern legislation 
(Bro-Rasmussen, 1999). The Delaney Clause, as it was called, required the Food and 
Drug Administration to ban any additive if experimental or epidemiological evidence 
had indicated it to be potential causes of cancer; it introduced a zero risk on potential 
carcinogens. This approach was in contrast to the remaining parts of the legislation on 
food additives, which was based on a relative safety concept and permitted the use of 
food additives as long as manufacturers could show the they were “reasonable certain 
not to harm human health (ibid, Brickman, Jasanoff, & Ilgen, 1985: 34). This is an 
excellent example on the co-existence of a precautionary approach and what later 
would develop to be the risk-assessment approach.  
It is important to stress that these changing perception of chemicals did not happen in 
a vacuum, but in a political culture where environmentalism and environmental issues 
gained increasing attention. The world was increasingly being constructed as the-one-
and-only world, and the ‘modern environmentalism’ differed from the earlier 
preservationist and conservationist movements in two important ways. It was driven 
by the idea of a global ecological crisis, which were nurtured by series of well-
published eco-disasters such as massive oil spillages, the mercury poisoning of 
Minamata Bay 1932-1968 (discovered in 1956), and the ecological devastation of 
Vietnam in the 1960s (Carter, 2001: 4, Jamison, 2000: 21). Secondly was the ‘modern 
environmentalism’ a part of the rapidly growing social movement protest that called 
for radical changes in the values and structures of society.  
The one-world view found expression in two influential lines of thinking articulated in 
the club of Rome’s Limits to Growth on the one hand and Blueprint for Survival and 
Small is Beautiful on the other (Meadows, 1973, Goldsmith et al., 1972, Schumacher, 
1973), lines which dominated the centre of the debate in early the 1970s and which 
therefore is important for the linking of discourse to regulation (Hajer 1995: 79). 
The two approaches agreed in the assessment of the threatening disaster and the need 
for action, but differed in the view on how to accomplish this. Limits to growth 
presented a top-down approach that, in the words of Hajer, ‘[…] sought to remedy the 
environmental predicament through a further integration of organized management. 
The environment was in danger of becoming a runaway issue, both socially and 
physically, but careful planning, drawing on scientific insights, could restore the 
equilibria. Limits to Growth was oriented towards the world leaders and national élites 
which it hoped to unite for a joint approach to the problem.’ (1995:84) 
The second line of thinking marked with Blueprint and Small is Beautiful, which was 
seen as a corrective to the technocratic worldview of the Limits to Growth, emphasised 
a fundamental critique of society. The mode of production, existing capital-labour 
relations was problematised together with the lack of morality in industrialised society 
(Hajer, 1995:84). Blueprint and Small is Beautiful became constitutive elements of a 
radical environmental discourse that rejected the technocratic response to 
environmental problems defined in naturalistic terms, because the environmental 
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problem was seen as primarily a social and political problem. Technocracy was seen 
as leading to exactly the opposite of what it was claimed to do: instead of being 
efficient and rational, it was short-sighted and careless (Hajer, 1995: 89).  
Hajer argues, however, that even though these two perspectives in many respects were 
very different – and even more outspoken supported different sets of actors – then did 
they have communalities in the characterisation of the problem as a matter of survival, 
and communalities in the focus on technological fixes and comprehensive planning 
techniques.  
8.2 The creation of a regulatory framework  
The framework for regulating chemicals took its starting-point in the second 
understanding of chemicals as problems that Carson had spurred in 1962. There was 
an urgent need to gain knowledge about the unintended side effects of pesticides in the 
environment, and this issue was first raised in the OECD in 1963. A joint US/Swedish 
proposal in 1966 led to a conference on “Research on the Unintended Occurrence of 
Pesticides in the Environment”. At this meeting was a co-operative study programme 
initiated, which should elucidate aspects of the problem where the OECD member 
states could benefit from research co-operation. This initiative became an 
environmental forerunner in the OECD and preceded the Environmental Committee 
that where established in 1970, the same year the final reporting from the study 
programme was to be delivered. (OECD, 1971b: 15, 99-104). 
It seems as if the discussions of regulating chemicals gained an autonomous internal 
expert driven momentum, which worked on the grounds of a technocratic approach 
out of reach of the active environmental movement. 
No major European environmental groups had the issue of toxic chemicals as prime 
focus. Instead emphasis was placed on natural habitats or on other technologies, 
notably nuclear power that came to dominate the environmental discourse from the 
mid 1970s, and which was important part of a fundamental critique of the 
industrialised society. The low level of attention that chemicals gained was probably 
also due to a general orientation among European environmentalists to focus on 
ecological deterioration rather than threats to public health (see Brickman, Jasanoff, & 
Ilgen, 1985: 253 and Hajer, 1995: 90).  It is therefore likely that the emerging 
regulations of chemicals in Europe were more open for technocratic approaches than 
were other parts of the emerging regulation of the environment.  
Concurrently was the development characterised by a very intensive and long-lasting 
work on developing concepts and procedures, with the 1982-OECD report that defined 
the words used in chemicals regulation as a brilliant example of the harmonisation of 
concepts (Chemicals Control Legislation: An International Glossary of Key Terms; 
OECD, 1982a). The intensive work on both defining glossaries and laboratory 
practises had probably the consequence that the general environmental critique was 
subjected to substantial translations and harmonisations in the development of coping-
strategies.  
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It is important to see the processes at both a national and an international level. A 
general picture of divergent strategies in a wide number of industrialised countries led 
to a situation where the trade with chemicals possibly could become seriously 
hindered.  
The case example to this was the emerging regulation of hazardous chemicals in 
relation to occupational health, which gained increased attention at the national level 
from the 1960s. In reaction to national initiatives was the first European regulation on 
chemicals made in 1967, “when it was recognised that provisions relating to the 
classification, packaging and labelling of substances on the market, in particular 
dangerous industrial chemicals, should be harmonised throughout the Community in 
order to eliminate the barriers to trade that national provisions in the Member States 
could represent.” (EC Commission, 1998: 1). Chemicals was a commodity before they 
were potential problems, and therefore was national regulations naturally followed by 
attempts to mitigate possible trade barriers posed by national regulations. And 
chemicals were indeed a commodity characterised by a high level of international 
trade.  
Therefore was logical when the OECD in 1970 established the Environment 
Committee, which was given three objectives:  
“To discuss common environmental problems, to examine possible solutions and to 
develop, where appropriate policies and guidelines for application in industrialised 
countries” (Nichols & Crawford, 1983: 45) 
One of the first acts convened by the Environment Committee was to prolong the 
cooperation on pesticide-research by establishing a group of national representatives 
to examine the possibilities for co-operation on pesticides. This group noted that any 
type of chemical potentially was hazardous, “and that all chemicals merit scrutiny 
before use for possible effects in the environment as well as directly on man.”  
Concerns were directed to the widely used chemicals PCB, mercury and cadmium, and 
a standing subgroup called The Sector Group on the Unintended Occurrence of 
Chemicals in the Environment were established by the Environment Committee (Ibid: 
45-46) with the following two main tasks: 
“- to encourage exchange of information between Member countries; and  
- to propose concerted approaches to problems which, in respect of use of chemicals 
»have international implications for environment, economy and trade«.”  (OECD, 1971a, 
quoted in Nichols & Crawford, 1983: 45) 
The establishment of the Environmental Group in fact changed the agenda of the 
Study Group on Unintended Occurrence of Pesticides, here in the words from the final 
report from the group in 1970: 
“The original mandate of the group, reproduced in Annex I, was specifically directed 
towards elucidating those aspects of the problem where the Member countries of the 
OECD could best benefit from co- operation in research. However, during the currency 
of the study and subsequent to the approval of the mandate, developments within the 
structure of the OECD led to the creation of an Environment Committee with a mandate 
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calling for examination of economic and trade implications of measures to improve the 
environment, as well as examination of the technical and research aspects. The final 
report of the group takes account of this change within the Organisation and the report 
now published advises on the type of investigations that could and should be made in the 
context of the enlarged mandate of the responsible committee.” (OECD, 1971b: 5) 
Trade became thereby a more explicit focal point for the OECD work on chemicals. 
The subgroup initiated major studies of PCB, mercury and cadmium, which led to a 
council decision to restrict the use of PCBs, and a recommendation to reduce all man-
made emissions of mercury to the environment, both in 1973 (see e.g. Some Recent 
OECD Initiatives in the Field of the Environment, 1973).  
The international breakthrough for the global perspective on environmental problems 
came with the “watershed” 1972 UN Stockholm Conference (Carter, 2001). But the 
OECD already prepared the initial steps and we find probably therefore the elements 
to a framework for regulating chemicals in the UN conference that corresponds 
closely to the initiatives already pursued in the OECD. The conference recommended 
international cooperation in the control with pollutants, contaminants and the most 
harmful man-made chemicals, and the similarities to the OECD work is striking (see 
e.g. UN, 1973: Recommendation 74). A number of issues that we find in the following 
year’s OECD negotiations and papers were mentioned in the recommendation, such as 
the international acceptability of procedures for testing pollutants, International 
division of labour, and development of international schedules of tests,  
A key issue that was brought forward was the need “to provide awareness and 
advance warning of deleterious effects to human health and well being from man-
made pollutants” (UN, 1973: Recommendation 74, italics added), and in this sense did 
the conference also refer back to a basic critique of chemicals.  
Also the recommendation 76 presented the idea of early prevention (which also was 
the title of the conference) as central, and it reveals the very strong focus at cancer:  
“That a major effort be undertaken to develop monitoring and both epidemiological and 
experimental research programmes providing data for early warning and prevention of 
the deleterious effects of the various environmental agents, acting singly or in 
collaboration, to which man is increasingly exposed, directly or indirectly, and for the 
assessment of their potential risks to human health, with particular regard to the risks of 
mutagenicity, teratogenicity and carcinogenicity. Such programmes should be guided and 
coordinated by the World Health Organization;” (UN, 1973: Recommendation 76(a), 
Italics added): 
Teratogenicity refers to defects in the developing foetus, which had been experienced 
at epidemiological levels with Thalidomide (a tranquiliser) in Europe in 1962, and 
with DES (a synthetic oestrogen) in the USA in 1971.  
The general control of chemicals entered during the early 1970s the regulatory agenda 
in a number of OECD countries (Switzerland in 1969, Japan and Sweden in 1973) and 
the OECD subgroup broadened concurrently is focus and changed name to The 
Chemicals Group. In fact the Swedish regulation not only focussed on chemical 
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substances but also on products, and the act was probably the first official references 
to the need for precautions in relation to chemicals: 
“Anyone handling or importing products hazardous to man or the environment shall take 
such steps and otherwise observe such precautions as are needed to prevent or minimize 
damage to man or the environment. Particularly anyone manufacturing or importing such 
a product must carefully investigate the composition of the product and its properties 
from the perspective of health and environmental protection. The product shall be clearly 
labelled with data of importance from the point of view of protecting health and the 
environment.” (Article 5 of the Act on Products Hazardous to man and the Environment, 
here quoted from Wahlström, 1999: 52). 
The focus of the OECD Chemicals Group was still at chemicals that unintentionally 
was dispersed in the environment, but the attention was now turned towards the 
assessment of the chemicals. In 1974 led the work of the Chemicals Group to an 
OECD Council Recommendation that the member countries should work towards 
more harmonized approaches with respect to the general control of chemicals, and 
especially pre-market scrutiny of the chemicals (Nichols & Crawford, 1983: 46-47).  
The emphasis on new chemicals was central. A prevailing perception of the existing 
chemicals was that the most problematic effects had been experienced. The world had 
been used as laboratory, as it was noted by the 1971 US President’s Council on 
Environmental Quality: 
“Our awareness of environmental threats, our ability to screen and test substances for 
adverse effects, and our ability to monitor and predict … are sufficiently developed that 
we need no longer be limited in a purely reactive posture with respect to toxic substances. 
We should no longer be limited to repairing the damage after it has been done, nor should 
we continue to allow the entire population or the entire environment to be used as a 
laboratory.” (Report of the Council on Environmental Quality on Toxic Substances, 
Washington DC 1971, here quoted from Nichols & Crawford, 1983: 13) 
The lesson learned was that the ‘early legislation’ in contrast to the ‘new generation of 
legislation’ only had focussed on foreseeable hazards presented by chemicals that 
were intended to have impact on biological systems such as pesticides, 
pharmaceuticals, food additives, and in some cases also cosmetics and cleaning and 
hygiene products. Detrimental effects from industrial chemicals were therefore 
unanticipated. But it was the prevalent perception that these chemicals more or less 
were single cases: 
“Of course, these chemicals are but a few of the many thousands which are in common 
use in modern industrialised societies today. Most substances pose no known risk to 
human health or the environment. But unanticipated problems of major proportions have 
risen with respect to the manufacture, use and disposal of some. This fact coupled with 
the sheer number of the chemicals entering the environment and their increasing diversity 
of use, has indicated a need for more systematic and general controls.” (Nichols & 
Crawford, 1983: 13) 
The quote does however also reveal a concern that had grown during the late 1970s 
and early 1980s as the number of serious accidents and surprising findings such as the 
widespread occurrences of PCBs, and the newly recognized ozone-depleting effect of 
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the CFCs. But despite this was the pre-market assessment seen as the prime challenge, 
as the following quote display nicely: 
“It must […] be recognised that decisions to control chemicals will necessarily, and 
generally, be made in the face of uncertainties. And this is, of course, especially true with 
respect to new chemicals. Until they are actually on the market in use, knowledge of their 
effects and, indeed, their pathways through the environment will simply be unknown. 
There are three fundamental reasons for this. One is the lack of empirical data. Another is 
found in the complexities inherent in interpretation. Finally, the timeframe for decision 
making is too short to allow research projects to be undertaken to fill gaps in available 
knowledge. (Nichols & Crawford, 1983: 96, italics added) 
An additional explanation to the strong focus at new chemicals may also be attributed 
to the chemical industries consistent resistance against testing of chemicals already at 
the market. It was industry’s opinion that testing of the old chemicals would absorb 
research energy, that it would cut into the profit margins, and that it therefore should 
be avoided (Brickman, Jasanoff, & Ilgen, 1985: 221). 
The assessment of substances at the pre-market stage therefore gained a top priority. 
The first step in the implementing the recommendation was to study the information 
needs and gaps with respect to pre-market scrutiny of chemicals, existing practises in 
pre-market and post-market controls, and the industry’s approach to safety testing.  
The first Guidelines for testing were recommended in 1977 after negotiations in the 
Chemicals Group and the Environment Committee, namely the “Guidelines for 
Procedures and Requirements for Anticipating Effects of Chemicals on Man and the 
Environment”. In OECD was the Guidelines perceived as a success as all OECD 
countries endorsed them. Same year was the OECD Chemicals Testing Programme 
launched, and five nations – West Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, US, and UK – 
volunteered to act as Lead Countries on the programmes on physical-chemical 
properties of chemical substances, degradation-accumulation of chemicals in the 
environment, ecotoxicology, long-term toxicology, and short-term toxicology 
(Nichols & Crawford, 1983: 48-49) 
In 1978 the OECD was recognised as authoritative in the standard setting for testing 
and mutual data accept. This happened at the Hasselby meeting in April where the 
Western world’s most highly industrialised nations and six international organisations 
met at Hasselby Castle in Stockholm to discuss international dimensions of the 
chemicals control issue at an informal level: 
“The meeting recognised the urgent need for improved national controls on toxic and 
hazardous chemicals. It called for harmonization of these efforts to utilise available 
resources effectively and to avoid economic dislocations. This meant the development of 
a framework which would allow governments to exchange essential data and other 
information necessary to evaluating hazards. To this end, the meeting identified the 
following priorities: 
• the development of consistent data requirements and testing methods; 
• the development of consistent standards for good laboratory practice and 
effective means of enforcing them; 
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• mechanisms to facilitate information exchange, both with respect to substance-
related data and to administrative actions; 
• the need to address problems of confidentiality of data, both to ensure 
international exchange of health and safety data and to provide adequate 
protection for legitimate trade secrets.  
[…] 
Recognising that work in some of these priority areas had already been initiated within 
the OECD forum, it was recommended that the Organisation’s Chemicals Programme 
should be expanded to take account of these issues. Continued support for ongoing 
activities of other international organisations was also emphasised, although the need to 
avoid duplication was stressed.” (Nichols & Crawford, 1983: 49-50) 
The core issue was to develop a system that could safeguard against chemical risk 
without hindering trade with chemicals. At the Hasselby meeting was it for example 
noted that: 
“In general it can be said that the chance to avoid the risks for barriers to trade in 
chemicals is directly proportional to the success in agreeing on specific and technical 
details, and the extent to which nations will be prepared to trust each other with respect to 
certifications of quality of products.” (Schmidt-Bleek & Bonberg, 1978: 17) 
In 1979 was a new Division created in the OECD to deal solely with the chemicals 
projects, and this is the point where the OECD was generally accepted as the 
authoritative source to a globally harmonised test-strategy. The OECD chemicals 
programme was created. 
8.3 Steps towards Risk Analysis & Risk Management 
The political attention to chemicals as a general regulatory problem had grown during 
the late 1970s. Elements of what later has been coined as the new politics of 
ecological modernisation (see e.g. Weale, 1992) had begun gaining momentum at the 
national level, and this resulted in a strong focus at anticipatory strategies at the 
Minister level in OECD. This was reflected at the 1979 OECD Environment Ministers 
Meeting: 
“The two central themes of the meeting concerned the State of the Environment and the 
need to develop Anticipatory Environmental Policies. The meeting reflected changing 
national environmental policies and, in particular, the pressure felt in OECD countries to 
reach a better harmony between issues of environmental and economic concern.”  
(Nichols & Crawford, 1983: 51) 
The OECD chemicals programme was in fact not on the agenda of this meeting, but it 
never the less received substantial attention at the meeting. The issue of chemicals 
regulation and hence the programme probably ‘fitted into’ the new turn of the 
environmental politics. As we already have seen was the idea of uniting the control of 
environmental hazard from chemicals with continued economic growth central for the 
work that was initiated by the OECD already from the beginning of the 1970s. This 
concurrent focus at chemicals as problems and as substantially important technology 
and commodity made the programme an excellent example on what later has been 
characterised as ecological modernisations. Nichols and Crawford explain that the 
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Chemicals Programme was discussed at the Environmental Ministers Meeting exactly 
because of this: 
“[The Chemicals Programme] received considerable favourable attention at the meeting. 
This is because its aims are anticipatory in the sense of health and environmental 
protection as well as in the sense of avoiding unnecessary impact on the international 
chemical industry.” (Nichols & Crawford, 1983: 51) 
In this sense it seems as if the regulation of chemicals has worked as an exemplar or a 
metaphor in the OECD for the new politics of pollution as Weale has called the 
development of the ecological modernisation. It is further interesting to note the dual 
meaning of the concept of anticipation that embraces both the idea of prevention and 
that of proportionality.  
Nichols & Crawford (Ibid) reported from the meeting that it was the Ministers 
perception that a successful regulation of chemicals would have to take the “entire 
life-cycle of a chemical – from inception to grave – […] into consideration”. This 
would involve procedures for managing chemicals that would exceed the mere hazard 
assessment, and some of those noted at the minister’s meeting was: 
“An estimation of the size of the population exposed, the mobility of chemicals in the 
environment, the genetic and other kinds of risks associated with chemicals, the costs and 
benefits of delaying use, and of available substitutes. A number of Ministers felt that 
international agreement on common methods of risk analysis is needed. They also noted 
that issues relating to import and export control need early review.” (Nichols & 
Crawford, 1983: 51-52) 
The shaping of the next level of the regime for managing chemicals – i.e. the level of 
risk assessment – had reached the minister level in the OECD.  
But this level would imply that the previous level was ready developed; the hazard 
assessment had to be standardised to serve as a fundament for the risk assessment 
procedures. Therefore, the “Hazard Assessment Project” was initiated by the 
Chemicals Group in December 1979. The project was co-ordinated by the Step 
Systems Group led by Sweden. The group had earlier developed the Minimum Pre-
marketing set of Data (MPD), and this work became the basis for the Hazard 
Assessment Project (OECD, 1984: 8-9).  
A slight confusion may be created here. In newer literature is hazard-assessment as 
concept winded up, and overtaken by the risk-assessment concept. This can e.g. be 
seen in the 1995 state-of-the-art work on risk assessment of chemicals (Van Leeuwen 
& Hermens, 1995) where hazard assessment is defined as the “comparison of the 
intrinsic ability to cause harm (see hazard) and expected environmental concentration, 
often a comparison of PEC [predicted environmental concentration] and PNEC 
[predicted no effect concentration]. Sometimes referred to as risk assessment.” (Van 
Leeuwen & Hermens, 1995: 348). However, hazard assessment is in the body of this 
work reduced to be hazard identification and a part step in the risk assessment / 
management process (Van Leeuwen & Hermens, 1995: 3).  
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By contrast was hazard assessment perceived in the original “Hazard Assessment 
Project” as a combined assessment of both chemical’s potential to harm biological 
systems, and it’s potential for exposure. Hence, the Project included guides for 
assessing both: 
• physical/chemical parameters and biodegradation 
• Toxicity and other biological effects 
• Intended Uses 
• Suggested Disposal Methods 
• Expected Mode of Transport 
Later would the latter three issues be included in the risk assessment phase. 
In 1980 the Chemicals Programme was formally reviewed at a High Level Meeting of 
the Chemicals Group of the Environment Committee (OECD, 1981). The meeting was 
considered a success, stressed by the good attendance and participation of Ministers 
and senior chemicals administrators from all of the member countries. The report from 
the meeting enhanced this impression with quotes from the Canadian Deputy 
Environment Minister and the US EPA Administrator: 
“The Chairman, Mr Seaborn, said afterwards that the Meeting represented »a major step 
in bringing our countries together in the control of chemicals«. One of the Vice-
Chairmen, Mr Costle, regarded it as »perhaps the most significant international meeting 
on chemicals« and that »it marked a major breakthrough in international co-operation in 
this field«. (OECD, 1981: 29) 
It is very characteristic that the issues discussed was perceived as mainly technical and 
administrative questions; namely the OECD Test Guidelines; an updating mechanism 
for the OECD Test Guidelines; the OECD Principles of Good Laboratory Practise; the 
OECD Minimum Pre- marketing Set of Data; and the (OECD, 1981: 31). The fifth 
issue – Mutual Acceptance of Data – has been considered to be the major achievement 
of the meeting (Nichols & Crawford, 1983: 52): 
Agreement on Mutual Acceptance of Data may, however, be considered the major     
achievement of the meeting. Acceptance of this principle ensures that data used in 
assessment of chemicals must be accepted as valid by all OECD countries provided 
certain procedures have been followed. These are use of the Test Guidelines and 
adherence to the OECD Principles of Good Laboratory Practice.  
With approval of this principle by the High Level Meeting, international harmonization 
moved from the realm of desirable policy goals, to reality. Formal adoption of the 
principle by the OECD Council Decision in 1981 established clearly the commitment of 
OECD countries to such harmonization (see Chapter 3).  
The provisionally agreement to confirm to these principles was approved in May 1981 
by OECD Council and thereby was the basis of a harmonisation regime for the 
regulation of chemicals a political reality. With this in place, the development of a 
management regime could take shape. The overall Programme for Chemicals was 
developed that year jointly by the OECD Management Group and Chemicals Group 
with the following major components:  
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i) The development of methods and guidelines for hazard assessment; 
ii) Analysis of approaches to step sequence schemes for testing chemicals; 
iii) The updating of the OECD Test Guidelines, their modification to take account of 
new scientific advances and the introduction of new Guidelines as necessary; 
iv) Analysis of the economic and trade dimensions of chemicals control including 
possible impacts on innovation and economic aspects of decision making; 
v) Priorities for assessment and control of existing chemicals; 
vi) Concerted action, where necessary, on specific chemicals; 
vii) Review of the principles underlying administrative and legislative approaches to 
chemicals controls; 
viii) The development of mechanisms to facilitate information exchange to meet the 
needs of regulators; and 
ix) Implementation of Council actions and High Level Meeting conclusions on 
chemicals control including the completion of expert work on confidentiality, the 
Glossary and GEP.11 
 
(Nichols & Crawford, 1983: 53) 
Nichols and Crawford summarized in 1983 the status of the management of chemicals 
as follows: 
“It is clear that the decision-making process on chemicals requires a great deal of 
flexibility in the selection, use and trade-offs between various factors. On the other hand, 
the interests of the chemical industry and the community at large dictate that approaches 
be developed which encourage the production of rational, consistent and credible results, 
which can be readily understood and relied upon in planning both domestically and 
internationally.” (Nichols & Crawford, 1983: 98) 
This is immensely central for the understanding of the dilemmas of the chemicals 
regulation. On the one hand was there very early established accept of the 
uncertainties inherent in assessing chemicals and therefore the need for flexibility and 
room for scientific creativity in the assessment of the specific chemical. This is clear 
in the guidelines for the Minimum Pre-marketing set of Data (MPD) that states:  
“PROVISIONS FOR FLEXIBLE APPLICATION OF THE 
OECD MINIMUM PRE-MARKETING SET OF DATA 
1. Those conducting the tests must have the option to omit or substitute tests so long as 
they can scientifically justify their course of action and demonstrate the equal or superior 
performance and predictive power of replacement tests (omissions/ substitutions).  
2. Those undertaking the assessments must have the option at any time to require 
information beyond the MPD in individual cases so long as they can justify their course 
of action (additions/substitutions).”  
(Nichols & Crawford, 1983: 59) 
On the other hand the industry and the regulators were interested in clear and 
unambiguous rules for testing and for interpreting the test results. The use of the 
words “rational, consistent and credible results” is remarkable, and it is stumbling 
close to attach the opposite to the ‘flexible approach’. 
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8.4 The “New Generation” of Chemicals Regulation in the 
Seventies and Eighties 
Concurrently with the built-up of the OECD basis for harmonisation was a regulatory 
frame established. A prevalent perception was that the ‘new generation legislation’ 
was in contrast to the ‘old generation legislation’, which had been focused at the more 
obvious suspects – chemicals that were biologically active or that was intended for 
intake. The new generation legislation was supposed to identify problems at the pre-
market stage, and to be applied in principle to all chemicals. The first-movers in 
establishing this type of regulations was examined by the OECD in 1975-76 (OECD, 
1976):  
• Canada (Environmental Contaminants Act of 1975),  
• France (Bill on the Control of Chemicals Dispersed in the Environment – 
Proposed in 1975, passed in 1977),  
• Japan (Chemical Substances Control Law – 1973),  
• Norway (Act Concerning The Control of Products Hazardous to Health and 
Environment – proposed in 1975, passed in 1976),  
• Sweden (Act on Products Hazardous to Man or the Environment – 1973),  
• Switzerland (Law on Trade in Toxic Substances of 21st March, 1969),  
• United Kingdom (Control of Pollution Act 1974 Section 100), and  
• United States of America (Toxic Substances Control Act – pending 1975, 
passed in 1976).  
The report reproduces the states’ reason for enacting the regulations, and these are 
well represented by the Japanese explanation: 
“The need for comprehensive measures to prevent environmental pollution by 
“persistent” chemicals (such as PCBs, DDT, etc.) was recognised following occurrence 
of several environmental crises related to chemicals, e.g. Minamata disease (caused by 
mercury) and the Kanemi rice bran oil incident (by PCBs). It was found that in such cases 
existing legislation was inadequate to effect control. For this reason, the Government 
proposed a bill to provide for prior examination and regulatory measures for all 
chemicals. The Chemical Substances Control Act was enacted in September 1973.” 
(OECD, 1976: 14) 
But beside this primarily reason for the establishment of legislation for the control 
with side effects of chemicals, started the trade and economic implications of the 
regulations getting explicit political importance for the national approaches to the 
regulation from the end of the 1970s. It was of course this prospect that had activated 
the OECD attention to the issue, which is clear from the number of OECD 
publications, dealing with these issues, and published in the 1970s and early 1980’s23.  
                                                     
23 See e.g. The Impact of Chemicals Control upon Trade, Innovation and the Small Firm 
(OECD, 1982b) Economic Aspects of International Chemicals Control (OECD, 1983), 
Proceedings from the international meeting on the control of toxic substances in 1978 
(Schmidt-Bleek & Bonberg, 1978).  
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The most important event that marked the transition to the new type of regulations, 
and the enhanced attention to the market and trade implications of the regulation was 
the enactment of the US Toxic Substances Control Act called TSCA. The TSCA did 
not address any specific substances but represented an influential attempt to define the 
universe of chemicals and thereby create the legislative framework that made it 
possible for the US EPA to track the numerous industrial chemicals produced or 
imported into the country. The EPA could now screen chemicals and require reporting 
or testing of those that possibly could pose an environmental or human-health hazard, 
and the EPA could ban the manufacture and import of those chemicals would be 
assessed to pose an unreasonable risk. The TSCA was basically a framework for pre-
market notifications to new chemicals. But to define what is new imply the definition 
of what is old, and therefore the TSCA included a Chemical Substance Inventory of 
chemical substances manufactured for commercial purposes, where “manufactured” 
included “imported” for purposes of the same requirement. The inventory of 
“existing” chemicals, that is chemical substances already in commerce, was build up 
during an initial reporting period, and any substance not on this Initial Inventory was 
covered by the for pre-market notification for new substances (see LIBRIZZI, 1977, 
USEPA, 2003). 
In Europe was the enactment of the TSCA seen as a provocative step; the TSCA was 
perceived by industrialists as a major threat to the continued access to the important 
American market, and officials was troubled by the US solitary approach to the 
regulation (Brickman, Jasanoff, & Ilgen, 1985: 276). Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen 
illustrate the frustration with the following quote from a UK spokesman: 
“I cannot understand the language of the Act. In its wording a chemical substance is not a 
chemical substance; the environment is not the environment …  “manufacture” means 
“import”; in short, everything means everything – including everything else. There also 
exists international machinery (notably in the OECD) – effective, intelligent, well-
serviced machinery-for discussing these subjects, exchanging information, and obtaining 
advice from individual governments. You have chosen to ignore that machinery. When 
you know what you want to do, and have something to say to us which we can 
understand, approach us through proper channels. . . . Until then do not expect the 
international community to compensate for the defects in your own approach to 
problems.” (Remarks of Alan Smith, Washington, D.C., March, 1977 reproduced after 
Brickman, Jasanoff, & Ilgen, 1985: 276-277) 
According to Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen (1985: 277) did officials and industrialists 
in Europe realise that the future negotiation strength for the setting of international 
standards covering the chemical market would require an internal European 
agreement. In this way became the TSCA the occasion that accelerated the 
development of the new chemicals legislation in Europe. West Germany and the 
United Kingdom had for some time been discussing their own programmes for 
chemicals screening, but for various reasons did they both see advantages in first 
reaching agreement at the EC level. Especially the West German Chemical Industry 
was characterised by a high level of export to EC countries (50%), which made it 
intrinsically important to have harmonised pre-market legislation. The only EC 
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member that proceeded with the enactment of chemical screening legislation was 
France. The proposal made in 1975 was passed in 1977, which should be seen as 
reflecting three circumstances; a prompt response to the TSCA; a growing 
environmental pressure from the mid-1970s; and a hope to increase the French 
leverage over the ongoing EC-negotiations (Brickman, Jasanoff, & Ilgen, 1985: 278).  
8.4.1  Establishment of the Current European System for Assessment of 
Chemcials 
The EC-Commission reacted promptly to the TSCA by issuing a proposal to establish 
a common framework for national notification schemes. The proposal consisted of 
frame regulation that should harmonise member state pre-market notification schemes. 
It would take three years before the discussion was tied up with the sixth amendment 
of the directive 67/548/EEC on classification and labelling of dangerous substances. 
Two issues dominated the discussions, where the positions of West Germany and the 
United Kingdom represented the two antagonistic extremes. The first issue regarded 
the extent of exemptions from testing requirements, and the second was the degree of 
flexibility allowed to national authorities in adapting the testing requirements to 
individual substances or classes of substances (Ibid).  
The British argued that all new chemicals manufactured or imported in volumes less 
than one tonnes should be exempted from full notification, and that national 
authorities should have substantial degrees of freedom to define testing requirements 
for specific substances (Ibid). The German position was opposite. At ministry level 
was it seen as important to secure that requirements imposed on German industry 
would be matched by requirements in other countries, and the German industry, “wary 
of overzealous bureaucrats and the volatility of domestic politics, wanted a full 
delineation of their obligations to be defined at the EC level” (Ibid: 279). Therefore 
was it possible for the Germans to have industrial accept to the “Stufenplan”, which 
was a plan based on a tired approach to the testing – much alike the step-sequence 
work that was initiated in the OECD in 1977 with Sweden as lead country (ibid, 
Nichols & Crawford, 1983: 49). The German officials advocated with this plan an 
approach with a 0.1 tonnes threshold for notification. The negotiations were stuck 
until both the TSCA and the French law was implemented in 1979. In May the 
Germans accepted the one tonnes threshold and in return did the British accept a 
modified form of the Stufenplan, though with considerable flexibility incorporated at 
all levels.  
The Sixth Amendment went further than the TSCA with respect to data requirements. 
Under the TSCA industry was not required to perform additional tests for the pre-
marketing notification (PMN), but just to submit all available data on the notified 
substance. Under the Sixth Amendment was the data requirement determined by the 
foreseen production volume of the substance as shown in Figure 8.1, so that the data 
requirements are reduced if production / import was below 0,1 tonnes and 1 tonnes, 
and increased if volume exceeds 100 tonnes and 1000 tonnes. This implies that the 
producer or importer of a new substance in contrast to the TSCA are required to 
produce eventual missing data. The Sixth Amendment was at that time perceived as 
“the EC’s crowning achievement in the area of chemical control.” (Brickman, 
Jasanoff, & Ilgen, 1985: 279).   
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Figure 8.1 The tired approach of the Sixth Amendment (EC Commission, 1979: 21-28). 
Substances has to be tested according to production / import volumes. The first category is 
volumes smaller than 100 kg and the last is volumes larger than 1,000 tonnes. After Vermeire 
& Van Der Zandt (1995: 294).  
The substances to be tested according to this scheme was all new chemicals, but the 
definition of these necessitated, just as under the TSCA, the identification of existing 
chemicals. September the 18th 1981 was set as the terminal date that divided all 
chemicals at the European market in ‘old chemicals’ and ‘new chemicals’. The 
substances eligible for the European Inventory of Existing Commercial Chemical 
Substances – the EINECS-list – was those marketed in the period from January 1st 
1971 to September the 18th 1981. The inclusion of a substance on this list had the 
consequence that the substance could and still can be marketed without any further 
notification, unless specific conditions or suspicion would give occasion for 
notification and eventual evaluation (EC Commission, 1979, GEISS et al., 1992, EC 
Commission, 1990). Therefore, there was a substantial economic incentive for the 
industry to have as many substances as possible notified as ‘existing substances’. It 
took several years to register which substances had been marketed up to the terminal 
day of the Sixth amendment, but well into the 1980’s the was 100.106 different 
substances registered. It has been suggested that the chemical industry, to save 
inconvenience and expenses due to registration, may have registered substances that 
was expected to be marketed (Bro-Rasmussen et al., 1996: 34). The list represented an 
immense effort, and it was not finalised before 1986; and the official publication came 
in 1990 e.g. the Danish version of the EINECS (EC Commission, 1990; GEISS et al., 
1992: 24-25). 
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The Sixth Amendment was followed by the Seventh Amendment in 1992 (Directive 
92/32/EEC) that outlined how the notification and risk assessment process should 
proceed for new substances, and in 1993 was the detailed principles for how to carry 
out the risk assessment adopted with Directive 93/67/EEC. This directive was and is 
supported by more detailed technical guidance documents (TGDs – see 
http://ecb.jrc.it/new-chemicals/) on environmental and consumer exposure assessment, 
occupational exposure assessment and testing strategies for the endpoints ecotoxicity, 
inhalation toxicity, genotoxicity, reproductive toxicity, carcinogenicity and sub-
chronic/chronic toxicity (Vermeire & Van Der Zandt, 1995: 295).  
8.4.2 Attitudes to existing chemicals 
But the existing substances, that was defined while defining the new chemicals, was 
not embraced by any systematic regulation before 1993, even though the work under 
the Hazardous Substances Directive from 1967 (67/548/EEC) did continue. 
Subsequent directives did prescribe similar requirements to specific groups of 
dangerous chemical preparations such as (after Smeets, 1981): 
- the "Solvents directive" (73/173/EEC, June 4 , 1973) concerned with 
dangerous preparations and certain substances solely intended for use as 
solvent  
- the " Paints directive " (77/728/EEC, November 7, 1977) concerning paints, 
varnishes, printing inks, adhesives, and similar products.  
- the " Pesticides directive " (78/631/EEC, June 26, 1978).  
It must have been obvious to all involved parties that alone the volume of the EINECS 
lists was a problem. At the general level noted the two OECD chemicals experts, 
Nichols and Crawford, in 1983 that the existing chemicals should be assessed, and that 
the small amount of available data was the central problem: 
“This is not to say that no data exist on these many chemicals. In developing its products, 
industry has generated a great deal of information. The problem is that it is not readily 
accessible to government. Some of the data are available in the literature, but have not 
been gathered and evaluated for government decision making purposes. Review of these 
chemicals is necessary because most were marketed before the state of the art in 
chemicals testing had advanced beyond approaches focussing on efficacy and immediate 
health effects testing.”( Nichols & Crawford, 1983: 99, italics added) 
The reason why the focus was mainly targeted at the new chemicals did the two 
experts explain with two reasons, which also has been reflected upon in the previous 
parts of this text: 
“In the OECD and other international forums work on the management of chemicals 
generally has focussed on new chemicals. There are two major reasons for this. First, it 
reflects national initiatives to tackle the general control of chemicals in stages. Secondly, 
a programme aimed at the management of new chemicals establishes preventive 
approaches to chemicals management. This reduces the number of chemicals on the 
market about which little is known with respect to environmental and long-range health 
effects.” (Nichols & Crawford, 1983: 99) 
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At the 1980 conference “CHEMISTRY - MAN - ENVIRONMENT : The price we 
pay for Progress: The hazards of the halogenated hydrocarbons” arranged by 74 
NGO’s had it mainly been representatives for OECD and the EEC that explicitly 
addressed the issue of the existing chemicals, here Crawford from the OECD 
(Crawford, 1981: 197):  
“As I noted earlier, there are today many chemicals on the market which have been 
subject to little analysis. We know that some of these could pose serious health and 
environmental problems; A major question facing chemical regulators is, simply, how do 
we select from these 70,000 chemicals those in need of further analysis. Thus, one future 
area of international work will be consideration of the criteria necessary to make such a 
selection. Once such selection is made, the work that has been accomplished with respect 
to new chemicals will be critical to the evaluation of existing chemicals. Of course the 
order of magnitude of the possible economic effect of regulation is greater for existing 
than new chemicals so current OECD work on trade-offs, risk assessment and decision-
making will be also very important in looking at this issue.”  
At that conference was the only explicit NGO-reference to the problem with existing 
substances not tested was made by Karim Ahmed & Jacob Scherr (Ibid: 156) from the 
Natural Resources Defense Council who coined the weaknesses of the concurrent 
European strategy with respect to the existing chemicals: 
“In the U.S., under the Toxic Substances Control Act, the federal Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) is authorized to require retrospective testing by manufacturers 
of compounds placed on a priority list by an Interagency Testing Committee. At present, 
there is no similar counterpart regulatory authority vested with any of the E.E.C. member 
states. This is indeed a glaring regulatory omission in European countries. One can only 
hope that future legislation will follow-the U.S. example in creating a program for testing 
of existing chemical substances.”  
However, at that time was the overarching focus aimed at the problems from 
hazardous wastes, and probably not without reason: 
“In the U.S. today, over 40 million tons of hazardous wastes are generated each year and 
the problem of safely disposing this waste material continues to elude any easy solution. 
There is, at present, an almost nightmarish concern about the potential contamination of 
groundwater supplies by existing hazardous waste sites.” (Ibid: 157) 
This overarching focus on hazardous wastes are also to be found e.g. in FoE’s 
comment to the Stockholm Conference (Friends of the Earth, 1972). 
To me this raises a number of questions. Why did it take so long time before the ‘old’ 
chemicals came under the spotlight? Was it because of specific political settings that 
did not facilitate a focus at the rather abstract issue of regulation of effects that we de 
facto do not know? I will in the following section – to get a little closer to this – 
elucidate the environmental and labour-related attention to the issue, and thereafter 
proceed to the developments that today has led to the EU Commission’s proposal for a 
new strategy for the regulation of chemicals. 
The regime for chemicals regulation developed in an environment of concerned 
experts and technocrats, who seems to have been quite isolated from a general public 
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debate and critic. When we interpret documents from the first phase of the creation of 
the regime we can find reference made to Rachel Carson’s Silent spring, to Meadows 
Limit’s to growth, and to Blueprint for Survival. An important example on this is the 
introducing chapter in the manifest book about chemicals management in the 1970s 
and 1980s “managing Chemicals in the 1980s” by Nichols and Crawford (1983: 11). 
However, there was no effective platform for continued public influence with respect 
to the development of the chemicals regulation-regime.  
Scholars discussing the social movements of the 1970s may give us various 
perspectives to explain this. I introduced this chapter with pointing to two possible 
explanations, i.e. that the movements were mostly concerned with ecological 
deterioration and with nuclear power (Brickman, Jasanoff, & Ilgen, 1985& Hajer, 
1995 op cit). One of the discussions that emerge from the literature is whether the 
movement was single issue oriented or focused at systems critique. I will propose that 
it was both. Hajer (1995) describes nuclear power as emblematic for the movements of 
the 1970s; “centralized, technologically complex and hazardous, an reinforcing all 
those trends in society which environmentalists most fear and dislike – the increasing 
dominance of experts, threatening the freedom of the individual, and reinforcing 
totalitarian tendencies” (Cotgrove 1980: 338, here quoted after Hajer, 1995: 91). On 
the other hand were a lot of the environmentalist activities targeted at concrete and 
visible problems. Chemicals were naturally central for the types of problems targeted 
but mainly so in shape of toxic waste problems and hazardous production-sites. The 
focus at concrete problems is not identical with a single issue focus, but case focuses 
have the tendency of singling out problems, even though there may be a general 
critical analysis behind, and this may be exaggerated through translations in the news 
coverage system and the political system. 
Furthermore was the type of chemicals regulation that was in the making in the 
international fora and especially in the OECD characterised a highly specialised 
approach that depended on centralised or a least harmonised employment of expert 
knowledge. The emerging chemicals regulation had therefore neither the systems 
critique that was inherent in the critique against the employment of nuclear power, nor 
had it the appeal of the disastrous effects of hazardous chemicals in uncontrolled 
waste-disposal and risky production-sites. The environmental movement constituted – 
most outspoken in continental Europe – an independent discourse coalition with 
alternative life styles and new organisations structures including alternative 
communicative practises such as mass demonstrations, and separate newspapers and 
radio stations (Hajer, 1995: 90). It is therefore comprehensible that the type of 
chemicals regulation discussed in the OECD had low relevance for the contemporary 
environmentalists of the 1970s – the regulation was simply perceived as not targeting 
the basic problems that were perceived as causing environmental degradation, but on 
the contrary as furthering international trade and covering up for its diverted problems. 
As Jamison et al notes did the environmentalism attack “what was seen as a global 
tendency towards formalised expertise and bureaucratic organisation in knowledge 
production”, and endorsed a radical democratic vision of a science for the people 
(Jamison et al., 1990: 186) 
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8.5 Critique of Chemicals 
So where did the critique of chemicals go after the Silent Spring? In the search for the 
answer will we in the following pay special attention to processes that took place at 
the Danish domestic scene in the 1970s.  
We start, however, at the international level: In the making of the Silent Spring had 
Carson departed from the profound and general critique of human use of synthetic 
chemicals and had instead targeted the use of pesticides. This should probably be seen 
as a strategic move, as pesticides were easier to convey as a public issue. But separate 
actor-groups reintroduced during the 1970s – at very different levels – the general 
critique of chemicals. The first group was central for the developments described in 
the previous sections. These actors were e.g. the experts dealing with international 
cooperation on establishing knowledge about adverse effects from pesticides. The 
preparatory OECD workgroup had been given the task to assess “the problem of 
persistent pesticides” but the group extended on own initiative the original mandate by 
also including certain other chemicals with similar behaviour in the work that was 
taken over by the environmental committee when it was formed in 1970 (OECD, 
1971b: 5). The singling out of pesticides from other types of chemicals was perceived 
as ‘artificial’. Hence, there was already from the beginning of the 1970s a movement 
among experts towards an integrative view on the problems related to chemicals. This 
type of what we can call ‘concerned experts’ seems to have played an important role 
for the creation of regimes for understanding and dealing with environmental 
problems, possibly as translators of concerns and critic formed and articulated by 
other actors and groupings.  It is important to see that these experts principally 
representing the national state in international for a was different from or at least only 
loosely connected to the critical wave within the scientific community that during  the 
1960s gave word to the new environmental consciousness, and which grew into 
general public debate in the late 1960s (Jamison et al., 1990: 9). 
The next two types of groupings was both movement-based, but approached the 
chemicals from different angles. The first of these was the radical environmental 
movement governed by a fundamental critique of the modern industrial society, and 
the technologies that it employs. The second grouping was concerned with care for 
occupational health. Common for both of these groupings was that they grew out of 
the anti-authoritarian student revolts of the 1960s. However, the crossovers between 
the two groupings were limited despite this communality.  
8.5.1 Movement based Critique 
The environmental movement had at the outset been concerned with synthetic 
chemicals as the prime technological artefact defining the environmentalist ‘other’, but 
nuclear power became increasingly the symbol of everything that was wrong with 
society (Jamison et al., 1990: 186; Hajer, 1995: 92). This transformation of the 
primary symbol for what was wrong with the industrialised society must be explained 
by a combination of a number of factors, of which those related to nuclear power has 
been discussed by a number of scholars (see e.g. Hajer, 1995; Flam, 1994; Rüdig, 
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1990)24. The more straightforward character of the nuclear power compared to 
chemical technology made it more useful as basis for critique. Nuclear power was one 
very specific and centralised type of energy supply, which furthermore was internally 
related to nuclear warfare, whereas chemical technology tended to be an extremely 
integrated type of technology associated to almost any part of society, which made it 
more difficult to ‘single out’ and isolate the broad phenomena for critic.  
This is probably why chemicals mainly received attention from the environmental 
movement as specific examples of the industrial societies malfunction (see e.g. 
Læssøe, 1987 and Jamison et al., 1990 for elaborate discussions of the new 
environmentalism in Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands). 
The second movement grouping focussed at the problems related to chemicals in the 
working environment. This second movement grouping was far the most important in 
shaping the critique of chemicals in Denmark, which also was stressed by the fact that 
NOAH, a Danish variation of Friends of the Earth, ended up supporting the working 
environment perspective. In relation to chemicals Changed NOAH by the end of the 
1970s from the traditional focus of the environmental criticism with distinctive outset 
in the limits to growth discussion and the systems ecology paradigm system that 
characterised environmental activities in general (see Jamison, 1993). Instead began 
NOAH in the late 1970s to discuss occupational health in a societal context, and did so 
in a way that supported the positions that during the 1970s was developed among 
employee’s organisations. This move was made out of the consideration that polluting 
substances at work did not differ from polluting substances in nature, and that it 
therefore would be important to bridge the conflicts that often had emerged between 
workers and environmentalists when NOAH had been campaigning against specific 
industrial sites (See Ansbæk, 1977; Ansbæk, 1979). NOAH approached the working 
environment question at a time when the chemicals critique was developed from being 
a radical outpost to become a position generally adopted by the labour-movement.  
8.5.2 Danish Critique of Chemicals in the Working Environment 
The 1970s critique of chemicals started in occupational context in Denmark as an 
offspring from the anti-authoritarian movements and the student protests of the late 
1960s in the cooperation between academics and workers beginning in the 1970s and 
in some parts of the Union (especially in the General Workers’ Union), and before 
chemicals became a central issue for the Danish labour movement in the late 1970s 
(see e.g. Gregersen, 2000). In a number of spectacular reports were concrete problems 
with chemicals in the working environment criticised. Important was the painter 
report, the linoleum report, and related struggles to remove organic solvents from the 
workers environment (see e.g. Glud, Jensen, & Nielsen, 1971; Petersen et al., 1972). 
An other important case was the building workers’ Unions boycott actions against 
epoxy products which ultimately resulted in the introduction of special regulations of 
these products in 1978 (see e.g. Nielsen & Poulsen, 1986 and Jørgensen, 1985).  
                                                     
24 It is important to stress that this shift predominantly occurred in Europe; the accident at the 
Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in Harrisburg, USA, 1979 led to a de facto moratorium 
on further construction of plants, which took the wind out of the sail of the radical movement 
in the USA. (see Hajer, 1995: 93, Rüdig, 1990: 3) 
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In the Linoleum-report from 1972 was the lagging control with new substances 
problematized:  
“Finally did The National Board of Health confirm: »there exist no arrangement ensuring 
control with all the substances that are used. If a new substance are introduced and used 
to a certain extent – either in the private households or at the workplaces – then will The 
Danish Working Environment Service or we [The National Board of Health] pay 
attention to the substance. But we have no active body in the sense that we demand that 
all companies must report what [substances] they use, or anything like that! « It is very 
scary that any company can use any chemical substance without any duty to report it and 
have the effects investigated. I ought to be so that all companies were required to declare 
which new substances they intended to use. The use should be prohibited if investigations 
show that the substance was injurious to health.” (Petersen et al., 1972: 41-42) 
The critic formulated i.e. in the painter report, and the linoleum report did indeed have 
a shaping effect on the developing approach to chemicals in the working life, and it 
was critique and arguments of a similar kind that ultimately would lead to the passage 
of the bill on the Danish Product Register in 1981 (Bekendtgørelse om registret for 
stoffer og materialer (Gældende) 1981/9/14) that redeemed parts of these demands, 
and which still is in force.  
However, in the early 1970s was the occupational health concern mainly targeted at 
the consequences of the ever more effective industry e.g. in shape of automation and 
increased speed in working, and with the development of the Health and Safety at 
Work Act, that was to regulate the problems; namely that the improved standard of 
living that had been experienced since the mid 1950s had only sparsely been 
accompanied by corresponding improvements in the conditions of the working 
environment (Arbejdsmiljøgruppen, 1973:133).  
The minister had in 1971 appointed a committee that should analyse issues related to 
the working environment and make recommendations for action. The committee 
consisted of prominent representatives from different research institutions and expert 
organisations, and it had a supporting committee with representatives from the 
relevant government offices and interest parties from the two sides of industry (the 
committee’s mandate in Arbejdsmiljøgruppen, 1973: 133, 136).  
Chemicals appear in the committee’s third report from 1975, where explicit reference 
was made to the radical reports, i.e. the painter report and the linoleum report made by 
academics and workers in the early 1970’s, as important documentation of the lagging 
control with chemicals in numerous businesses (Arbejdsmiljøgruppen, 1975: 34-35). 
However, the report did not advance critic of the bill to the Health and Safety at Work 
Act but reflected the act. The importance of the report in the present context is rather 
that it also reproduces both general and specific positions in relation to chemicals 
regulation in the early 1970s. The report reproduced some of the contemporary 
arguments pro and contra to a tightened regulation of chemicals, of which I have 
reproduced the following four because they relate to conception of incertitude and 
level of proof. 
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Contra regulation arguments Pro regulation arguments 
“It creates feeling of insecurity among the 
population to raise [attention to] a number of 
problems related to insidious dangers, such as 
carcinogenic substances and congenital 
malformations, when one cannot indicate how the 
problems are to be solved.” 
“Problems will certainly not be solved, if they are not 
raised. In a democratic society is it fundamental that 
the public attention is being drawn to the social 
problems now and in the future. Otherwise is it an 
illusion to believe that people sensible can take 
position on the problems.” 
“Our present life is based so substantially on 
substances and preparations that a considerable 
restriction will make it difficult to maintain our 
present Welfare State.” 
“Damage and harm stemming from the working 
environment burden the community household. 
Moreover, one should not let a minority pay with 
failing health for the majority’s welfare.” 
“We know too little to justify drastic intervention.” “We know a good deal and we will get far with that 
we do know, especially if add the knowledge of the 
single countries in international co-operation. 
Besides, it must be questioned whether ignorance 
should lead to that we must manufacture and take the 
risk, or if we should wait until we have knowledge 
that can provide safety [translated from word that 
also means certainty].” 
“Full safety [certainty] cannot be obtained.” “It is not a question of an either-or situation, but a 
question of how far one is willing to go. The higher 
requirements, the more is the research relating to 
safety furthered. Experience show that greater 
knowledge usually lead to increased safety 
requirements. Our ignorance has – so far – more often 
concealed unknown risks than unreasoned fear.” 
Table 8.2 Positions pro and contra to a tightening of chemicals regulation in Denmark in 
the early 1970s. 
From Arbejdsmiljøgruppen, 1975: 35-36. 
The committee’s position was that a tightening of the chemicals regulation was 
needed. The existing legislation was criticised as diffuse, that no authority had 
comprehensive view of the body of laws, and that the existing knowledge and research 
made a too weak basis for an adequate regulation (Arbejdsmiljøgruppen, 1975: 38). 
The committee recommended that a new committee should give a concrete 
recommendation for how society could improve the control the use of hazardous 
substances and preparations considering the working environment, the environment, 
and the public health in general. The new committee should consist of members from 
relevant government departments, administration, and institutions, from management 
and labour, and from other interest groups, implied consumer and environmental 
interests (Ibid: 39). The committee had a number of suggestions that a future 
committee should consider in the making of a comprehensive chemicals strategy. 
Central for these suggestions was inspiration from recent initiatives in Norway and 
Sweden to solve problems with chemicals in the in working environment. Two issues 
got special attention in the committee-report’s description of these initiatives: 1) the 
establishment of central registers over substances and preparations used in the working 
environment, which existed in Norway as a parliamentary motion in 1974) and 2) the 
establishment of supplier-responsibility with respect to knowledge of composition and 
possible hazards related to the product in Sweden in 1972.  
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The committee’s recommendation was that the control with chemicals in the working 
environment should be improved by in a number of areas including use of positive 
lists for substances in a gradually extended number of applications, by supplier 
responsibility for information about hazards related to products, and by safety 
procedures including information duty and use of least harmful substances. 
The supplier responsibility should be tightened: 
“Suppliers of substances and preparations must inform costumers and users about the 
product, e.g.: 
by declare the contents of the products, either directly on the packaging or – if the 
supplier want to keep the manufacture process secret - in return for a  fee to an 
information central office, 
by using easily understood and adequately informative labelling that guide how the 
product is handled”  
(Arbejdsmiljøgruppen, 1975: 154)  
The committee recommend further that hazards should be avoided by substituting 
hazardous substances with safe substances or at least less hazardous substances and 
suggested that this should be furthered with taxes on dangerous substances or on the 
use of these substances (Ibid: 53). As a rather radical suggestion did the committee 
suggest to extend the workers existing right to come out on strike in case of unsafe 
working conditions, to include situations with suspicion of hazard, especially when 
new substances was included. (Ibid: 54) 
Discussing the importance of setting up limit values and exposure norms, did the 
committee criticise that the existing practise in the western industrialised world by 
focussing on “visible or marked symptom of illness or nuisance [… and by …] 
stressing more or less isolated alterations in cells and organs” tendentiously were 
allowing too high limit values. The committee argued that the fixing of limit values 
basically was a political decision, because the decision often would have to be based 
on a number of assessments: 
“Limit values are therefore not demarcating sharp limits between harmful and harmless 
exposures. In principle should concentrations of harmful airborne substances be as low as 
possible, not least out of consideration for eventually unknown long-term effects.  
The working environment group [the committee] therefore find that, by using strict 
criterion for setting limit values, will it be possible to generally reduce the gradual run 
down caused by harmful airborne substances etc.” (Arbejdsmiljøgruppen, 1975: 45).  
The report recount a rather detailed and differentiated view on the problems of 
chemicals in the working environment and it documents the dissemination of the 
concern.  
The health and safety at work act was passed December 17th 1975 by the Danish 
Parliament, shortly after the publication of the committee’s report, and at that point 
did chemicals in the working life gain broader more attention. The Minister of Labour 
(Erling Dinesen, the Social Democratic Party) acknowledged, when the act was 
passed, that the act did not sufficiently take into account solutions of chemical 
  Regulating Chemicals      177 
occupational health problems (LO, 1980: 48). The Act was passed with votes from the 
Social Democrats, the Social Liberals, and Christian People's Party. Against was the 
Conservatives, the Liberals, the Progress Party, and the left-wing Socialists, accusing 
the act either for being interfering with the employers rights, or for being empty 
symbolic politics. The leader of the Socialist People's Party, Gert Petersen, explained 
the blank vote:  
“We regret very much that it was not possible for the majority to accept what is called 
positive-lists, i.e. pre.-market approval of dangerous substances and preparations. 
Accordingly, new substances and preparations may not be utilized before they are 
approved by the Danish Working Environment Service.” (Gert Petersen quoted in AAA, 
1985) 
The argumentation originally formed by radicals likes the AAA was partly adapted by 
the Danish Trades Union Congress and a number of union federations and trade 
unions during the last part of the 1970s. The increased attention to chemicals in the 
working life can be traced in the Danish Trades Union Congress’ report where 
chemicals in 1975 for the first time appear as an issue:  
“One of the most serious single occupational health problems is unreservedly the 
chemical working environment problems. In preparation for the establishment of an 
adequate regulation of these chemical problems, did LO [the Danish Trades Union 
Congress] set up an expert committee December 1975, which shall go through the 
chemical problems and advance proposals to the trade-union movement’s efforts in this 
area.” (LO, 1976: 39) 
The union required, during the years after the approval of the health and safety at 
work act, that all chemical substances in the working environment should be tested 
and approved within 15 years, and that no new substances should be approved after a 
five-year period.  
Summer 1975 the General Workers’ Union (SiD) in Denmark published a devastating 
criticism of the existing hygienic limit values. Life, Honour, and Welfare under "the 
Wings of Science", as the report was titled, forwarded the same point of view on limit 
values as did the committee, though in an aggravated tone: 
“One feels powerless in word and action when concluding on the present report’s facts 
that loud and clear tell that the intention with the American norms never has been to grant 
an effective protection against exposures during a whole working life.” (Demsitz, 1975: 
1) 
As in most parts of the western world were the Danish hygienic limit values based on 
American norms, but the value basis of the American norms were received with 
uneasiness by the General Workers' Union’s consultant. Especially was the author 
concerned with the use of the words believed, nearly, and small in the preamble to 
publication with the norms: 
“Threshold limit values refer to airborne concentrations of substances and represent 
conditions under which it is believed that nearly all workers may be repeatedly exposed 
day after day without adverse effect. Because of wide variation in individual 
susceptibility, however, a small percentage of workers may experience discomfort from 
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some substances at concentrations at or below the threshold limit, a smaller percentage 
may be affected more seriously by aggravation of a pre-existing condition or by 
development of an occupational illness” (TLVs® Threshold Limit Values for Chemical 
Substances in Workroom Air Adopted by ACGIH for 1974, quoted in Demsitz, 1975: 
exhibit no 2, italics added) 
The General Workers’ Union’s executive committee took the report very serious; the 
union had before attempted to persuade the Danish Working Environment Service and 
the Ministry of Labour to tighten the limit values, but without results. Now the union 
found that its case was reinforced and the executive committee made the following 
statement: “We have lost all confidence in the existing norms, and until long-term 
scientific experiments considering the individuals health and safety exists, then will 
we allow the worker the benefit of the doubt and use the lowest documented norms” 
(Quoted in Rabing, 1975a). The executive committee approached concurrently the 
LO, suggesting that the General Union should take initiative to recommend new 
tightened hygienic limit values, and the request was answered, as it was reflected in 
the Danish Trades Union Congress’ congress-report. The assembly was held in 
October and the expert committee was set up in December and should review existing 
relevant knowledge and on that basis produce a list that the Danish Trades Union 
Congress could recommend (Rabing, 1975a; Rabing, 1975b).   
However, it took several years before new limit values would be adapted, even though 
the expert committee was asked to deliver within a short term. In the meanwhile were 
a related and central discussion opened, namely the questions of pre-market 
notifications and pre-market approvals. While this question was settled in the EEC 
during the late 1970s in such a way that substances market before a certain date 
(September 18th 1981) was to be notificated before marketed, was a slightly more 
profound strategy was followed in Denmark, and in Sweden and Norway. The 
demands regarding pre-market approvals began to have broad support in 1977. The 
newly appointed minister of labour Sven Auken, who took over the position as after 
Erling Dinesen that year25, announced that new legislation on pre-market approvals 
should be made. The Danish authorities in the Ministry of Environment and the 
Labour Ministry was preparing a registration of chemicals, and there was agreement 
that this registration organizational should be located in the newly established 
National Institute of Occupational Health, and the Minister of labour found that if it 
was possible to use positive lists for the use of additives in foodstuff, then should it 
also be possible for the use of substances and preparations used out in the production 
(Sørensen, 1977a). Concurrently was the LO ready with the first comprehensive 
proposal as to how problems with chemicals at the workplace could be controlled, 
which included the work done on limit values. The Ministers initiative was welcomed, 
and the Unions position was at this point that prohibited dangerous substances easily 
could be substituted: 
“We must reject [the understanding] that strict measurements against the use of 
dangerous substances will lead to problems for industry and employment. With the highly 
                                                     
25 Dinesen had been in charge at that position for the social democrats from August 27th1963 
to September 8th 1977, interrupted in 1968 to 1971 and in 1973 to 1975 when a centre-right 
and then a Liberals government seized power. 
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developed technologies of  today will there easily be found at new and better substance to 
replace the one that was prohibited yesterday” (Bent Nielsen quoted in Sørensen, 1977b) 
The Danish Trades Union Congress articulated the demand for pre-market approvals 
the following year (1978). The direct occasion was the so-called “epoxy executive 
order”, which was the authorities’ attempt to prevent the escalation of a year-long 
conflict over the use of epoxy products in the building branch. Again the General 
Workers’ Union had been pushing for stricter control. Concurrently with the 
publication of the “Under the Wings of Science” report in 1975 had the building 
workers, organised in the same union, asked the LO secretary for working 
environment to do something about the epoxy-problem. The secretary had forwarded 
the problem to the Danish Working Environment Service but the requested working 
committee that should deal with the problem was not appointed until the autumn 1977 
(Monggaard, 1978). The working committee was set up as an ad hoc group under the 
subcommittee for chemical substances and preparations under the occupational health 
council that was a consequence of the enactment of the health and safety at work act 
July 1977. We can perceive this as a struggle with a chain of important groups pushing 
the ‘problem’ around as indicated in the figure below. 
 
the environment 
secretary and his 
consultants 
representing LO
the Danish Working 
Environment 
Service
the Labour Minister Svend 
Auken representing the Social 
Democratic government
Diffuse public education strategy regarding problems 
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controlling epoxy
the radical 
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action 
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Multi-
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chemical 
Industries
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building workers 
organised in SID
  
Figure 8.3 Chain of main actors in the epoxy case up to 1978. 
In 1975 the building workers in the General Workers’ Union began to fight epoxy as a 
problem. The pressure on the LO was made in alliance with the Action Group Workers 
Academics. LO pushed the Working Environment Service, who could not afford the needed 
man-hours, turned then to the Minister who pointed at a recently released number of position 
to the Working Environment Service. However, the Working environment Service did not 
initiate the work before 1977, summer 1978 published the mutagen group its spectacular 
results, and by the end of 1978 had Denmark one of the world’s strictest regulations of epoxy 
and polyurethane products – even so in the opinion of the radical Action Group (AAA, 1985: 
13). 
Summer 1978, when the draft to executive order on epoxy was finished and the 
environmental secretary announced the demand for pre-market approvals, was the 
pressure for progress dramatically increased. That summer a report was published by 
an independent research team called “the mutagen group” at the Danish University of 
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Pharmaceutical Sciences. The group had used the Ames’ test on epoxy components 
and showed that the components could be connected with a risk for cancer. The 
research results were published in an international scientific journal (Andersen et al., 
1978), but concurrently the results was presented at a conference June 3rd 1978 in 
Odense on the epoxy-issue held with participation from the building workers’ 
executive committees from Copenhagen, Århus, Odense and Aalborg. The conference 
became the start of a one and half year’s long conflict and campaigning for a total 
prohibition of epoxy products (Meyer, 1979; AAA, 1985). 
Seen from the Danish Trades Union Congress’ perspective would it have been good if 
the epoxy-case could have been closed with the executive order, as a grass-root driven 
conflict could reduce the Unions value as negotiator. The Union saw the epoxy-case as 
a front-runner for how chemicals at the workplace should be regulated, and did so in a 
pragmatic manner: 
“There is no reason to demand a total prohibition of epoxy products. It is possible to 
regulate the use with the new executive order, and basis to have the worst phased out. 
Next step must be pre-market approvals of all substances entering the working 
environment and minister of labour Svend Auken say that he, with basis in the health and 
safety at work act, will consider pre-market approvals.” (Bent Nielsen quoted in 
Monggaard, 1978) 
Bent Nielsen expressed the Danish Trades Union Congress’s discontent with the 
situation, after one year with the epoxy-conflict and brusque debate. The conflict 
hindered, from his point of view, broad progression in the chemicals control by 
contributing to a situation where “there is being made stopping with regard to new and 
effective executive orders that could secure workers against health risks” (Nielsen, 
1979).  
The demand that Danish Trades Union Congress had put forward in 1978 was that 
after a five years deadline should it be illegal to introduce new chemical substances in 
the working environment before they where examined short-term and long term 
effects. Furthermore, the same legislation should prescribe that substances used also 
had to be tested and approved for the specific uses. 
But the union started a retreat from the demand for general pre-market approvals not 
very long after. Shortly after the announcement of the demand was the question 
brought up for discussion at a round table discussion reported in the union’s magazine 
in 1979. The invited experts warned that the demand as to have all substances 
evaluated could be difficult to realise, and the forum pointed with approximate 
agreement at an alternative strategy that would not require all substances tested.  
A key issue for the discussion was the immense number of chemicals that had to be 
tested. The union’s demand would, according to one of the experts, literally taken 
imply that all the four million registered chemical substances and the 6000 weekly 
added substances should be tested. The union’s consultants objected that the marketed 
number of substances was considerably lower than the number registered in scientific 
literature, and implicitly, that the requirement as to have all substances tested therefore 
was more viable than the experts indicated. This was rejected with the argument that 
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all registered substances in principle were available for any manufacturer, instead, was 
the expert’s argument, should the strategy focus on local control rather than universal 
approval: 
“If concerned action is to be made against the harmful effects from this flood of 
substances, then must there be labour-control where the formulations are being made. 
This would give the labour-side control over what substances are being used.” (Uffe 
Sæbye in Engen & Monggaard, 1978) 
Like this did the experts oppose a strategy that would rely on systematic testing and 
approval or various restriction-levels of use-regulation of the single substances, and 
pointed instead at the problematique as a lever to obtain increased labour-control at 
the workplaces. This position was furthermore strengthened by experiences from the 
USA saying that the cost and time per substance would be 1 million dollars and two 
years. The idea was that increased labour control instead should further the 
development of safer chemical technology:  
“It is possible to make sound substitutions for hazardous substances. But the capitalistic 
mechanism demands the chemists to develop the most inexpensive substance with the 
broadest possible technological effect. No company in the world has brought in the heath-
concerns on equal terms. [But] this should be a requirement to the development of new 
substances.” (Uffe Sæbye in Engen & Monggaard, 1978) 
The experts point was that the large number of substances would be better controlled, 
or could possibly only be controlled, by giving more influence to the workers. At this 
point in time the Union still maintained the demands for approvals of all chemical 
substances in the working environment (see Nielsen, 1978), but they would soon 
soften the requirements.  
The Danish Trades Union Congress was placed in a dilemma between the radical 
proponents for a stringent pre-market approval strategy (positive list strategy) and job-
considerations.  The then secretary for environment and the environmental adviser of 
the Danish Trades Union Congress who dealt with these issues recall that the radical 
cooperative between workers and academics had criticisms against the union’s 
pragmatic position. From the union’s point of view were the radical proponents well-
provided but irresponsible extremists, and if their advice was followed, then would it 
block for any industrial production (Nielsen, 2004, Elikofer, 2004).  
The Danish Trades Union Congress was, on the other hand, met by cost-efficiency 
requirements from the national policy level, despite the prevalence of Social Democrat 
led governments in the 1970’s and early 1980’s. The a weak Social Democrat minority 
government had to make deals to keep control, and part of the centre and rightwing 
parties’ pressure on the Social Democrats was requirements for cost efficiency 
assessments of the measures made to protect the workers. The Danish parliament 
required in 1980 that the minister of labour should issue guidelines directions for the 
assessment of economic consequences of measures (LO, 1981: 63 and LO, 1982: 71).  
Bent Nielsen recall they ironically had noted that railing at scaffolding sites should be 
obligatory when workers could drop and become crippled, but not if the height of the 
platform was so high that the worker would die from falling and therefore would not 
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strain the public finances (see also Jørgensen, 1984). This situation may have had 
importance for the Danish Trades Union Congress’ strategy that aimed at the local and 
concrete problems such as those related to asbestos, epoxy and organic solvents, and 
with the struggle for achieving improvements not by use of personal protective 
equipment but by eliminating or enclosing the problem whether it being noise or 
chemicals.  
8.5.3 The Danish Product Register 
These discussions at the Danish national political level coincided with the unilateral 
initiatives in France, the non-EEC countries Sweden and Norway, and the 
development of the European chemicals regulation that gathered speed in 1977. The 
Danish as well as the Swedish and the Norwegian reflection of the international 
development did however get a slightly more radical character than seen elsewhere. 
What in the OECD and in the EEC debates took shape as pre-market notifications of 
‘new substances’, was in the Scandinavian context transformed to discussions of pre-
market approvals of both ‘new’ and ‘existing’ substances. The challenge for the 
Danish politicians was therefore to balance these two agendas, and to accomplish this 
was a dual strategy followed. The foreseen European requirements for a harmonised 
chemicals regulation was followed up in the development of the act on chemical 
substances and products, and the domestic requirements for a tightened control with 
both new and existing chemicals was pursued in an amendment to the health and 
safety at work act.  
The new Act on Chemicals in 1979 was a law reform that replaced separate legislative 
elements (mainly the poison law and the pesticide law) and incorporated the 
requirements of the EEC-Commission’s proposal for a sixth amendment, hereunder 
specifications of how new and existing substances should be perceived, and how new 
substances should be notified. In the motivation for the bill before the third reading in 
the parliament, the majority behind the bill stressed its interconnectedness with the bill 
on the amendment to the health and safety at work act, and the leftwing minority 
parties stressed that the law ignored the existing substances, and to the second reading 
had the Danish Communist Party severely criticised the bill for being a unimaginative 
reply to “the demands from LO, federations and unions for beforehand approvals of 
chemical substances” (Møller & Jensen, 1979). However, when the act was passed 
May 1979 LO found that the Act was an important step on the road to beforehand 
approvals because the act caused that no new substance could be used without first 
being notified to the authorities (Monggaard, 1979).  
The second legislative element that should meet the domestic demands for a tightened 
chemicals control was the amendment to the health and safety at work act. The 
amendment of the section 49a made it possible for the Danish authorities to require 
information about substances used at Danish work places, and with the intention that 
existing chemicals should be notified by stages. The minister acknowledged that the 
law did not introduce a general beforehand approval of existing substances, as had 
been required by parts of the labour movement and the opposition, but argued that the 
chosen strategy gave the authorities the possibility to prioritise the efforts (see 
Folketingets skatte- og afgiftsudvalg, 1979: 1357-58).   
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The register was enforced with an executive order October 1981 that detailed the 
purpose, procedures for registration, confidentiality, and circumstances for complaints 
(See Bekendtgørelse om registret for stoffer og materialer 1981/9/14; Honoré, 
1981;Flyvholm et al., 1992). Substances produced, used, or imported should be 
notified to the register with information about composition of the preparation which 
the substance form part of, known health issues etc. he criterion for notification was 
that a component of preparation was listed on the hazardous substances list. 
Furthermore was it intended that the register should enhance the substitution clause 
that had been introduces in the section 49c amendment to health and safety at work 
act. 
Sweden and Norway established concurrently with Denmark corresponding registers. 
Denmark had, with the register, succeeded making a compromise making it possible to 
register chemicals used in the working environment without coming in conflict with 
the EEC free market regulations. Those, who were calling for actual positive lists for 
all chemicals, criticised the register for being without any consequence for the reality 
at the work place, but the major actors interested in the working environment were 
satisfied. The normal view is that the achievements of the 1970s and 1980s in question 
of controlling problems with chemicals and noise; the improvement in the physical 
working environment were profound.  
8.5.4  1980s: Chemicals Becomes an Environmentalist’s Subject 
We will now leave the occupational health scene – or rather: the occupational health 
actors left the chemicals regulation-scene. This should not be understood as 
occupational health struggles with chemicals at the workplace had stopped – the 
contrary was the case. Rather, this should be understood as the general discussion 
about how the regulation of chemicals should be regulated was covered by the closure 
that had been reached with the act on chemicals and the amendment of the health and 
safety at work act, and the creation of the product register. The battles did indeed 
continue but they related from this point mostly to specific discussions of specific 
substances, and not to the more general discussion of how chemicals should be 
regulated. This tendency probably reinforced as the probably most important 
discussion that related to organic solvents was halted at the European level, and at the 
domestic level was transformed to a discussion about the consequences of Denmark’s 
affiliation to the EEC. At the general level had the major actors on the occupational 
health scene decided that the issue of chemicals had landed on a suitable place – other 
issues had apparently greater importance. The chemicals issue was furthermore landed 
at a technocratic dead-end that was not on top of the agenda among those progressive 
academics who was concerned with occupational health and who had helped fuel the 
critique against chemicals during the 1970s. The focus was now more targeted on how 
to enforce the workers control with his or her own situation that challenged the 
employer’s right to manage, and the economic recession resulted in a generally 
increased pressure on the achieved progresses in the working environment. The large 
number of known and un-known chemicals on the market did not disappear as issue, 
but new forms of critique of chemicals became more dominant.  
New issues relating to chemical production-sites began to surface in the news media 
during the 1980s. This was e.g. the Danish pesticide manufacturer Cheminova, and its 
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emissions and waste disposal (see TV-Aktuelt, 1981; TV-Aktuelt, 1981), a risky 
chlorine production site in the capital Copenhagen (see e.g. TV-Aktuelt, 1985), and 
the Prom’s chemical manufacturing industries (see e.g. Søndagsavisen, 1987). Also 
the Bhopal catastrophe played an important role in the shaping of the public media’s 
presentation of the chemicals problematique. Concurrently emerged a new type of 
environmentalism with the major aim to point out the lacking compliance with the 
Environmental Protection Act both among local authorities and industries, and to 
stress the shortcomings of the existing legislation (see Larsen & Christensen, 1985). 
These processes and events were of great importance for the increased public 
awareness of the issue of chemicals during the 1980s. 
The second important element relating to chemicals in Denmark in the 1980s was the 
introduction of tightened regulation of pesticides that also was described and 
discussed in the previous chapter. An interesting similarity between the regulation of 
occupational health regulation and the regulation of pesticides was the introduction of 
substitution clauses, which in the pesticide regulation came to have fairly profound 
impact on the number of permitted pesticides. 
The 1980s was also the period when farmers and agricultural consultants had observed 
possible adverse effects from the use of pesticides, and by that engendered the 
research that spurred the intense debates that was covered in the previous chapter. The 
straw shortener case can thereby be seen as one discreet emblem for both the generally 
raised awareness of the possibility of un-intended side effects from chemicals, and the 
specifically increased intensity in debates over the regulation of pesticides. 
The German Vorsorge Prinzipe started getting translated e.g. by the Bremen 
Declaration, where it became precautionary measures in shape of best available 
technology (BAT) to the reduction of airborne pollutions (Bremen Declaration, 1984: 
section D3), and as discussed in chapter 1.  
Finally, the 1980s was also the decade when the Brundtland report was produced. Our 
Common Future took part in a fundamental change of the environmental discourse 
that successfully raised the environment to become an issue (almost) in line with 
traditional high level policy-areas such as international security policy by linking it to 
economic concerns (see e.g. Hajer, 1995: 12, 100). Furthermore, this report produced 
the basis for the Earth Summit in 1992 that constituted a global consensus on a 
specific wording of the precautionary principle. 
However, In Denmark was the critique raised in the 1970s sustained by a number of 
actors, including parts of the union and some academics at universities and in the 
administration (see e.g. Jørgensen, 1985).  
The discussion on the existing chemicals surfaced again in the mid 1980s, when the 
European Commission put pressure on the Danish Government as to have the 
harmonisation of the sixth amendment pre-market notifications effectuated, meaning 
that substances notified in an other EEC member country immediately could be 
marketed in Denmark. This was in the contemporary debate interpreted as the then 
40.000 substances registered in the EU freely could be marketed in Denmark 
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(Sokkelund Radio, 1985, Frit slag for kemikalier, 1985, Nej til farlige kemikalier, 
1985). The Parliament’s Environment and Planning Committee asked the same year 
the Environmental Minister which of the many substances used by Danish industry 
was most ecologically and health-wise harmful? And the DEPA answered that it was 
only a few of the used substances for which there existed data on e.g. toxicity, but that 
they were working on the case (Dansk industri bruger 40-50.000 kemiske stoffer, 
1985).  
In the beginning of the 1980s the OECD set up two expert groups to develop 
suggestions as how to assist member countries in optimizing the rational and cost- 
effective selection of existing chemicals for health and environmental purposes. One 
of the proposed methodologies was the use of Structure-Activity Relationship (SAR) 
for the determination of whether a chemical could have (unwanted) biological effects. 
The reports came out in 1984, and this prompted the Danish authorities to initiate 
work with that methodology September 1985. The English summary from the report 
that came out in 1987 states:  
“We are all surrounded by a large number of chemical compounds. Some of these may 
affect human beings and other organism in a harmful way. The effects on the living 
organism are known for smal1 groups of chemicals but we know very little what 
biological effect the majority of the existing chemicals may have. QSAR (Quantitative 
structure-Activity Relationships) is one way of coping with missing biological activity 
data of chemicals. This approach is suggested as a tool in estimating unknown biological 
activities in the OECD- report "CHEMICALS ON WHICH DATA ARE CURRENTLY 
INADEQUATE: SELECTION CRITERIA FOR HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
PURPOSES:” 1984. As a consequence of this suggestion, the Danish QSAR-project was 
established in September 1985 to examine strengths and limitations in using QSAR in 
estimating biological activities and as a tool in the regulation of existing chemicals.” 
(DEPA, 1987: 163) 
The SAR/QSAR strategy would in the coming years become one of the authorities’ 
favourite strategies to cope with the missing data was to apply computer models to the 
prediction of effects. In the US was this type of computer-modelling applied since 
1981 as substitutes for much-more expensive laboratory-experiments to predict 
aquatic toxicity in the absence of test data (Cash & Nabholz, 2001). This was probably 
the first time this type modelling was used for that purpose, and the appliance was 
coterminous with the anti-environment Reagan administration’s ruling in the White 
House26, and this practice was continued in the testing of new chemicals since 1992 
(Goldman, 2002: 11028). In a joint EU/US EPA evaluation of the methodology was 
the European position that the tool was not enough developed and that it 
underestimated the severity of several elements (USEPA/EC, 1994: 53). Probably for 
these reasons has the use of SAR (Structure-Agency Relation) and QSAR models for 
regulatory purposes often been seen as symbolic, in the interest of a cost-cutting 
industry, and therefore as problematic in the regulation of chemicals. 
                                                     
26 See Dryzek (1997) for an elaborate description of the Reagan-administration’s anti-
environmentalism. 
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8.6 The first steps to a revision of the regulation 
In the following, we extend the focus to the European scene with a starting point in the 
Danish initiation of the discussion of the non-assessed chemicals. 
In the mid 1990s ascended the discussion about the large volume of existing and 
mostly non-regulated chemicals again. Both the product registers and the EINECS 
register increased the attention to the high number of substances not embraced by the 
sixth amendment and to the lack of data. Alone the number of substances on the lists 
had an argumentative quality that made it attractive in the media’s punch lines. We 
could trace this awareness already in the 1980s both in public discussion, and in the 
authorities’ dispositions especially with respect to the use of computer models in the 
prediction of adverse effects.  
The precautionary principle had been ‘opened’ as a policy concept in the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992 without any clear definition. This presented therefore an opportunity 
for pro-environmental member-states and environmental NGOs who had been  using 
the principle in relation to the chemical pollution of the North Sea for several years. 
The intensified debate took place concurrently with what I in the chapter-introduction 
called the third step in the development of the perception of chemicals (at page 128). 
This change was stabilised in the fourth North Sea Conference’s confirmation of the 
generations target of ceasing discharges, and losses of hazardous substances, the 
extended toxicity-concept and the confirmation of the precautionary principle as the 
overarching principle for achieving a sustainable, sound and healthy North Sea 
ecosystem (Esbjerg Declaration, 1995: 18). Jointly with the environmental NGOs took 
The Danish representatives and Environmental Minister Sven Auken active part in 
these extensions hereunder the acknowledgement of endocrine disruption as an 
adverse endpoint (see e.g. Løkke, 1998: 77-78).  
By the early 1990s was the present chemicals policy in Europe in place. It was 
probably the part of the environmental field that was most closely regulated at the EU 
level, and correspondingly one of the most harmonised legislative fields in the EU. 
Simplified, the following three components made out the core of the present closure 
on chemicals legislation, of which I introduced the first two in the beginning of this 
chapter (see Establishment of the Current European System for Assessment of 
Chemcials, p128):  
1. Classification and labelling of dangerous substances and preparations27,28.  
2. Evaluation and control of the risks of existing substances29. 
Restrictions on marketing and use30. 
                                                     
27 Directive 67/548/EEC on the approximation of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to the classification, packaging and labelling of dangerous substances. 
28 Directive 88/379/EEC on the approximation of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to the classification, packaging and labelling of dangerous preparations. 
29 Council Regulation (EEC) 793/93 on the Evaluation and Control of the Risks of Existing 
Substances. 
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The three cores covered problem-identification, problem-qualification, and problem-
management. The closures that this legislation institutionalises are based on following 
principles: 
The Single Market is a key objective, putting the Internal Market on the same footing 
as protection of human health and environment. 
Sharp distinction between ‘existing’ and ‘new’ substances. 
Strong demand for proofed causality between the single substance and the single 
adverse effect, through the performance of risk assessment with proof of harm of the 
single substance is a prerequisite for action 
As I have described above had the awareness of the systems weeknesses been latently 
present for quite some time but it had been limited to expert circles. In 1995 launched 
the Danish Board of Technology a project that should problematize and discuss the 
problem of non-assessed chemicals. The project was set up as an expert group 
consisting of experts from academia and state research institutes. The timing of that 
project seems to have been overwhelmingly perfect, as it is widely referred to as the 
first systematic public discussion of the problem of non-assessed chemicals in the EU, 
as the English title was. The Danish EPA was invited to take part in the project but 
declined, probably because they themselves were working on a coping-strategy.  
The expert groups mandate was described in the preface to the report:  
“About 15 years ago the American National Research Council reported, that no 
information was available about the possible toxicity of 80 % of the more than 50.000 
industrial chemicals in use in the USA. Simultaneously, from Europe it was informed that 
a vast majority of the more than 100.000 chemicals which by the European Commission 
had been registered as marketed within the EU, had never been subjected to 
investigations or evaluations for effects on health and environment, e.g. toxicity, 
carcinogenic properties, global and/or local effects on the environment etc. Any such 
investigation is technically, scientifically, temporally and economically demanding, and 
because of the size of the problem, societies were facing a large - almost insurmountable 
problem. 
In the spring of 1995, the Danish Board of Technology decided to initiate a review 
process dealing with the still unsolved problem of non-assessed, existing chemicals. An 
expert working group was established to perform a review which should describe/analyse 
the problem in order to 'promote the understanding and submit the problem to debate'. 
The Danish Board of Technology asked the question whether: 
'… the many non-assessed chemicals pose a risk of a ticking bomb, which constitutes 
a latent threat to the health of human beings and/or the environment ?' 
and the working group was requested 
                                                                                                                                            
30 Directive 76/769/EEC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions of the Member States relating to restrictions on the marketing and use of certain 
dangerous substances and preparations. 
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… to focus on the non-assessed, existing chemicals and to evaluate proposals for 
strategies towards more fast and earlier investigations of them. The consequences of 
such strategies should be part of the considerations of the working group, and possibly 
a plan of action or elements of such plan should be suggested for presentation and 
discussion in a public debate - primarily in a forum of political decision-makers and 
interested parties, but possibly also calling upon a broader interested and informed 
public. 
In its review work, the working group should deal not only with the possibility of 
achieving a highest possible reduction in the workload required for the assessment of 
chemicals. It should also consider possibilities for reduction of toxic or environmental 
risks that might result from the use of chemicals.” (Bro-Rasmussen et al., 1996: 5). 
The key recommendation of the report was that the risk assessment of the existing 
substances should be short-circuited: 
“the working group recommends that demands for chemical testing and assessments are 
made more stringent, in order that 
not only new, but also all existing chemicals are included in a notification and 
regulation system extending from the present practice, in which chemicals are 
classified individually for hazardous properties and characteristics independently 
and individually. 
But in so doing, it is accepted 
that decisions for aligning all chemicals into chemical groups, blocks or clusters are 
made by analogy or calculation from one chemical to another, from 
chemical/biochemical or structural relationships (cf. QSAR) etc., and 
that 'the most dangerous' chemical in each group shall be the determinant for 
classification of all group chemicals . 
Following a detailed outline of this principle, it can be expected that incentives will 
develop, and that data and documentation needed for regulation of all chemicals will be 
created considerably faster. This will occur 
because a vast number of individual chemicals guided by an established 
'precautionary principle', can be drawn into the regulation schemes merely on the 
basis of the outlined group or block relationships, but also 
because producers and importers undoubtedly will be increasingly motivated to 
create the necessary data and to develop the experimental and more profound 
documentation needed for their individual assessment and regulation demands.” 
(Bro-Rasmussen et al., 1996: 31-32) 
The expert group abstained from making the general group-classification more 
specific. In a following international conference with participation from experts, 
administrators, and politicians from Denmark, the EU, the OECD, and from NGOs 
and Industry was the report generally endorsed, but the specific hope for group 
classification and QSAR as a solution did only receive moderate support (Danish 
Board of Technology, 1997). 
The Danish EPA received with reservation and to some extent rejection the expert 
group’s recommendations in correspondence to the Danish Board of Technology. One 
of suggestions that were rejected a first, but never the less later adapted, were to label 
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substances according to the test and assessment status, e.g. “not completely tested and 
assessed” or “not tested and assessed” (Bro-Rasmussen et al., 1996: 34).  
There was nevertheless also interesting communalities between elements of the critical 
report and the EPA’s discussion paper that was published later that year 
(Miljøstyrelsen, 1996b), namely the focus on QSAR as a possible way forward, and on 
the precautionary principle. In the Danish EPA arose the idea that the QSAR 
methodology could be used in an opposite way compared to the rebuked US-practise; 
instead of using the methodology for the approval-procedure, it could be used for a 
bulk screening of non-assessed chemicals (Miljøstyrelsen, 1996a; Tyle, 2003). The 
first official Danish List of Undesirable Substances with environmental data generated 
with QSAR came in 1998 (DEPA, 1998a). 
8.6.1 The Critique and the Enlargement in 1995 
An important premise for the focused critique leading to the current EU revision of the 
chemical policy was the enlargement with Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995 (se 
e.g. Andersen & Liefferink, 1997). Together with Denmark and the Netherlands, these 
three countries in April 1998 tabled a note at an informal meeting among the EU 
environmental ministers, suggesting the development of an overall policy for 
chemicals in form of a framework directive, including short- and long-term goals.  
Table 8.1 The first steps towards a new EU chemical policy. 
Date of event Description 
March 1998 Informal discussion between Austria, the Netherlands, Finland, Denmark and Sweden 
on the European chemicals policy. (KEMI, 1998) 
April 1998 The informal meeting of environmental ministers in Chester (environmental council) 
acknowledges the March paper. The Commission undertakes to review the legislation 
on chemicals. (UK Presidency, 1998) 
September 1998 The European Environment Agency and UNEP publish a report, which draws 
attention to the problems with the current policy on chemicals. (EEA & UNEP, 1998) 
November 1998 The European Commission publishes a working document on the operation of four 
major legal instruments in the EU chemical policy. (EC Commission, 1998) 
February 1999 The European Commission holds a stakeholder Brainstorming workshop in Brussels, 
entitled "Industrial Chemicals: Burden of the past – challenge of the future". 
(Cartwright, 1999) 
June 1999 The Environment Council calls upon the Commission to submit a policy document 
outlining a new chemicals strategy takes a positive step towards a fundamental review 
of the EU chemicals. (EC Council, 1999) 
In the so-called “five-country-paper” played the precautionary principle an important 
but subordinate role in relation to the adjustment of risk assessment concept (KEMI, 
1998). The five-country-paper at first initiated the ongoing revision process within the 
EU framework, which is sketched in the table above. Shortly after the meeting, also 
Germany endorsed the document and the arguments.  
The paper revealed a language that was in the line with the discourse of ecological 
modernisation, stressing first-mover advantages, development of new markets and 
long-term improvements performance, all related to improved environmental and 
health standards through risk reduction.  
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The five-country-paper stressed four issues as being important for the future EU 
chemical policy (KEMI, 1998: 3-4): 
• Operative goals should be adapted. 
• The responsibility of different stakeholders should be clearly defined. 
• General guidelines on precaution and safe management of chemicals should 
be adopted. 
• The speed of marketing new products and procedures for risk assessment 
should be adapted to each other.  
Four issues was stressed in relation to responsibility, namely:  
• The industry, limiting the freedom to produce and use chemicals, by reversing 
the burden of proof that a substance are “harmless”, from the present status 
where the authorities must proof that a substance pose a risk, before invoking 
restrictions. 
• The industry, requiring the industry to be both responsible for assessment and 
risk reduction measures, and restrictive when using and placing products at 
the market. 
• The European Commission, calling for a clear distribution of responsibilities, 
so as to e.g. risk assessment gives rise to risk reduction measures. 
• The industry, calling for the consumers’ right to know with respect to possible 
impacts on human and environment. 
(KEMI, 1998: 3) 
Guidelines on Precaution and Safe Management 
The proposed guidelines corresponds to the BAT concept (best available technology), 
focusing at 1) using the least harmful chemical or technology in order to avoid and 
minimise emissions and exposure, 2) minimising use of chemicals, and 3) minimising 
risk when using a chemical (KEMI, 1998: 4). 
Adjusting Marketing and Risk Assessment 
The precautionary principle played explicitly a central role as a safeguard for man and 
nature against possible negative consequences of speeding up the assessment 
procedures. This meant mainly that substances should be restricted without performing 
a risk assessment if there was no clear need for the substance and there existed doubts 
about negative effects on humans and environment. Risk assessment should be applied 
in occasions with a clear need for the substance, and within the assessment, special 
attention should be given to vulnerable groups. Beyond speeding up the regulation by 
omitting risk assessments in cases with substances posing evident hazard, it is also 
proposed to perform ‘focused’ and thereby resource-saving risk assessments, when 
appropriate (KEMI, 1998: 4). 
The procedures for problem identification were further suggested to be simplified by 
procedurally issue ban against substances that are bio-accumulative and persistent or 
have irreversible toxic effects. Furthermore, it was suggested that industry must be 
requested to carry the burden of cost for the necessary assessment work. 
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Finally it is proposed that a “self financing mechanism should be introduced, obliging 
industry to carry the burden of cost for the necessary assessment work”. This refers to 
the discussion of ‘true’ costs of using chemicals (see e.g. EEA & UNEP, 1998: 25). 
In April 1998 the environmental ministers of the EU member countries met in Chester 
to discuss the Community’s approach to the safe management of chemicals. Here they 
welcomed the five-country-paper and declared agreement with the critique of the 
missing progress in the risk assessment programme, and the need for making the risk 
assessment more effective.  
However, the language of the conclusions from the meeting is significantly different 
from that in the five-country-paper. This mainly by the weight given to the importance 
of “guiding principles” of “the economic and social benefits that the use of chemicals 
brings to society and to the quality of life”, and of “maintaining an effective single 
market for chemicals” (UK Presidency, 1998: 1-2). 
Furthermore, the precautionary principle was drawn out as most important together 
with “a soundly based scientific assessment of the risks to health and the environment” 
and “an analysis of the socio-economic consequences of the decision” (UK 
Presidency, 1998: 2). Obviously, the two latter arguments are counterbalancing the 
precautionary principle in the sense of how strict the resulting chemical policy should 
be. In line with this, there was “differing views on the relative importance to be given 
to these three considerations” (UK Presidency, 1998: 2). 
At the meeting, the Commission agreed to undertake a review of the central directives 
and regulations, governing industrial chemicals, and to explore the weaknesses of the 
instruments (UK Presidency, 1998: 3). 
8.6.2 The joint EEA and UNEP Report on Chemicals in the Environment 
In September 1998, the European Environmental Agency and the United Nations 
Environmental Programme published a joint annual message with the title “Chemicals 
in the European Environment: Low Doses, High Stakes?” The report stressed the need 
for adopting the precautionary principle in chemicals regulation, and thereby the need 
for a substantial change in the approach to chemicals regulation. 
The precautionary principle – with reference to definition in the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development - was applied to chemicals as it was argued that the 
principle is emphasised by public authorities as “a prudent response to potential 
chemical hazards”. Two mutually related reasons, explaining this was put forward. 
The emphasis on the precautionary was firstly seen as a response to the present 
situation with very limited data on chemicals actually used, and with an increasing 
awareness of the scientific complexity and uncertainty associated with the assessment 
of chemicals’ impacts (EEA & UNEP, 1998: 19). 
The interpretation was that persistent and bio-accumulating substances should be 
regulated without waiting for evidence of toxicity: 
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Instead of assuming chemicals are “innocent until proven guilty” of damage via strong 
evidence of toxicity and actual harm, the new approach assumes hazardous potential from 
the chemical’s ability to persist and bio-accumulate in animals or the environment. (EEA 
& UNEP, 1998: 20)  
Further, it was emphasised in the report that this application of precaution had been 
advanced as a more equitable and cost-effective approach.  
8.6.3 The Commission Evaluation of the Regulation of Industrial Chemicals 
The evaluation from the European Commission was published in November the same 
year. The conclusions pointed in two directions. On the one hand, the conclusions can 
be interpreted as saying that the EU legislation on Chemicals is outdated, and on the 
other, that the problem is lacking implementation, due to low priority and resource 
shortage.  
The Commission’s evaluation differs significantly from the member state critique with 
respect to the perception of the precautionary principle. The precautionary principle is 
being pushed ‘downstream’ away from the science feeding the risk assessment, 
towards the outlet of the risk assessment, as the principle is assigned with the role of 
guiding the risk communication:  
“In general the findings […] recognise the role of sound science and highlight the need to 
meet more fully the concerns of the outside world by giving full consideration to the 
precautionary principle.” (EC Commission, 1998: 8) 
The precautionary principle seems to be represented in the report mainly as a 
legitimising concept, meeting the ‘the concerns of the outside world’. What the 
outside world might be is an open question, but the phrasing alienates the principle 
from the authors, i.e. the Commission. Further, the principle was guarded by the 
concept of ‘sound science’.  
Explaining the contemporary attention to the chemicals legislation, the report point at 
three issues:  
Currently there is wide spread public concern about the effects of chemicals on human 
health and the environment as well as the fear about new potential threats as in the case 
of endocrine disrupters. This concern is exacerbated by the co-called “burden of the 
past”. (EC Commission, 1998: 2, Italics added) 
The reluctance to accept the critique was also to be found in relation to the risk 
assessment of the existin chemicals (Regulation (EEC) 793/93):  
The basic principle of the Regulation is that controls on hazardous chemicals should be 
based on an assessment of the actual risk to human health and the environment, rather 
than the hazardous properties of the substance only. This approach, based on sound 
science, is strongly supported by Industry. (EC Commission, 1998: 6) 
The report gives the highest importance to the following four issues:  
“Hazard identification as the initial key step in protecting both human health and the 
environment from the potential harmful effects of industrial chemicals; 
The distinction between hazard identification, risk assessment and risk management; 
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The concept of the “burden of proof” in relation to the different instruments of hazard 
identification, risk assessment and risk management; 
Ascertaining the number of “existing” industrial chemicals which constitute the “burden 
of the past” and of drawing up a clear strategy for assessing these for their harmful effects 
in order to address the public concern.” (EC Commission, 1998: 8) 
Major findings was that the procedures (for classification, labelling, and publication) 
were too slow (1-2 years), lacking implementation, too complicated labelling systems, 
lacking compliance with requirements. Hereto came that the follow-up to dangerous 
substances was assessed as inadequate.  
The report consists of both the main report and four annexes discussing the four legal 
instruments in detail. The annexes are 20-40 pages whereas the main report is 14 
pages. In these technical annexes, the precautionary principle was only reflected in 
different contexts. The first is in the annex concerning the testing of the existing 
chemicals, where the principle was connected to the co-called ‘burden of the past’: 
“Given that all chemicals are potential dangerous, it was reasonable that precautions are 
taken to assess each chemicals to ensure that appropriate steps are taken to reduce the 
potential risks associated with their use to an acceptably low level” (EC Commission, 
1998: 91 (“Discussion”)) 
The second context was the so-called “limitations-directive”, which is concerned with 
restricting the marketing and use of dangerous substances and preparations listed in 
the annex to the directive. In the findings on the limitations directive, the authors refer 
the to Rio definition of the precautionary principle, stressing the dimension of cost-
effectiveness. The main hope is to avoid Member States requesting derogations under 
Article 100a section 4 to keep stricter national legislation31.  
This reference to the Rio Declaration is unlike the EEA/UNEP report that stresses both 
the position that all chemicals are possible dangerous and that a precautionary 
approach will be long-term economically favourable. 
At the following Environmental Minister Council meeting, December 1998, affirmed 
the council the need for a new chemicals policy that should reflect the precautionary 
principle and the principle of sustainability in order to warrant both a high level of 
protection for human health an environment in the rapidly developing marked for 
chemicals and a efficient working internal market. 
At a stakeholders workshop in Brussels 1999 presented the major European 
stakeholders and their positions in the chemicals discussion and towards the 
precautionary principle.  
There was a broad agreement that the precautionary principle – as a technical issue – 
should not be not a mantra, but had to be defined and applied in a practical way 
(Cartwright, 1999: 8), but it was disputed whether there was need for a fourth category 
for risk assessment: “limited data, limited concerns leading to temporary precautionary 
                                                     
31 Examples was PCP, cadmium, and creosote.  
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action”. Criteria would need to be established for this and the burden of proof could be 
reversed requiring further information before precautionary action ceased. (Ibid: 9) 
The industry approach was open for discussing problems with the progress in the risk 
assessment of chemicals but stressed that it was fundamental to preserve the risk 
approach (Ibid: 10).  
The NGOs had the opposite position: hazard should be used instead of risk, thereby 
could uncertainty be reduced, and the possibility to keep science free of manipulation 
would be improved. Furthermore was it the position the overall use of chemicals 
should be reduced. This should be obtained partly through a minimisation of the use of 
chemicals, partly by a stringent use of the substitution principle (Ibid: 11). 
8.6.4 The environment Council Take the First Step 
At the Environmental Ministers Council meeting June 1999 was the Commission 
given a clear mandate to develop a new strategy based “the precautionary principle, 
the goal of sustainable development and the environmental safety and the efficient 
functioning of the internal market” (EC Council, 1999: 19). The Commission was 
asked to: 
“to submit the policy document outlining a new chemicals strategy at the latest by the end 
of the year 2000” (EC Council, 1999: 21). 
8.7 Steps to REACH  
A number of important steps outlined below in Table 8.2 followed the first 
development, ultimately resulting in the Commissions proposal for a new chemicals 
strategy REACH that was presented November 2003.  
Following the Council decision to initiate the revision of the chemicals regulation 
began a unique NGO campaign with the aim to influence the development of the 
future European chemicals policy, uniting environmentalists and consumers’ 
organisations. In addition, the European chemical industrial association Cefic initiated 
an intensified effort centred on stakeholder events in 1999 and 2000. The detailed 
negotiations and strategies of the involved parties not studied in the present analysis, it 
is however evident that massive lobbyism has taken place. 
REACH stands for Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation of Chemicals and it is 
basically a compromise between the very strict testing requirements to ‘new’ 
substances and the weak requirements to the ‘old’ substances, and thereby a 
compromise between an increased protection of health and the environment and a 
facilitation a chemical innovations. The improved protection of health and the 
environment should be reached by a generally increased knowledge about the 
properties and uses of the existing chemicals, and by an increased speed of the risk 
assessment process and improved placing of responsibilities. The role of the 
precautionary principle has been centred on the questions of how the assessment of 
chemicals possibly can be speeded up. The weight given to the principle, and possible 
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also the interpretation, has changed during this process, which is evident when the 
Commissions 2001 white paper and the final 2003 proposal are compared.  
Date Event 
December 1999 Industry stakeholder event aiming at increasing the level of understanding between the 
various stakeholder groups (competent authorities from member states, MEPs, the EU 
Commission, NGOs, Trade Unions and downstream users). 
October 2000 NGO conference “Chemicals under the spotlight” aiming at influencing the new EU 
chemicals strategy. The conference was a part of a European NGO-campaign on 
chemicals policy (Dyekjaer & Boye, 2000) 
December 2000 2nd Industry stakeholder event 
March 2001 White paper on the Chemicals Policy released by DG environment and DG Enterprise. 
(EC Commission, 2001b).  
October 2001 - 
February 2002 
Technical working groups made up of stakeholder experts on particular topics covered 
by the White Paper, from authorities in the Member States, industrial associations and 
NGOs.  
September 2002 2nd NGO conference “European chemicals policy reform – from paralysis to action” 
May 2003 Commission Proposal: REACH. The draft is a compromise between DG environment 
and DG Enterprise. 
October 2003 Final Proposal to REACH is published. 
November 2003 The Proposal is passed on to the Commission and the European Parliament 
Table 8.2 The latest steps to REACH 
 
The precautionary principle was detailed in the white paper as having implications 
both in the assessment process to prevent damage to human health and the 
environment and for a systematic substitution strategy of dangerous by less dangerous 
substances. With respect to the risk assessment process was the principle given a 
special role in case the process was unduly delayed and where there was an indication 
of unacceptable risk: “In particular, should a producer of a given substance delay the 
filing of information or test results, the central entity would be entitled to conclude the 
assessment” (EC Commission, 2001: 5, 20).  
The Commissions final proposal has played down the importance of the precautionary 
principle. Instead of giving the principle specific interpretations in relation to the 
regulation of chemicals was the principle only referred to in broad terms as a 
corrective measure to the overall purpose of an effective functioning of the common 
market for chemical substances, with reference to the rather ambiguous 
Communication on the Precautionary Principle (EC Commission, 2003: 19; EC 
Commission, 2000). The immediate and linguistic weakening of the precautionary 
principle does also show in the text of the final proposal. In earlier drafts was 
producers and importers required to secure that substances, that may adversely affect 
human health or the environment, would not emitted from the product. This was a 
provision that included the knowledge that some substances, e.g. phthalates and 
certain brominated flame-retardants, may be emitted even though the leak is not a 
functional part of the product concept. This requirement was reduced in the final 
proposal to only encompass substances that intentionally are released from consumer 
products (EC Commission, 2003: 20, 58, 73).  
An important REACH mechanism that shall speed up the assessment process is the 
pointers to chemicals of ‘very high concern’. The concept is that alone some specific 
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inherent characteristics of a substance will lead to a requirement for authorisation. The 
authorisation procedure will be applied to substances that can be classified as 
carcinogenic, mutagenic or toxic to reproduction (CMR) in one of the two strictest 
categories, to substances that are persistent, bioaccummulating, and toxic (PBT), to 
substances that are very persistent and very bioaccummulating (vPvB), and substances 
of equal concern such as endocrine disrupting substances (EC Commission, 2003: 16, 
32). Compared to the classification and labelling directive (Council Directive 
67/548/EEC) are the PBT and the vPvB criteria new in the REACH proposal and these 
do reflect the precautionary principle by taking into account properties that has 
implications for future and possible effects rather than focussing on the substance’s 
adverse effect that presently are known. Furthermore, the category ‘substances of 
equal concern’ opens up for the possibility of adding effect categories, and may 
thereby assist that the framework will not be locked by restraints in the present 
knowledge. Endocrine disrupting chemicals can be seen as a test for the flexibility of 
the authorisation approach, and environmental NGO’s has already questioned whether 
endocrine disruption will be included beyond the integration into tests for reproductive 
toxicity. The development of tests for identification of such substances is ongoing and 
it is foreseeable that internationally accepted tests will be adapted, but will this result 
in an extra authorisation category that will lead to actual assessment of these effects in 
the authorisation procedures?  
The REACH data requirements has been compared to the classification and labelling 
criteria by a Swedish research team (Hansson & Rudén, 2004: 25-33), and it is 
revealed that the data required for substances produced in volumes less than 10 tonnes 
will not be sufficient for any classification or authorisation. Only for substances 
produced in volumes exceeding 100 tonnes will enough data be available to 
potentially trigger the REACH authorisation process (ibid: 32). The consequence is 
that quite a high number of substances and products potentially still will be left 
without classification and labelling, either because the substance has been assessed as 
harmless or due to lack of data. Whether the small production volume substances will 
remain invisible for the new regulatory approach is a central question that remains 
standing.  
8.8 Discussion  
The first wave of chemicals regulation was encouraged by precaution-based public 
concern for the adverse effects of chemicals. In this first wave was a strong, 
thoroughgoing belief human’s ability to cope with these adverse effects on a 
traditionalist scientific basis where scientific based data are collected until evidence 
can be established and consequential policies can be made. This belief is traced back 
to the early discussion of chemicals regulation in the 1970s, and it is evident in the 
establishment of the European strategy for the risk assessment of existing chemicals in 
1992.  
The use of the concept ‘precaution’ is therefore not enough in itself; the concept has to 
be followed by recognition of both the capabilities and the limitations of scientific 
method and practises that reflects this recognition. In fact we may even extent the 
concept of science to embrace the precautionary principle as suggested by Stirling 
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(2001: 64-68 ) who differ between narrow and broad science regimes. What would 
this imply for the regulation of chemicals? One lesson that should be learned is that 
chemicals are far too important to be left with the experts, and therefore will it be of 
great importance to leave the new regulatory system open for uncertainty. Naturally, 
there are multitudes of possibilities to do this, but I will point to two core issues 
relating to transparency and simplicity. One of the criticisms against the ‘old’ 
regulatory system referred above was that the consumer had no possibility to see if a 
substance was without label because the substance was harmless or because the 
substance was non-assessed, and it was suggested that these substances should be 
question-marked, which also has been suggested recently (Bro-Rasmussen et al., 1996, 
Hansson & Rudén, 2004). A second possibility, which Hansson and Rudén also has 
suggested, is to extent two new ecological concepts – persistency and bioaccumulation 
– to a new tired approach that breaks with the volume-based approach that 
characterises both the old system and the new REACH proposal. These two 
parameters are relatively simple to assess and they give essential information about the 
substances environmental-chemical characteristics, and may thereby give an 
alternative key to a prioritised tiered approach. 
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9 Conclusions 
Even though the precautionary principle only was spelled out as a principle during 
1970 to 1992, budding from the German Vorsorgeprinzip, to the Rio Conference’s 
Principle 15 on Precautionary Action, has the principle in a tacit form and embedded 
in practise existed in a much-longer period. This has been examined in the context of 
chemicals, where the of use of chemicals in industrial society has been under critique 
at least since Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring. It was precautionary principle like 
arguments that kicked-off the chemicals regulation as we know it today. There was a 
great belief in humanity’s ability to control the adverse effects of chemicals. And 
indeed, the ability was great but the latest developments show that it was not great 
enough. One basic dimension of this is the ‘irrational’ element of the critique; the 
argument that chemicals should be used with caution already at the outset.  
The creation of the regulatory framework that took place internationally since the 
early 1970’s and in Europe up to the end of the 20th century can be perceived as 
triggered by a first wave of precaution carried by the social critique of the 1960s and 
70s. The new reform of the European chemicals policy, REACH, can be perceived as 
a second wave of chemicals regulation reform triggered by critique that invokes the 
precautionary principle. What is new in this view? What can we learn from that 
contemplation? In the first wave was the reaction of a reductionist type and 
tendentiously in accordance with the industrial society’s logic where risks are 
controlled without basic changes in industrial practise. It is the task in the second 
wave – which we are in the middle of right now – is to participate in the struggle for 
transforming the industrial societies’ logic. There are strong tendencies that the new 
policy may fall in pit-falls similar to those that characterised the first wave of 
regulatory frameworks for chemicals control. 
In Denmark the development of precautionary-like discussions and measures has 
started in the field of occupational health, then moved to the field of pesticides, and 
seemingly it is the field of industrial chemicals that is next. Along this development 
has the perception of chemicals as possible harm-doers become more detailed and 
sensitive. 
The Danish straw-shortener-case indicates important features about the precautionary 
principle in action. The very basis of the case was the existence of competing 
scientific approaches as to how chemicals (in this case pesticides) should be tested; 
and this indicates that diversity in approaches and early involvement of different 
stakeholder interests and consequently different test-designs combined with openness 
can play an important role for the development of policies informed by a 
precautionary principle.  
The European Commissions communication on the precautionary principle maintain 
that it is imperative to reserve the precautionary principle to the risk management 
phase. The examined cases cause reason to question this, and to propose an ad hoc 
approach that partly or temporarily can bypass the full risk assessment. In this sense, it 
is proposed to base an ad hoc risk management on intrinsic properties or what has 
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been termed hazard assessment, partly to overcome the large ‘burden of the past’ 
partly to motivate economic stakeholders to produce improved data. 
In the analysis, it has been showed that international harmonisation plays an all central 
role for the regulation of chemicals and it is showed that these regimes potentially can 
hinder alternative approaches to the assessment of (chemicals) technologies. 
International regimes are unavoidable but a reform that would render the regimes more 
open to alternative assessments – or rather – regimes that less readily can be used by 
industrialist to rule out inconvenient results is needed. This alternative understanding 
of harmonisation should acknowledge the existence of uncertainties and competing 
views of existing knowledge, and thereby enhance the ability to reframe problems and 
enhance the possibilities of open deliberation of the technological risks of chemicals. 
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